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Summary
This thesis is motivated by an unfortunate state of affairs: impairment of working memory
and attention is a frequent sequelae of acquired brain injury experienced by millions of
people all over the world. However, there are currently no cost-effective treatments for such
impairments. The present work is an empirical exploration of two candidate treatments to
ameliorate this problem.
Computer-based cognitive rehabilitation is one such candidate treatment although results
are  mixed  in  healthy-  and  patient  populations.  Interestingly,  research  on  these  two
populations  have  proceeded  in  parallel  with  little  cross-talk.  We recruited  39  healthy
subjects  and  39  inpatients  in  the  post-acute  phase.  They  were  stratified  to  an  N-back
condition or a closely matched Visual Search condition. Training did not cause transfer to
untrained tasks in neither condition for neither subject group. However, healthy subjects
improved  2.5  to  5.5  standardized  mean  differences  (SMD)  more  than  patients  on  the
training tasks, indicating an impaired ability to learn task-specific strategies in the patient
population.
To further explore the effectiveness of computer-based cognitive training, I conducted a
review and meta-analysis of the literature. Thirty studies were included in the review and
26 in the meta-analysis, representing a total of 1086 patients across 42 treatment-control
contrasts.  There  was  no  transfer  effect  (SMD=0.05)  when  controlling  for  task-specific
learning (coded as training-test similarity) and inappropriate control conditions. From this
analysis and the N-back experiment, it is concluded that computer-based training in general
is  unsuitable  as  a  means  to  rehabilitate  high-level  cognitive  functions  in  patients  with
acquired brain injury.
In a third study, we used hypnotic suggestions to target impaired working memory capacity.
68 brain injured patients in the chronic phase were included. There was a unique effect of
these targeted hypnotic suggestions as compared to  a  closely matched hypnotic  control
condition  (SMD=0.66)  and  very  large  effects  compared  to  a  passive  control  group
(SMD=1.15).  This  effect  was  sustained  after  a  7  week  break.  The  hypnotic  control
condition improved when crossed over to the active condition, resulting in both groups
having normalized performance on working memory outcome measures while a passive
control group remained at status quo throughout the experiment.
In light of these results and the broader literature on the topic, I suggest that we should be
mindful of our intuitions about how a given intervention affects the mind. I present three
metaphors  which allow for a  quick heuristic reasoning about the expected outcomes of
different families of interventions. In the typical case, high-level cognition is not improved
by exercising it bottom-up as a muscle, as is done in computer-based training. Neither is it
improved by nourishing it like a plant, as seems to be the strategy of physical exercise and
pharmaceuticals.  I  suggest  that  the metaphor of  the  mind as  a  computer  which can  be
programmed using symbolic language may carry useful intuitions to predict the outcome of
the interventions considered in this thesis.
Dansk resume
Denne afhandling er motiveret af et uheldigt sammenfald: nedsat arbejdshukommelses- og
opmærksomheds-funktion er en af de hyppigst forekommende følgevirkninger blandt de
millioner af mennesker, som har en erhvervet hjerneskade på verdensplan. Alligevel findes
der ikke effektive behandlinger af disse følgevirkninger. Denne afhandling er en empirisk
undersøgelse af to interventioner, som er kandidater til at afhjæpe problemet.
Computer-baseret kognitiv rehabilitering har hidtil  vist blandede resultater i  den almene
befolkning og med patienter. Forskningen i disse to populationer har dog kørt parallelt uden
sammenligninger eller gensid inspiration. Som et første skridt til at bygge bro mellem disse
to felter, udførte vi et forsøg hvor vi rekrutterede 39 raske forsøgspersoner og 39 patienter i
den post-akutte fase. Deltagerne blev stratificeret til enten at træne N-back opgaven eller en
tæt matchet opgave med visuel skanning. Ingen af opgaverne medførte transfer til ikke-
trænede tests for nogle af grupperne. Dog forbedrede de raske deltagere sig langt mere på
selve træningsopgaven end patienterne, hvilket indikerer en nedsat evne til at tilegne sig
opgave-specifikke strategier efter erhvervet hjerneskade.
For  yderligere  at  undersøge  effektiviteten  af  computer-baseret  træning  på  høj-niveau
kognition,  udførte  jeg  et  review og en  meta-analyse.  I  alt  blev  30  artikler  inkluderet  i
reviewet, hvoraf 26 indgår i meta-analysen. Datasættet dækker i alt 1086 patienter fordelt
på 42 intervention-kontrol kontraster. Der var ingen transfer effekt (SMD=0.05) når der
blev kontrolleret  for  opgave-specifik læring (lighed mellem træningsopgave og test) og
utilstrækkeligt  matchede kontrolgrupper. Tilsammen indikerer N-back forsøget og meta-
analysen  at  computer-træning  ikke  er  egnet  til  rehabilitering  af  høj-niveau  kognition  i
patienter med erhvervet hjerneskade.
I et tredje forsøg anvendte vi hypnotiske suggestioner om at forbedre arbejdshukommelses-
kapaciteten. 68 personer med kroniske følger af erhvervet hjerneskade blev inkluderet. Der
var  en mellemstor  unik effekt  af  de målrettede suggestioner, sammenlignet  med en tæt
matchet kontrolgruppe (SMD=0.66) og en meget stor effekt sammenlignet med en passiv
kontrolgruppe  (SMD=1.15).  Denne  effekt  var  opretholdt  efter  7  ugers  pause.
Kontrolgruppen  forbedrede  sig  da  de  herefter  blev  krydset  over  til  de  målrettede
suggestioner,  med  det  resultat,  at  begge  grupper  opnåede  en  normaliseret  ydeevnet  på
arbejdshukommelsestests.  En  passiv  kontrolgruppe  forblev  på  status  quo  igennem hele
eksperimentet.
På  baggrund  af  disse  resultater  og  den  bredere  literatur  på  området,  opfordrer  jeg  til
refleksion over vores implicitte intuitioner om hvordan en given intervention kan påvirke
psyken. Som afrunding præsenterer jeg tre metaforer, der heuristisk kan give en intuition
om  de  forventede  udfald  af  forskellige  typer  af  interventioner.  Høj-niveau  kognition
forbedres sjældent ved at en stimulus-dreven træning af hjernen som var den en muskel,
sådan som det for eksempel gøres med computer-baseret træning. At nære hjernen med
psykofarmaka eller motion, som var det en plante, medfører heller ikke forbedringer. Jeg
foreslår, at et metafor om psyken som en computer der kan programmeres med et symbolsk
sprog, kan indfange nyttige intuitioner, som kan forudsige de eksperimentelle resultater fra
denne afhandling.
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Definitions
High-level cognition:  cognitive functions which take a wide variety of stimuli as input
across multiple modalities and transform them to behavior  in a flexible way. Examples
include attention, working memory, and executive functions.
Low-level  cognition: cognitive  functions  which  take  a  narrow set  of  stimuli  as  input,
perhaps only in one modality and transform them to behavior in a fairly rule-based way.
Examples  include  pitch  discrimination,  coordination  of  hand-movements,  and  naming
familiar objects.
Probabilistic  inference: assigning  probabilities  to  possible  causes  (e.g.  parameters  or
parameter values) of an observed output.
Transfer effect: a change in performance on non-trained behaviors.
Training effect: a change in performance on trained behaviors.
Nomenclature
APT: Attention Process Training
BF: Bayes Factor.
HNT: Hours Needed to Treat. HNT = NNT x hours
LRT: Likelihood Ratio Test
MBSR: Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction
NHST: Null Hypothesis Significance Testing
NNT: Number Needed to Treat. In this thesis calculated from SMD.
OSPAN: Operation Span - a complex span task.
RAPM: Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices.
SMD: Standardized Mean Difference. SMD = (μpost - μpre) / � baseline where μ is the population
mean and  � is the population (i.e. unbiased) standard deviation. 
SMDc: the controlled Standardized Mean Difference. SMDc = SMDtreat – SMDcontrol.
TBI: Traumatic brain injury, including concussion.
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 1.1  Brain injury and neuropsychological 
rehabilitation
 1.1.1  Epidemiology
The number of people for whom the topic of this thesis is relevant is staggering. In the U.S.
alone, an estimated 3.3 to 5.3 million people suffered from long-term disabilities following
traumatic brain injury (TBI) according to a 2005-estimate (Ma, Chan, & Carruthers, 2014).
In 2010 there was an estimated 23 million stroke survivors under 75 years of age globally
(Feigin et al., 2014). This is an increase in 10 million compared to 1990, likely caused by
the  improvement  in  life-saving  procedures  worldwide.  A consequence  of  more  people
surviving injuries to the central nervous system is that more people live with disabilities
(American Heart Association, 2014). Therefore, chronic sequelae of brain injury constitutes
an increasing societal cost of healthcare, assistance with daily living, subsidiaries, and lost
productivity. Such costs are estimated to be in the order of an annual 48-76 billion for TBI
and 34-65 billion for stroke in the US alone1. This makes stroke and TBI the second and
third largest health care cost in the US next to pain (Ma et al., 2014). As the population life
span increases, the incidence rate of stroke due to cardiovascular degeneration and TBI due
to falls are expected to increase even more (Feigin, Lawes, Bennett, & Anderson, 2003).
 1.1.2  Sequelae
46% of ischemic stroke survivors suffer from long-term cognitive deficits (Kelly-Hayes et
al., 2003). Most reviews qualitatively point to memory and attention as the most frequent
impairments without giving specific numbers (Cumming, Marshall, & Lazar 2013; Carroll
et al., 2003). Consistent with this, TBI patients primarily complain about forgetfulness and
poor concentration with the rates being 41% and 74% for TBI patients in general, and 27%
and  32%  for  post-concussion  patients  (Engberg  &  Teasdale,  2004;  Fox,  Lees-Haley,
Earnest, & Dolezal-Wood, 1995).
1 The US constitute only around 5% of world population but these numbers cannot be extrapolated
because the offerings and cost of offerings vary a lot between regions.
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 1.1.3  Rehabilitation
Relatively effective2 interventions have been developed for the more specific impairments.
For example, more than 18 intervention techniques have been proposed for the treatment of
visuo-spatial neglect (Luaute, Halligan, Rode, Rossetti, & Boisson, 2006). One widely used
and effective intervention is prism adaptation (Rossetti et al., 1998) where patients wear
goggles that shift the visual field to the right, thereby increasing awareness of the world to
the  left  of  the  centerline  in  the  visual  field.  Other  techniques  include  compensatory
behavior such as trunk rotation, visual scanning training. Limb motor dysfunction can be
effectively  improved using  constraint  induced  movement  therapy  in  which  patients  are
prevented from compensating with their functional extremities (Taub, Uswatte, Pidikiti, &
others, 1999). Aphasia/dysphasia can be ameliorated with techniques from speech therapy,
e.g. constraint induced language therapy (Pulvermüller et al., 2001).
These  are  specific  remedies  for  relatively  specific  deficits.  High-level  cognitive
impairments  are  less  tangible,  making  it  harder  to  notice  mild  impairments  (e.g.  to
distinguish  it  from  pre-injury  low  intellect)  but  also  harder  to  rehabilitate  severe
impairments (Park & Ingles, 2001).
 1.1.4  Cost-effectiveness of rehabilitation of high-
level cognition
Several  interventions  have  been  proposed  to  improve  impaired  high-level  cognitive
sequelae of brain injury. In this section I will informally review some non-computerized
interventions and evaluate their cost-effectiveness. For each intervention type, all relevant
papers on the first 5 Google scholar pages and their references were scanned, totaling to
approximately 100 scanned abstracts. Only studies with adult brain injured subject, parallel
control  groups,  and accessible full  text  were included.  All  performance-based cognitive
outcome measures (questionnaires not included), that were hypothesized to be improved
from  the  intervention,  were  considered.  From  these,  the  average  standardized  mean
difference (SMD) were calculated, standardized using the average of the pretest standard
deviations. Statistical noticeability (p < 5%) was scored for group � time interaction terms
only.
Interventions  include  (1)  Attention  Process  Training,  a  face-to-face  intervention  with  a
2 Here “effective” means that less than 40 hours of intervention is needed to produce large effects 
(SMD > 0.8).
4
number  of  therapist-administered  exercises  and  strategies  to  improve  attention,  (2)
Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction which claims to improve attention per se, (3) physical
exercise, and (4) pharmaceuticals. The latter two target cognition in general whereas the
first  two  target  attention  specifically.  For  the  sake  of  brevity,  I  take  the  results  from
published  effect  sizes  at  face  value  without  subjecting  them  to  theoretical  and
methodological scrutiny.
Since resources are limited in healthcare, the best intervention is the one which yields large
effects  using  the  fewest  resources.  In  clinical  research,  the  primary  resource  drain  is
therapist hours so that may be used as an index of the cost of an intervention. The Number
Needed to Treat (NNT) statistic can be calculated from SMD (Furukawa & Leucht, 2011)
and may be used as an index of the effectiveness. Combining these to an index of cost-
effectiveness,  I  calculate  an  Hours  Needed to  Treat  (HNT) statistic  by multiplying  the
Number Needed to Treat (NNT) statistic with the number of therapist hours used in each
study (HNT = NNT x therapist-hours). 
None of  the four intervention types have satisfactory cost-effectiveness  with respect  to
high-level  cognition  (see  Table  1).  It  would  take  an  expected  586  therapist  hours  for
Attention Process Training to make one patient show a more favorable result than would be
expected in the control group. This translates into 73 full 8-hour workdays, planning and
administration  not  included.  319  hours  are  expected  for  Mindfulness  Based  Stress
Reduction  and  930 hours  for  physical  exercise.  The average  SMD for  pharmaceuticals
(amantadine, methylphenidate, and sertraline) was 0.175 which translates into a NNT=19.
Pharmaceuticals take little therapist time but one positive outcome out of 19 patients is not
satisfactory when considering medicine costs and side effects for the remaining 18 patients.
I conclude that Attention Process Training, Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction, exercise,
and pharmaceuticals are not cost-effective for cognitive improvement following acquired
brain injury (see also Cumming, 2013). This is not always apparent from published research
and reviews which treat a single uncorrected statistical noticeable outcome (p < 5%) as
synonymous with effectiveness even though p depends just as much on sample size and
sampling intentions (e.g. number of outcome measures and stopping rules; see Kruschke,
2011; Nickerson, 2000).
There is  a clinical need for treatments which require fewer resources,  i.e.  few therapist
hours for behavioral interventions, and with larger effect sizes. This is the state of affairs
that this thesis aims to improve. For comparison, see Table 13 in the discussion for similar
statistics on the two intervention papers in this review.
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Publication Treatment p < 5% Hours SMDc NNT HNT
Barker-Collo (2009) APT 6 of 10 13.5 0.33 9.57 129.2
Park (1999) APT 4 of 6 40 0.13 26.08 1043.2
Johanssen (2012) MBSR 3 of 5 64 0.33 9.57 612.5
Azulay (2013) MBSR 3 of 4 20 0.22c 14.9 298.0
McMillan (2002) MBSR 4 of 12 3.75c 0.09 38.26 48.7
Studenski (2005) Exercise 0 of 2 54 0.11 31.1 1679.4
Ploughman (2008) Exercise 0 of 5 2.8 0.01 355.7 996.0
Quaney (2009) Exercise 1 of 5 18 0.47 6.45 116.1
Meythaler (2002) Amantadine 0 of 4 % 0.67 4.3 %
Schneider (1999) Amantadine 0 of 4 % 0 ∞ %
Lee (2005) Methyl-phenidate 1 of 10 % 0.23 14.2 %
Lee (2005) Sertraline 1 of 10 % -0.20 % %
Table  1: Effect  sizes,  consistency  of  outcomes  and  economic  feasibility  of  different
interventions  for  cognitive  rehabilitation.  MBSR:  Mindfulness  Based  Stress  Reduction.
APT: Attention Process Training. SMDc: the controlled standardized mean effect, SMDc =
(Δtreat - Δcontrol)/((σtreat + σcontrol)/2) where σ is the standard deviation of pretest scores (Cohen,
1992). NNT: Number Needed to Treat calculated from SMDc, assuming a controlled event
rate of 20% (Furukawa & Leucht, 2011), HNT: Hours Needed to Treat (HNT = NNT x
hours).  a[positive/total]  outcome  measures.  cThis  study  had  a  total  of  2*10  hours  of
meditation when including home-exercises, corresponding to an HNT of 715.5.
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 1.2  Inferring the aptitude of cognitive 
constructs from behavioral tests
The  vast  majority  of  cognitive  research  uses  standardized  tests  to  make  inferences  on
cognitive constructs.  In clinical  research in particular, it  is  common to assign cognitive
labels to tests. For example, the Stroop task is often used to measure “inhibition”, PASAT to
measure “attention”, digit span to measure “working memory”, and the Wisconsin Card
Sorting Test to measure “executive function”.
This thesis is no different. In this section, I will discuss what can be concluded from such
inferences and the assumptions it entails. I will argue that it is a logical error to assign a
single psychological construct to each particular neuropsychological test and that it is also
too strong a simplification to be justifiable. Rather, constructs are useful systematizations of
probabilistic relationships between behavioral performance on a set of neuropsychological
tests. We need not commit ourselves to the existence or non-existence of such constructs,
nor to the idea that they can be truly measured.
 1.2.1  Psychology as ill-posed reverse engineering
Psychology can  be seen  as  reverse inference or  reverse engineering3 of  the  mind from
behavior (Dennett, 1994; Pinker, 1997; Poldrack, 2006). In general, reverse engineering is
the act of reconstructing an unknown mechanism by observing its input and output. The
mechanism  is  a  “black  box”  with  interiors  that  will  remain  forever  unobserved.  In
psychology, the input is stimulation, the mechanism is cognition, and the output is behavior.
In  the  broadest  sense,  behavior  includes  movements,  blushing  of  the  skin,
electromyographic (EMG) activations,  electroencephalography (EEG),  brain metabolism
(usually measured using BOLD), and other overt reactions to input (see Henson, 2005, for
an argument for this definition of behavior). 
3  Forward inference is knowing the generating mechanism and inferring the output it would 
generate given a specific input. Reverse (or “backward”) inference is knowing the input and the 
output and inferring the mechanism that mediated between the two. Determinism is usually 
assumed in both forward and reverse inference.
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A neuropsychological test is just this kind of inference. In digit span, for example, we read
a series of digits to the subject (input) and observe how many digits were recalled correctly
(output). Since digit span tends to follow a (probabilistic) Guttman scale4, we may use these
data to infer that this reduction in output relative to input was caused by a capacity limit in
the cognition of this subject.
Contrary to the well-posed problem of forward inference, reverse inference is often ill-
posed in that there is no unique solution. Many different mechanisms could generate the
same  observed  input-output  relations5.  To  give  just  one  example  from  cognitive
psychology: capacity limits on short-term storage of information has been argued to be 7
items (Miller, 1956), 4 chunks (Cowan, 2000), 4 objects (Luck & Vogel, 1997), 2 seconds
for  sound  (Baddeley  & Hitch,  1974),  1  chunk  (McElree,  2001),  and  many  more  (see
Cowan,  2005,  pp.  139-164  for  a  list).  Numerous  theories  have  sought  to  describe  the
mechanism which has the property of such capacity limits (e.g. Baddeley & Hitch, 1974;
Norman & Shallice,  1986;  Cowan,  1988).  These  theories  disagree  on  the  cause  of  the
capacity limit (decay, interference, etc) and the unit of the capacity limit (items, chunks,
objects, time, etc.). It is clear that it is difficult to raise any one of these theories to the
status  of  “absolute  truth  which  solved  the  reverse  inference  problem”  with  respect  to
capacity  limits  on memory. This problem is particularly strong for  high-level  cognition
which, by definition, is involved in all behavior in flexible ways and thus is difficult to
isolate using input-output relations alone. Lower-level  computational  processes,  such as
detection thresholds for visual objects or auditory sounds, allows for tighter inference. 
To conclude: cognitive constructs such as attention and working memory are unobservable.
As  a  consequence,  they  are  not  uniquely  defined  epistemologically  speaking.  This  has
implications for how we approximate the aptitude of such constructs.
 1.2.2  Cognitive constructs group correlated 
behaviors
It  is  circular  reasoning to  say that  the performance on a given behavioral  test  directly
channels  a  cognitive  construct  (e.g.  “WCST measures  executive  function”),  since  that
construct was inferred from behavior in the first place6. This logical fallacy can be avoided
4  A Guttman scale has a sharp cutoff between successes and failures, e.g. 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0. This 
can be made probabilistic as in e.g. Rasch analyses where sequences like 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0
can be interpreted as a sharp cutoff with random noise.
5  This is known as the problem of multiple realizability in philosophy of mind.
6  This circular reasoning is especially apparent in psychiatric diagnoses where it is often said that 
the diagnosis is the cause of behavior. E.g. “he is sad because he is depressed”. In the DSM and 
ICD systems, the diagnosis is based on behavioral symptoms, e.g. sadness for a certain period. 
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by turning the statement into a probabilistic one about relationships between behaviors, e.g.
“Performance on WCST correlates with performance on other tests of executive function”.
Here,  the  cognitive  construct  is  merely  an  “epiphenomenal  label”  which  identifies
correlations between behaviors that fall under this label. To give a more explicit example, I
propose the following translation:
■ Cognitive language: He is doing poorly on a working memory task. His working
memory is probably impaired.
■ Translates  to:  He is doing poorly on a task which is a  member of  the category
“working  memory”.  Therefore  he  will  probably  do  poorly  on  other  tasks  and
behaviors in the category “working memory” since tasks covary within categories.
In other words, cognitive constructs is a systematization of behavior. The above translation
puts dichotomous reasoning in the background and brings probabilistic reasoning in the
foreground by substituting an all-or-none categorical construct (“working memory”) with
an (imperfect) correlation. 
This is not new. It follows directly from the way that we assess the construct validity of
neuropsychological  tests  using  structural  equation  modeling  (most  frequently  factor
analysis). Here, individual tests are clustered together using mathematical procedures that
ensures maximal shared variance within clusters and minimum shared variance between
clusters. Such clusters are not uniquely defined. Therefore it is typical to consider several
probable  cluster  configurations  in  these  publications.  Furthermore,  the  labeling  of  the
factors is an entirely subjective act based on the compound face validity of the items in
each derived factor.
 1.2.3  Any test represents multiple constructs
The  above  highlights  the  non-unique  relationship  between  test  and  construct.  If  a  test
reflected a single construct, then performance on two tests of different constructs should be
uncorrelated.  This  is  seldomly the  case7.  For  example,  the  Wechsler  Adult  Intelligence
Scale has a common intelligence factor which explains a large proportion of the variance in
individual tests and derived indices (Working Memory, Perceptual Reasoning, and Verbal
Comprehension; see e.g.  Benson, 2010;  Holdnack, 2011; Canivez, 2010).  Even though
these  tests  are  often  labelled  according  to  the  derived  indices  under  which  they  are
That turns the sentence into “he is sad because he is sad”. Likewise, the WCST utterance can be 
turned into “WCST measures WCST performance”.
7  There are several papers who do make claims about conditional independence between factors, 
by factoring out variance from other constructs, in which case one has already assumed more 
than one construct as explanatory variables for the behavior. Conditional independence is not an 
argument against what I propose here.
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subsumed,  this  shared  variance  show  that  they  are  not  independent.  Given  that  the
correlation  to  the  common  intelligence  factor  is  not  1,  the  outcome  on  each  test  is
determined by multiple constructs. Similarly, Roca et al. (2010) found that fluid intelligence
accounted for all  differences between patients with frontal  lesions and matched healthy
controls, indicating that all tasks depended to some degree on fluid intelligence in addition
to their more local domains. The same has been found in numerous other latent variable
analyses on other cognitive outcome measures (e.g. Engle et al., 1999; Conway et al., 2002;
Kane et al., 2005; Friedman et al., 2006). All of these findings are at odds with a 1-to-1 test-
construct relationship.
The multiplicity of constructs involved in performance of a particular test can also include
more task-specific factors. Consider, for example, the digit span test in which subjects are
asked to repeat  gradually longer sequences of digits. For auditory input, the number of
recalled digits would be reduced by impressive aphasia and impaired hearing. For visual
input,  blindness  and neglect  would reduce the output.  For both modalities,  dyscalculia,
memory capacity, attention, and expressive aphasia (for verbal output) would limit output,
to name a few. Therefore digit span performance could be bottlenecked by any of these or
any combination of these - not just a memory capacity limit8.
Again, I propose a translation from categorical language to probabilistic reasoning:
■ Cognitive language: Digit span is a working memory task.
■ Translates to: digit span shares more variance with tests labeled “working memory”
than tests which are not labeled “working memory”.
 1.2.4  Choosing an explanation among ambiguous 
constructs
So far I have argued that there are many constructs which could be said to mediate between
stimulation  (input)  and  performance  (output)  on  a  single  test  and  that  many  different
constellations of such constructs could give rise to observed behavior. It  is an ill-posed
problem to objectively choose among such constellations.  Where we reach the limit  of
inference we can, however, use a normative criterion to choose between competing models.
To  this  end,  Morgan’s  canon  is  often  used  as  a  guiding  principle  for  comparative
psychology (see e.g. Hampton, 2009):
8  The digit span test is used to measure attention, working memory, or short term memory, 
depending on publication. This speaks to the ambiguity of one-to-one relationships between tests 
and cognitive constructs.
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In  no  case  is  an  animal  activity  to  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  higher
psychological processes if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes
which stand lower in the scale of psychological evolution and development.
(Morgan, 1894, p. 53)
Morgan’s law can be said to enforce a law of parsimony in terms of the predictive space of
the proposed explanation9.  Since concepts lower on the psychological  hierarchy tend to
process a smaller set of stimuli in a more rudimentary way, the predictions from low-level
models  are more restricted.  This makes low-level  models more exclusive and therefore
more  parsimonious.  Concepts  higher  in  the  psychological  hierarchy  tend  to  be  more
versatile  and  have  a  larger  prediction  space,  thus  being  more  complex  (Lee  &
Wagenmakers, 2014).
 1.2.5  Summary
In  short,  we  may  use  “cognitive  language”  for  convenience  and  the  translations  for
scientific accuracy. The translations shift the focus away from a language which implies
that cognitive constructs exist as known entities with known aptitudes, towards a science
based  on  shared  variance  between  tasks  with  cognitive  labels,  thus  preventing  false
assumptions and circular reasoning. There is nothing lost in this translation and as such it
should  be  an  uncontroversial  reminder.  It  still  allows  for  reasoning  about  hitherto
unobserved  behaviors  (theoretical  predictions)  and  the  “underlying”  effectiveness  of
interventions given observed behavior.
9  It is captured in the idiom “A model which predicts everything predicts nothing” (Lee & 
Wagenmakers, 2014). This is a different approach than the more well-known model selection in 
maximum-likelihood statistics which use the number of parameters as a measure of complexity 
(for models where covariates share the same residual, the number of parameters is actually 
proportional to the predictive complexity), using e.g. AIC og BIC.
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 1.3  Probabilistic inference: Bayesian 
inference does what we want to do. 
Null Hypothesis Significance Testing 
does not.
Empirical science use samples to draw inferences about the parameters of a population, i.e.
the parameters which generated these samples.  In the context of rehabilitation research,
these parameters are often effect sizes of interventions. Probabilistic10 inference is the act of
narrowing down the values of parameters in a mathematically sound way given the data and
a model of the relationship between parameters.
Since probabilistic inference side with the experimental method as the most important tool
to draw conclusions about the efficacy of various rehabilitation methods, and since I will
deviate from mainstream Null Hypothesis Significance Testing practices, it deserves some
attention  here.  But  since  this  thesis  uses probabilistic  inference  but  is  not  about
probabilistic  inference,  I  will  avoid  presenting  a  full  mathematical  and  philosophical
analysis of methods for probabilistic inference although it is a subject near and dear to my
heart. I have tried to keep this section relatively short and conceptual in order to motivate
the choices of inferential procedures without losing focus from the real task at hand. The
footnotes present expanded justifications for the rather superficial claims in the main text.
 1.3.1  p-values and confidence intervals have low 
inferential value
p-values do not reflect the strength of evidence against the null hypothesis nor the inverse
of the strength of evidence for the alternative hypothesis (Nickerson, 2000; Goodman &
Royall, 1998; Cohen, 1994).
The fathers of current statistical practices acknowledged this fact. Ronald Fischer proposed
p-values as an “index” which approximately co-varied with the real  probability (Fisher,
10  “Probabilistic” inference is contrasted to normal logical inference in that we assign numerical 
probabilities to parameter values instead of TRUE / FALSE labels. So given incomplete data we 
may infer probabilities but not truth. This is also the reason why data does not “prove” a 
hypothesis (read: assign a TRUE label) but rather “supports” them (read: increase the probability 
of it being true).
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1959,  p.44.)11.  Neyman  &  Pearson  developed  a  statistical  framework  which  avoids
assigning probabilities to hypotheses altogether because they saw probabilistic inference as
inherently problematic. The Neyman-Peterson framework simply serves to control the rate
of false positive claims and false negative claims in the limit of infinite perfect replication
attempts (Neyman, 1957).
Fisher and Neyman-Pearson fiercely disagreed on how to use data to falsify or support
models12.  Yet,  while  the  debate  was  ongoing,  the  Fisherian  and  Neyman-Pearsonian
frameworks  appeared  in  an  inconsistent  hybrid  version13.  This  “bastard  child”   which
11  A nice selection of quotes from Fisher’s book is collected in the contemporary book review by 
Pitman (1957)
12  Fisher was advocating “inductive reasoning” using essentially a probabilistic version of 
Popper’s falsification principle: quantify how likely the data is under the null and use this as your
inference without directly accepting or rejecting any model. There is only probabilistic 
falsification; no support of an alternative hypothesis. The p-value should be interpreted as an 
approximate measure of the strength of falsification. Any decisions can then be made based on 
these beliefs afterwards.
Neyman advocated “inductive behavior” based on the observation that evidence is used to assign 
TRUE/FALSE labels to discrete hypotheses in scientific practice. This kind of behavior will 
sometimes be wrong (type-1 and type-2 error) and controlling the rate of these error-behaviors 
will lead to proper inductions in the long run. I find that the discrepancies between Neyman’s and
Fisher’s frameworks are concisely captured by Fisher (1956) and Neyman (1957) in which they 
launch fierce attacks on each other.
The key disagreements are these: Fisher had no acceptance of an alternative where Neyman-
Pearson did. Fisher distinguished decision from inference where Neyman-Pearson did not. And 
Fisher regarded the p-value as a (approximate) quantitative measure of the strength of evidence 
(against the null) where Neyman-Pearson used a decision threshold (alpha).
I am most sympathetic to Fisher’s arguments in this debate although I of course take distance to 
both frameworks for the reasons mentioned in the main text. My primary concern is that even if 
it may be common practice to use a measure of probability label hypotheses as TRUE or FALSE,
induction from data is not logical but probabilistic and the dichotomous labels TRUE/FALSE are
therefore unwarranted. The best we can do is to assign probabilities to the two (or redistribute it 
if they had prior probabilities). As a remark, I side with Fisher on the impossibility and 
strangeness of relying on infinite hypothetical perfect replications for inference or as Jeffrey’s put
it: “A hypothesis that may be true may be rejected because it has not predicted . . . results which 
have not occurred." (cited in Goodman & Royall, 1988, p. 1569)
13  Most papers on the NHST controversy identify contemporary textbooks as the likely source of 
the hybrid version. However, this is not supported by historical investigations of textbooks from 
the period (Halpin & Stam, 2006; Huberty, 1993) which point to small-sample research papers as
a possible source.
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neither  Fisher  nor  Neyman  would  have  accepted14 is  now  widely  known  as  the  Null
Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST, see Nickerson, 2000, for an introduction). NHST
is  now applied  as  if  it  was  a  sound probabilistic  inference  procedure.  In  short,  NHST
consists of the following steps:
■ Define a Null hypothesis (usually the Nil hypothesis of no difference in population
means)
■ Decide on a threshold (alpha) for the accepted rate of false positives claims.
■ Collect data.
■ Calculate the likelihood p = P(data | H0) that the current data were generated under
the null hypothesis.
■ If p < alpha, claim that the hypothesis is supported. If p > alpha, claim nothing.
A major practical problem with NHST is that the null hypothesis may be more likely than
the alternative, even though p < alpha (Berger & Sellke, 1987; Rouder, Speckman, Sun,
Morey, & Iverson, 2009). In fact, it has been shown that if the H0 and H1 are equally likely
a priori, a p-value of 5% corresponds to a 29 % probability of H0 being true within the
logic of the NHST-framework (Sellke, Bayarri, & Berger, 2001) and between 33% and 82%
(depending on the sample size) using a Bayesian analysis as reference (Berger & Sellke,
1987).
Several philosophical problems add to this, including (1) that p=alpha+0.0001 and p=alpha-
0.0001 are clearly not qualitatively different but we are forced to make that statement in
NHST. (2) The strangeness of doing inference on perfect replications which has never been
done and probably never will. (3) the impossibility of such perfect replications (see e.g.
Fisher, 1956) and (4) that differences in an experimenter’s prior sampling intentions lead to
different  p-values  for  the same dataset  independently of  the  data  (Goodman & Royall,
1988; Kruschke, 2011). Many of these issues were raised in the Fisher versus Neyman-
Pearson  debate  in  the  50’s  but  they  remain  largely  ignored  in  the  scientific  empirical
literature today which ritually follow the NHST procedure.
14  For example, both Neyman-Pearson and Fisher thought that the null hypothesis should be well 
qualified and thus seldom would be 0 (what we now call the Nil hypothesis). Once the null is 
defined, the strength of evidence required to accept or reject some hypothesis should also be 
decided on a per-study basis. In Neyman-Pearson this plays out as alpha and beta values which 
essentially constitute a loss function on type-1 and type-2 errors in this particular context. Fisher 
thought that different levels of p would be required to reject the null, depending on the context. 
Neyman-Pearson would accept the null whereas Fisher would not accept anything.
Today NHST almost always test the Nil hypothesis (mean=0) against a universal p<5% threshold
(corrected or uncorrected) which is used to accept the alternative but not the null. This is clearly 
at odds with both Fisher and Neyman-Pearson.
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Confidence intervals has been suggested as an improvement over p-values (Gardener &
Altman, 1986; Cumming & Finch, 2005).  However, confidence intervals are simply re-
expression  of  p-values  centered  on  a  mean  and  scaled  by  the  observed  dispersion
(Kruschke, 2011; Feinstein, 1998). As a consequence, they inherit the same problems as p-
values. In fact confidence intervals are often used in the same way as p-values to judge
effect sizes to be significant or not-significant (Coulson, Healey, Fidler, & Cumming, 2010;
Morey, Hoekstra,  Rouder,  Lee,  & Wagenmakers,  2014) and used in  this  way they add
nothing new. I will return to the definition of confidence intervals in a later section.
For the reasons just presented, I conclude that p-values and confidence intervals have low
value as a measure of evidence for different hypotheses and effect sizes. In the next section
I will argue that Bayes Factors (BF) and Highest Posterior Density intervals (HPD) have
much higher value for these inferential goals. If used right, Maximum-Likelihood based
Likelihood Ratio Tests (LRT) may approximate a Bayesian model comparison.
 1.3.2  Bayesian inference has high inferential value
Bayesian inference15 is the branch of mathematical probability theory which is based on the
Kolmogorov Axioms16.  Bayesian  inference  deals  with  conditional  probabilities  between
parameter values. Two parameters are conditional if a change in one of them changes our
knowledge about the other, however little that change might be. In empirical science, we
often condition parameter values on data: conditioning on data changes our belief in what
parameter values might have generated these data.  But c.f.  the discussion about how to
“measure” cognitive functions, there are many underlying parameter values which could
have  generated  a  given  dataset.  The  bayesian  solution  to  this  ambiguity  is  to  assign
15  Bayesian inference is named after Thomas Bayes (1701-1761) although it probably owes more 
credit to Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827) and Andrey Kolmogorov (1903-1987).
16  These axioms were originally presented as 5 axioms by Kolmogorov’s “Foundations of the 
theory of probability” (1956, p.2) but has since been reformulated to three axioms (see e.g. 
Russel & Norvig, pp. 484-489 for a very clear formulation):
■ 1. The probability of a state is a non-negative real number.
    P(state)  , P(state)  0∈ ℝ ≧
■ 2. The probability that one out of all possible states occur is 1.
    SUM(P(state)) = 1
■ 3. The probability that one out of several disjoint states occur is the sum of the probabilities of
the respective states.
 P(state1 | state2) = P(state1) + P(state2)
       From axioms 1 and 2 it follows that 0  P(state)  1. Note that in most texts the word “event” is ≦ ≦
used where I write “state”. I prefer the latter since the former has connotations of real-life events,
i.e. something local at a specific time.
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probabilities to each value that the underlying parameter(s) might have17. This allows us to
reason about such “hidden” values to the best of our knowledge about them. In this way,
bayesian inference is well suited to get the most out of the reverse inference problem.
Continuous parameters can have an infinite number of different values, so to simplify how
we describe our current knowledge state, we use distributions. For example, the normal
distribution simply takes two parameters: the mean and the variance. Likewise, the uniform
distribution takes just two parameters: the minimum and the maximum.
 1.3.3  Three prior distributions for effect sizes
One  of  the  most  disputed  features  of  Bayesian  inference  is  this  necessity  of  prior
information for the calculation of conditional  probabilities.  Although it  arises as  a pure
mathematical necessity, many intuition-appealing interpretations of the math has been put
forward (see e.g. Edwards, 1963). One of the most mathematically true arguments is this:
you  can  only  reason  about  that  which  is  conceivable  (i.e.  has  an  a  priori  non-zero
probability). If it is inconceivable (has a prior zero probability), no amount of data could
make it conceivable. So everything, parameters and parameter values included, has to have
a non-zero probability before you can even begin to reason about it and we call this the
prior probability.
Again, we often use distributions to specify our prior knowledge. We usually distinguish
between narrow or “informative” priors and wide or “uninformative” priors. Informative
priors concentrate probability on a relatively small range of states, deeming some states
much more likely than others  a  priori.  Uninformative priors distribute probability  on a
relatively large proportion of states, deeming them approximately equally likely.
I will use three different priors in this thesis. They are illustrated in Figure 1. For parameter
estimation, I use an informative Normal(mean=0, sd=0.5) prior on SMD which puts 95%
probability on the interval -0.98 SMD to 0.98 SMD. This is informed by the observation
that effect sizes in behavioral intervention research tends to be below 1 SMD.
For  model  selection,  I  rely  on  two  other  priors,  primarily  because  they  have  nice
computational  properties  and  because  they  have  been  widely  used  in  the  scientific
literature. The JZS prior has been proposed as a “dealt bayes factor” for model selection of
linear  models  (Rouder  &  Morey,  2012).  It  is  a  Cauchy(0,  sqrt(2)/2)  which  puts  95%
17  I have often seen it said that the difference between frequentists and bayesians is that 
frequentists think that there is just one real parameter value while bayesians think that it is 
distributed. This is not accurate since bayesians also assume (per the Kolmogorov axioms) that 
there is one real parameter value. But the bayesian belief in what that value is distributed given 
incomplete knowledge. Frequentists postulate a single value given data and then make inferences
on the frequency with which they’d be wrong in making such statements.
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probability between -8.9 and 8.9 SMD. This is clearly way outside what could reasonably
be expected a priori in intervention research but due to the shape of the Cauchy (which is
just a t-distribution with 1 degree of freedom), it still has a great deal of mass around zero
with 60% in the interval -0.97 to 0.97 SMD (see Figure 1). 
Lastly, I use the very wide unit information prior where the other bayes factors are not
possible to compute (see a later section). The unit information prior can be calculated based
on  the  Bayesian  Information  Criterion  of  two  models  estimated  using  the  Maximum
Likelihood method (Wagenmakers, 2007). It is a normally distributed prior that corresponds
to the information of having a flat prior and one observation at the maximum likelihood
estimate.  The  unit  information  prior  depends  on  the  data18 so  it  cannot  be  illustrated
correctly. To give an impression, I have plotted a wide Normal(0, 5) prior in Figure 1. That
prior has approximately the same 95% credible interval as the JZS prior, but puts much
more probability on extreme effect sizes.
Figure 1: Density and probabilities of different priors as a function of effect size. Vertical
lines  mark  the  95%  credible  interval  for  each  prior. The  vide  Normal(0,  5)  prior  is
illustrated to show how the Unit Information Prior might behave compared to the other two
priors.
18  And is therefore not proper
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A part of the worry about the need for priors relative to the NHST ritual is that there is no
correct prior. In principle, this makes perfect scientific consensus impossible since each
scientist  has  his/her  own  prior  knowledge19,20.  However,  a  rule  of  thumb for  scientific
reporting is to choose a prior which is acceptable to a skeptical audience. That will usually
be an uninformative prior or one that is conservative with respect to the expected outcome.
 1.3.4  The posterior distribution as the parameter 
estimate
When conditioning  the  model  on data,  the  resulting distribution  of  probabilities  across
parameter values is called the posterior distribution. The posterior distribution is a complete
description of the knowledge we have about what parameter values might have generated
the data, i.e. our inference on the parameters. Often, the posterior distribution follows a
well-known distribution and can simply be described using that distributions’ parameters,
i.e. the mean and standard deviation for a normal distribution.
19  This, by the way, is the point of departure for the epistemology of Chalmers (2011) in which 
rational subjects have a justified true belief about a proposition if that proposition follows from 
his/her experience. Chalmers calls this prior endorsement. It is a challenge to classical analytical 
philosophy in which truth can be fully uncovered and agreed upon by rational subjects 
irrespective of their prior experiences. I am sympathetic to the view of Chalmers here.
20  This is the reason that Bayesian inference has been called “subjective” and is the major source of
criticism from the frequentist stance which claims to be “objective”. This criticism is largely 
unfounded, though. Note that both Fisher argued that p-values should be interpreted qualitatively 
with respect to the phenomenon at hand and Neyman-Pearson argued that alpha-levels should be 
set per-experiment. I.e. the founders of modern what became NHST strongly endorsed the 
necessity of prior information in inference. In that sense, Bayesian inference is less subjective 
since the use of prior information is principled and mathematical. This is the philosophical 
argument. The prior is also an effective means to fix the problems with the NHST neglection of 
base rates which leads to many many erroneous inferences since rare events is conflated with 
evidence against the null. The most famous of which is the problem of mammography and breast 
cancer which was introduced by Eddy (1982) and subjected to thorough analysis by Gigerenzer 
& Hoffrage (1995). Cohen (1994) is maybe the most famous single published rebuttal of the 
failure to take base rates into account in NHST.
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However,  we are  often  interested  in  knowing the interval  in  which  we can  expect  the
parameter to be in. The credible interval is the interval with the highest posterior density. As
such,  the  credible  interval  is  free  from any  assumptions  about  the  distribution  of  the
posterior. Many people interpret  the confidence interval  as  if  it  was a credible interval
(Coulson, 2010), but consider the difference in what the two intervals are:
■ The 95 % Confidence interval is the interval which, if calculated in infinite perfect
replications of the experiment, would contain the true parameter value in 95 % of
these calculations.
■ The  95  %  Credible  Interval  contains  the  true  parameter  value  with  95  %
probability.
 1.3.5  Model comparison using Bayes factors
Since a hypothesis is most frequently deduced from competing theories, multiple statistical
models are at  play. Testing a hypothesis comes down to evaluating which theory-based
statistical model is most likely given data from the experiment. Procedures to this end are
called model selection or model comparison21.
I  will  be  using  Bayes  factors  for  model  comparison.  A Bayes  factor  is  the  odds  ratio
between the posterior probability of the two models in question. It is explained in more
detail in the three papers but briefly, a bayes factor of 5 in favor of model #1 means that it is
5 times more likely to have generated the observed data than model #2 which conversely is
then 5 times less likely to have generated the observed data than model #1. It does not
matter if we consider one of them a null model - we can quantify evidence for all models.
Bayes factors can be computed using the product space search method (Lodewyckx et al.,
2011; Han & Carlin, 2001), where all models of interest are included in a grand model,
connected  by  an  indicator  parameter.  When  conditioning  on  the  data,  the  posterior
distribution over the indices of the indicator parameter is the posterior probability of the
models.  Conceptually,  this  simply  means  that  instead  of  having  a  fixed  100%  prior
probability that the parameters exist, we now make inference on that probability.
Others advocate the use of posterior predictive checks for model comparison instead of
bayes factors (Gelman et al., 2013; Gelman & Shalizi, 2012). This debate is beyond the
scope of this thesis (see Morey, Romeijn, & Rouder, 2012, for a reply). Bayes factors do
21  “Selection” implies that a binary TRUE/FALSE label is assigned to each model as is common in
step-wise frequentist model selection procedures where parameters are included/excluded using 
p-values with respect to an alpha threshold. “Selection” is a misleading word in a bayesian 
context since the data is used to assign probabilities to each model rather than accepting or 
excluding them. “Model comparison” is a more appropriate term.
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have the advantage that they are axiomatic while posterior predictive checks are not. In
either case, I have used both for all the statistical models in this thesis but for the sake of
brevity, I only report the bayes factor.
In practice, however, the product space method can be computationally expensive to the
extent that it is not feasible. This is also true for some of the models in this thesis, e.g. in the
meta-analysis model and when testing multiple parameters simultaneously in the hypnosis
model (See Appendix B). For simple models, the Savage-Dickey method can be used to
estimate the Bayes factor from the posterior distribution of the largest of two nested models
(Wagenmakers et al., 2010). Since it is inappropriate for the more complicated models used
in this thesis, it is not reported here. A Bayes factor estimate can also be computed from the
difference between the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) of the models in question, as
discussed in the next section.
 1.3.6  The Likelihood Ratio Test: a Maximum-
Likelihood Bayes factor
There is a Maximum Likelihood equivalent to the Bayes factors analysis: the Likelihood
Ratio Test (LRT). The likelihood is the probability of observing data under a given model,
P(D | Mi), i.e. how well the model accounts for data. The likelihood ratio is simply the ratio
between the log-likelihoods of two models, e.g. a full model and a null model. Since the
likelihood of  the data given a model is  proportional  to the model  evidence given data,
likelihood ratios are proportional to the bayes factor. However, the likelihood ratio is based
on a point estimate while the bayes factor integrates over the full parameter space. In that
way, the bayes factor accounts for model complexity while the likelihood ratio is overfitted.
However, a Bayesian Information Criterion can be computed by combining the likelihood
ratio and a penalty for the number of parameters in the model and that  can be used to
calculate a bayes factor, BFBIC = exp(BICfull - BICnull) (Wagenmakers, 2007). This bayes
factor assumes the very uninformative unit information prior as described above.
Today’s academic publication landscape demands p-values so the p-value of the LRT is
reported together with the bayes factor in the papers. I have presented reasons to ignore that
p-value.
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 1.3.7  Choosing Bayes: what are the implications for 
this thesis?
Let us assume that if I had used NHST I would commit all the common errors of NHST, i.e.
use maximum-likelihood parameter estimates, interpret the 95% confidence interval as the
interval  within which the parameter  is  with 95% probability, and think that  p  < 5% is
evidence that the alternative is true and the null is false. 
Since  I  analyse  linear  models  on  approximately  normal  data,  there  is  a  large
correspondence between NHST and Bayesian estimates. The following differences should
be expected:
■ Bayes-derived SMD is smaller than Maximum Likelihood derived SMD. The SMD
posterior is not normally distributed since the posterior of the population SD has a
positive tail. Therefore the SMD will have more mass on smaller effect sizes than an
ML estimate which assumes that the SD is normally distributed.
■ BF-based quantification of evidence against the null is more conservative than p-
based ditto (Wetzels et al., 2011), so I will be less likely to embrace full models than
had I used NHST.
■ I will quantify evidence for the null. This is not possible in NHST.
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 2.1  N-back Prologue
I  will  keep  this  introduction  short  since  the  paper  is  relatively  self-contained.  The
conclusions advanced in the paper will be subjected to scrutiny in the final epilogue after
the review paper.
The N-back study was conceived in 2011 inspired by a series of papers by Susanne Jaeggi
and colleagues (Jaeggi et al., 2008, 2010, 2011) who demonstrated that training a single- or
dual- N-back task caused transfer to untrained outcome measures in healthy subjects. At
that time, I had not realized that the 2011-paper is a null finding masked as an effect and
that the 2008-paper is deeply flawed (Shipstead et al., 2010; Redick et al., 2012). The study
was initially simply designed to generalize these results to brain injury rehabilitation.
Within a few months during the summer of 2012 two research articles, two reviews, and a
meta-analysis were published on the topic of computer-based training in general and the
Jaeggi  studies  in  particular.  They  uniformly  discredited  the  idea  that  computer-based
training have been demonstrated to cause improvements in high-level cognitive constructs
such as fluid intelligence and working memory. Redick et al. (2012) published a thorough
study on N-back training. First and foremost, Redick et al. uncovered that Jaeggi et al.
(2008)  had  lumped  together  several  very  small  experiments  using  different  outcome
measures and reported them as if they were the same experiment and the same outcome
measure. Redick et al. then sought to replicate the findings with several methodological
extensions. They stratified 140 subjects into three groups and tested them on 17 different
tests at  three timepoints.  75 subjects completed (43 % dropout rate).  Although subjects
improved on the  training tasks,  there was no differential  improvement  on the outcome
measures at  either timepoint, thus simultaneously discrediting the transfer-claim and the
dosage-response  claim  put  forward  by  the  Jaeggi  papers.  Chooi  &  Thompson  (2012)
independently published a high-quality  N-back study with 130 subjects starting and 93
completing  (28  % dropout  rate).  Again,  there  was  no  differential  improvement  on  the
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outcome measures  between the groups, thus discrediting the claim that  N-back training
causes transfer to fluid intelligence or working memory. Two reviews on computer-based
working memory training (Shipstead, Redick, & Engle., 2012) and the CogMed software
(Shipstead, Hicks, & Engle, 2012) was published simultaneously with the above studies.
They convincingly showed that effects were too inconsistent between studies to establish a
claim that they were effective. They were accompanied by a meta-analysis (Melby-Lervåg
& Hulme, 2012) which found moderate effect sizes for near-transfer tasks but no transfer to
untrained constructs (e.g. from “working memory training” to intelligence as Jaeggi and
colleagues had claimed to show). 
Still, other reviews concluded that the evidence speak in favor of computer-based “brain
training” as an effective promoter of cognitive transfer  effects (e.g.  Morrison & Chien,
2010; Klingberg, 2010).
With  these  publications,  I  became aware  that  the  research  on  healthy  participants  was
seldom referenced in patient studies (and vice versa), meaning that the two research areas
proceeded in parallel. For this reason, I decided to include a healthy group as well in order
to  build  a  bridge  between  research  on  brain  injured  and  healthy  subjects.  I  turned  to
bayesian statistics in the same period, so the prospect of a null finding was less scary since
the null became interpretable. Certainly, support for the null hypothesis of no treatment
effect  is  of  very  high  clinical  value  since  such  a  finding  helps  ruling  out  ineffective
treatment methods. Finally, even the very slim chance of discovering positive transfer in a
patient  group  would  be  overwhelmed  by  the  benefit  that  it  would  pose  for  patients
worldwide.
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 2.2  Training and transfer effects of N-back
training for brain injured and healthy 
subjects.
Working Memory impairments are prevalent among brain injured patients. Computerized
training  targeting  working  memory  has  been  researched  extensively  in  non-injured
populations but this field remain isolated from similar research in brain injured patients.
We report  the results of  an actively controlled randomized controlled trial  in which 18
patients and 19 healthy subjects completed training on the N-back task. The non-injured
group had superior improvements on both training tasks (SMD=6.1 and 3.6) whereas the
brain  injured  group  improved  much  less  (SMD=0.5  and  1.1).  None  of  the  groups
demonstrated  transfer  to  untrained  tasks.  We  conclude  that  computerized  training
facilitates improvement of specific skills rather than high-level  cognition in non-injured
and brain injured humans alike. The acquisition of these specific skills seem to be impaired
by brain injury. The most effective use of  computer-based cognitive training may be to
make the task resemble the targeted behavior(s) closely in order to exploit the stimulus-
specificity of learning.
Randomized controlled studies on computer-based cognitive rehabilitation of brain injured
patients go back to at least Sturm, Dahmen, Hartje & Wilmes (1983) and more than 50
RCTs have been published so far (see reviews by Lindeløv, submitted; Cha & Kim, 2013;
Chen, Thomas, Glueckauf & Bracy, 1997). There is a much larger and growing literature on
computerized  cognitive  training  in  non-injured  individuals  (see  reviews  by  Shipstead,
Redick & Engle, 2012; Melby-Lervåg & Hulme, 2012). However, these two fields have
hitherto  proceeded  in  parallel  with  no  cross-talk  or  direct  comparisons.  Computerized
cognitive  neurorehabilitation  could  potentially  expand its  evidence  base  considerably  if
there are points of convergence to non-injured subjects. After all, all subjects are humans
and all would benefit from improved information processing capacities.
Unfortunately,  enhancement  of  domain-general  cognitive  functions  such  as  working
memory and attention has proven difficult in brain injured (Lindeløv, submitted, Park &
Ingles, 2001) as well as non-injured subjects (Shipstead, Redick & Engle, 2012; Melby-
Lervåg & Hulme, 2012) where the sum of evidence show a dominance of domain-specific
effects  of  rehabilitation  efforts,  i.e.  relatively  little  transfer  to  untrained  material  and
contexts. There is an ongoing search for interventions which could promote far transfer, one
of which is variations of computer-based cognitive rehabilitation.
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There is a general distinction between training effects and transfer effects. This distinction
is also known as domain-specific vs. domain-general and near-transfer vs. far-transfer. For
example, working memory is said to be domain-general because it operates cross-modally
on a wide range of stimuli domains and contexts  (Baddeley, 2007; Cowan, 1988; Kanet et
al.,  2004).  An  improvement  of  working  memory  would  then  by  definition  lead  to  an
improvement on all behaviors which rely on working memory. If that improvement was
brought about by training a subset of these behaviors, such an effect be a transfer effect. In
contrast, domain-specific processes apply to a narrow range of stimuli and contexts. The
challenge for all studies is to provide convincing evidence that observed improvements are
not mere training effects. For example, Westerberg et al. (2007) observed improvements on
digit span and a spatial span tasks but both were a part of the training program so these
results could be attributed to mere training effects.
In  the  present  study  we  administered  an  N-back  training  procedure  to  a  non-injured
population and a patient population. The N-back has been used in numerous studies in non-
injured participants with initial evidence of positive transfer (Jaeggi, Buschkueh, Jonides &
Perrig, 2008; Jaeggi et al., 2010) but later replications have yielded null results (Jaeggi,
Buschkuehl,  Jonides  &  Shah,  2011;  Redick,  Shipstead  &  Harrison,  2012;  Chooi  &
Thompson, 2012). An N-back-like intervention has only been administered to brain injured
patients  in a  small  study by Cicerone (2002) who found very large positive effects  on
untrained tasks in the order of a standardized mean difference of >2, although in a very
different setting than the other N-back studies and with a sample size of only 4 patients in
the intervention group. Studying the N-back task therefore serves the triple purpose of (1)
vaguely  replicating  the  Cicerone  (2002)  finding,  (2)  providing  further  evidence  to  the
ambiguous  results  in  the  non-injured  population  and  (3)  to  assess  the  extent  to  which
evidence can be generalized across these two populations - at least for the N-back task.
 2.2.1  Methods
Sample: We recruited 39 in-hospital patients with acquired brain injury (ABI) at Hammel
Neurorehabilitation  Centre  and  University  Research  Clinic.  They  did  the  training  in
addition to treatment as usual. 19 patients completed (see Figure  2). Additional inclusion
criteria were (1) no aphasia, deafness, blindness or other disabilities which would prevent
testing and training, (2) the patient should be able perform reasonably (d-prime > 1) at N-
back level  1 and Visual  Search level  2 at  the time of recruitment and (3)  and that  the
training did not interfere with the standard treatment as judged by the patient’s primary
therapists.
We recruited 39 non-injured participants who trained in their free time using their own
personal computer. Twenty completed (see Figure  3). See Table  2 for descriptives on the
recruited and final sample.
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This  study  was  approved  by  the  local  ethics  committee,  all  subjects  signed  informed
consent  and  participation  was  voluntary.  Subjects  were  not  reimbursed.  Patients  were
informed  that  the  training  was  designed  to  facilitate  their  cognitive  recovery  and  non-
injured subjects were informed that it was designed to boost their intelligence.
Group Included Finished N-back VisualSearch
Males / Females ABINI
31 / 8
18 / 21
13 / 4
8 / 10
6 / 2
3 / 6
7 / 2
5 / 4
Age in years ABINI
53.3 (10.4)
27.4 (10.3)
56.1 (6.3)
29.3 (11.3)
56.1 (5.6)
29.2 (11.1)
56.1 (7)
29.4 (11.9)
Days since 
injury ABI 54 [28-94] 57 [33-95] 63 [35-89] 55 [33-95]
FIM cognitivea
(0-35) ABI 24 [22-28] 26 [23-28]
FIM motora 
(0-91) ABI 82 [60-89] 82 [67-89]
Table  2:  Sample descriptives  at  baseline for each group as frequencies  or mean (SD).
Included  column  is  for  all  included  subjects.  Finished  column  describe  subjects  who
eventually finished. N-back and Visual Search columns subdivides the finished columns to
the  two  treatments.  ABI=Acquired  Brain  Injury  group.  NI=Non-Injured  group.  FIM =
Functional  Independence Measure.  aFIM scores  at  baseline were only available for 18
patients and should therefore be regarded as a rough indication of  the patient  group’s
functional level rather than a sample descriptive. It is not shown for individual treatments
since there were only 4 of the patients in each group who finished that had a baseline FIM
score.
Design and randomization: This is a parallel-groups design with a 2 (patients/non-injured)
x 2 (N-back/Visual Search) design resulting in four treatment arms. Participants entered the
study continuously and were pseudo-randomly allocated to N-back and VS so that pre-test
RAPM scores and ages were balanced. The studies on patients and non-injured subjects
took place simultaneously but the stratification was independent for each group. Allocation
of the first four participants was truly random. Participants were scheduled for a post-test
when 20 training sessions were completed. Since more patients dropped out in the N-back
group, more were allocated to this group in the continuous enrollment.
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Figure 2: Study design and flowchart for the patient group.
Figure 3: Study design and flowchart for the non-injured group.
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N-back training:  The N-back task consisted of a series of stimuli presented at 3 second
intervals. The subject is instructed to press a key when the presented stimulus is identical to
the stimulus N back in the sequence. There were 25 % targets per block and at most two
consecutive targets. In order to prevent the formation of stimulus-specific strategies there
were a total of 137 different stimuli as shown in Figure 4: 3 types of audio and 4 types of
visual. A random selection of 8 stimuli from a randomly selected type was chosen for each
block of training to ensure some interference between stimuli.
Figure 4: The training tasks. Top left: 4 trials of the N-back task illustrated at 2-back level
with image stimuli. Top right: seven different stimulus types. Bottom: 4 trials of the Visual
Search task at level 4 (4 x 4 grid) and with “E” as a target. For each block any of the six
different shapes would be picked randomly as target. Subjects were instructed to press a
key on target trials.
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Visual Search training:  Subjects were instructed to press a key if a target symbol was
present in an N x N array of symbols. The target symbol changed from block to block but
there were just 6 different symbols. The Visual Search (VS) task is unrelated to working
memory (Kane, Poole, Tuholski & Engle, 2006) and served as an active control condition. It
has  served this  purpose in  other  training studies  (Redick,  Shipstead  & Harrison,  2012;
Harrison et al., 2013). During training levels increased from N=1,2,3,4... etc. but we will
use the number of items to be searched (N=1,4,9,16,...) as a measure of difficulty level
throughout in this paper.
Both training tasks: Tasks were kept similar in all other respects to maximize the purity of
the contrast. All participants trained 12 blocks of 20 + N trials on an adaptive N-back task
for 20 days. Less than 10 blocks were considered an incomplete training day. Interstimulus
interval  was  3  seconds.  Thus  the  full  intervention  consisted  of  4.4  hours  of  constant
training, breaks not included. Participants trained unsupervised in a laptop web browser.
Visual correct/incorrect feedback was given on response (hit/false alarm) and on misses in
the end of every trial. To increase motivation, participants were awarded points after each
block and given progressively more attractive titles. Feedback sounds were played on level
upgrade or downgrade. In addition, participants would see a graph of their own progress.
Outcome measures: Subjects  were  tested  on  the  following  measures  before  and  after
training. Although each is related to many cognitive abilities, they are grouped according to
the cognitive labels usually assigned to them: 
■ Fluid intelligence: Equal and unequal items from the Raven’s Advanced Progressive
Matrices (RAPM) was administered at pretest and posttest in counterbalanced order.
Subjects  were  given  10  minutes  to  solve  the  18  items  in  each  set.  RAPM has
excellent construct validity with respect to fluid intelligence as determined by latent
variable analysis (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999).
■ Working Memory: the WAIS-IV Working Memory Index (WMI), calculated from
forwards/backwards/ordered  digit  span,  mental  arithmetic  and  letter-number
sequencing. The latter is optional and was skipped for some fatigued patients.
■ Working Memory:  A computerized Operation Span (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, &
Engle, 2005) with 3 x span 2-4. Each subject was scored using the partial credit unit
scoring  method (Conway et  al.,  2005) which is  the average  proportion of  items
recalled in the correct location in each trial.
■ Processing  Speed: the  WAIS-IV Processing  Speed  Index  (PSI),  calculated  from
symbol  search  and  digit-symbol  coding.  PSI  and  WMI  have  high  internal
consistencies and retest reliabilities (Iverson, 2001).
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■ Processing speed with inhibition: 180 trials on a computerized Stroop task of which
20  %  were  incongruent.  Subjects  responded  verbally  to  maximize  interference
(Liotti, Woldorff, Perez, & Mayberg, 2000) while pressing a key to register reaction
time. Psychometric properties?
The operation span test  and the stroop test  were computerized using PsychoPy (Peirce,
2007) version 1.79 and administered in a separate test session.
Statistical models and inferences: Outcome data was modeled in R 3.1.2 as mixed models
with main effects of time, treatment and group and their interactions using the lmer 4.1.1
(Bates,  Maechler, Bolker and Walker, 2014) and BayesFactor 0.9.10 (Morey & Rouder,
2015)  packages.  There  was  a  random intercept  per  subject  to  account  for  correlations
between repeated measures. Inference was based on model selection between a full model
and a null model. The null model was the full model less the fixed effect in question, e.g.
the three-way interaction.
Training  data  was  modeled  using  a  power  function  (N=k+axb)  for  task  level  (N)  as  a
function of time (block number) with random intercepts (k) per subject and random a and b
parameters for intervention and group respectively to reflect differences in gain.
p-values from the chi-square statistic of a likelihood ratio tests (henceforth LRT; see Barr,
Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013) were reported to comply with current publishing practices.
It has long been known that p does not quantify evidence for/against the null and therefore
has poor inferential value (Berger & Sellke, 1987; Sellke, Bayarri, Berger, 2001; Wetzels et
al., 2011). Bayes factors (BF) with a relatively uninformative Cauchy(0, √(2)/2 ) prior
on each covariate were used to quantify the relative evidence for each model (Rouder &
Morey, 2012) with the exception of the power function where a more uninformative unit
information prior (Wagenmakers, 2007) was used for computation convenience. A Bayes
Factor is the odds ratio between two models. For example, BF=5 means that this data shifts
the odds 5:1 in favor of the full model and simultaneously shifts the odds 5 -1=0.2 for the
null.
 2.2.2  Results
Training tasks: The progression on the training tasks can be seen in Figure  5 and effect
sizes for the training task in Table 3. Block number was used as time unit with a total of
between 200 and 240 blocks for completers (20 days x 12 blocks per day). The average of
the power fits for individual patients are superposed on the data in Figure  5. The power
model was by far preferred to an intercept-only model for all four group x treatment cells
(pLRT << 0.001, BFBIC >> 1000) providing evidence that  there was improvement on the
training task in all conditions. I.e. the power model is much more than 1000 times more
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likely than the intercept model given the data. This is of crucial theoretical importance since
it establishes the training as a potential source of transfer to the outcome measures. It was
also preferred to a linear model with the same random-effects structure (pLRT << 0.001,
BFBIC >> 1000), thus providing evidence that the data is more likely to have been generated
by a power law than a linear law. It is apparent from Figure 5 that the NI group improved
much more than the ABI group numerically. This was confirmed by a substantial group-
specific  testing the random effects of group on a and b (pLRT << 0.001, BFBIC >> 1000).
Figure  5:  Level of training task as a function of block number (out of 240 in total) for
completers in each group by task. The ABI group was consistently at a lower level and
improved little on the training tasks whereas the non-injured group improved on both tasks.
The thick black line is the average of the predictions from a fitted power function. The thin
gray line and the gray area are the means and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for
the  mean  level  at  each  block  number. The  transparent  ‘+’ symbols  are the  data  from
individuals which the above represents. Two NI completers  improved to N=27 and N=45
on the N-back task and were not plotted. The breaks in the power function after block 200
is caused by subjects who stopped training there. Plots for all individuals are available in
supplementary Figure 6.
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N-back Visual Search
group Pre Post SMD Pre Post SMD
ABI 2.1 (1) 2.6 (0.8) 0.45 13.9 (8.1) 22.5 (11.9) 1.06
NI 2.7 (0.8) 7.5 (3.5) 6.11 20.2 (7.7) 48.1 (23.6) 3.58
Table  3:  Pre- and post-test means, standard deviations and standardized differences for
task level N. “pre” is computed from the the first 12 blocks starting from the first block
where the subject did not increase a level. “post” was is computed from the last 12 blocks.
Given the large sample of blocks, even very small effects would trivially would fall under
the full model (pLRT << 0.001 and BFBIC >> 1000) so we consider effect sizes is the most
informative statistic here.
Outcome measures.  See Table 4 for descriptives and inferences on outcome measures. A
difference in effect between the Visual Search training and the N-back training was not
supported by the data on any outcome measure, neither in the patient group nor the non-
injured group. All Bayes Factors favored the model without the treatment x time interaction
with a BF of about 2:1 against the full model. This BF is suggestive but too weak to say
anything definitive about  the direction of the effect  as  it  still  puts around 1/3 posterior
probability on the full interaction model. Furthermore, the controlled standardized mean
difference (SMDc = SMDnback - SMDsearch) were in the zero-to-small range (around 0.0 to
0.3) with no signs of a differential effect between single tests or cognitive domains.
Interestingly, the data suggests that the ABI and NI group did not differ in their gains on N-
back nor Visual Search on any outcome as revealed by inferences on the group x time x test
interaction  term  (see  Table  4).  Bayes  Factors  again  favored  the  null  more  than  the
alternative and no interactions were statistically noticeable (p > 5%).
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 2.2.3  Discussion
We observed  an  improvement  on  the  training  task  but  no  transfer  to  untrained  tasks.
Therefore the Cicerone et al. (2002) findings were not replicated. This should be regarded
as a conceptual replication of the N-back part of the Cicerone intervention since there are a
number of design differences, including that Cicerone et al. provided the intervention in
person, used different materials and different outcome measures. 
With respect to the N-back literature on non-injured adults, these results fail to replicate
findings of  positive transfer  (Jaeggi,  Buschkueh,  Jonides  & Perrig,  2008;  Jaeggi  et  al.,
2010) but are in line with several null findings  (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides & Shah, 2011;
Redick, Shipstead & Harrison, 2012; Chooi & Thompson, 2012). The former studies used
passive control groups while the latter used active control groups. It is possible that the
initial positive results were caused by confounding nonspecific factors, such as expectation
and motivation, which cannot be attributed to the task itself. If that is the case, these studies
do not constitute evidence that the training task per se caused the observed effects.
Convergence: computerized training yield specific effects.  N-back and Visual Search
training did not differentially improve performance on neuropsychological tests which are
thought to reflect working memory, processing speed or fluid intelligence. Since previous
research has shown that N-back performance reflects working memory and that VS does
not (18 and we observe no selective effect  of N-back improvement on working memory
measures, we conclude that subjects developed specific strategies to solve the N-back task
during the course of training.
How specific? Answer: So specific that N-back training on digits did not transfer to digit
span (part of WAIS Working Memory Index), N-back training on letters did not transfer to
Operation Span letter recall, Visual Search training did not transfer to Symbol Search (part
of WAIS, see supplementary) and N-back training on locations in a 3 x 3 grid did not
transfer to the RAPM 3 x 3 grid. It is clear that these data pose problems for the naïve view
that abstract cognitive abilities were acquired during the training and even the view that
something intermediate was trained, such as recalling sequential items or scanning visual
grids.  Instead,  we  believe  that  computerized  training  follows  the  well-known  learning
principle that the efficiency of the decoding/use of a skill is proportional to the similarity of
the decoding context to the encoding/learning context of this skill  (Perkins & Salomon,
1989; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). The repetitive nature of computerized training make up a
highly stable context and thus the N-back and VS skills become “locked” to this context in
a way that does not generalize to a neuropsychological test setting or even the computerized
tests.
This is evidence that the development of specific strategies that do not transfer to untrained
tasks might be a possible point of convergence between a non-injured and a brain injured
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population. Although specific improvement may seem unflattering compared to generalized
improvement,  it  could actually be thought of as a very efficient  information processing
strategy where the cheap local strategies are preferred to the slow and costly high-level
cognition (Clark, 2013). As such, the tendency and ability to develop specific strategies
could be regarded as a property of a healthy cognitive system.
Divergence: the  formation of  specific  skills.  The non-injured  group improved 2.5-5.5
SMD more on the training tasks than the ABI group. We interpret the training data to reflect
an impaired ability to form specific strategies in the ABI group. One explanation for this
observation is that well-functioning domain-general cognition is necessary for the effective
formation of specific strategies. However, 5 out of 17 ABI patients had a baseline Working
Memory Index score over 100 and two patients had a Processing Speed Index score over
100. But neither of  these improved nearly as  much on the training task as the average
person in the NI group, thus discrediting this hypothesis.
The group differences in etiologies could be confounded by the age difference. However,
Dahlin et al. (2008) did computerized training on non-injured young and elderly adults and
found no difference in gain on the training task. A meta-analysis on 25 computer-based
parallel-groups  RCT  on  brain  injured  patients  similarly  found  no  effect  of  age  on
improvement  (Lindeløv,  in  preparation).  Thus  both  within-study  and  between-study
evidence discredits age as the sole explanation for the observed discrepancy between the
ABI and NI group.
This leaves us in a limbo with no single candidate explanation for the observed difference
between groups. There is a vast  literature on the topic of specific learning impairments
following  acquired  brain  injury  (Vanderploeg,  Crowell,  Curtiss,  2001;  Schmitter-
Edgecombe,  2006).  However,  it  has  almost  exclusively  investigated  verbal  and  motor
learning within single sessions. Four weeks of training on the N-back task and the Visual
Search  tasks  do  not  readily  subsume under  these  categories  so  the  present  study  may
contribute new evidence. It is up to future studies to narrow in on the mechanisms driving
this effect. To support this effort, we encourage authors to report and interpret training data
explicitly when doing this kind of study.
Limitations:  The  final  sample  size  per  condition  is  small  even  though  a  total  of  78
participants initiated the training. The present study should not be considered as basis for
clinical  guidelines but rather as preliminary evidence which puts a few ideas about the
mechanisms underlying computer based training on the table. Even then, is not smaller than
the two most cited studies on the topic (Westerberg et al., 2007; Sturm, Willmes, Orgass &
Hartje, 1997).  The sample size was influenced by a large dropout rate of 50% which was
not biased with respect to age, gender, baseline scores or (for patients) FIM score. The
dropout rate may be informative about the expected adherence to fully self-initiated training
without a monetary reward for NI and ABI subjects alike. The optimal evidence support for
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the  conclusions  above  would  have  been  obtained  if  the  ABI  and  NI  group  had  been
matched on all nuisance parameters such as age, education and socioeconomic status.
Future  directions: We  suggest  that  future  research  on  computerized  cognitive
rehabilitation may progress along two different routes: (1) Prevent specific learning. This is
not  easy. Simply  training  on  a  large  array  of  different  tasks  may  not  be  sufficient  as
demonstrated by several null findings who did this (Middleton, Lambert & Seggar, 1991;
Chen et  al.,  1997).  A true context-breaking intervention would constantly present novel
problems, shifts between devices, change colors, be trained at different locations etc. We
expect  that  this  approach  is  too  chaotic  to  be  feasible  with  a  patient  population.
Alternatively, (2) exploit the context-specific effects and make the training task as similar to
the  transfer  target  as  possible,  i.e.  practice  reading  television  subtitles,  doing  mental
arithmetic on shopping costs etc. For example, Yip and Man (2013) successfully improved
real-life shopping performance after training in a matching virtual reality environment. This
is a much less ambitious target than high-level cognition but may also be more realistic.
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 2.2.5  Supplementary training data
Figure 6 shows training data for all 78 individual subjects together with predictions from
the  linear  mixed  model  which  as  an  R  formula  can  be  represented  as  log(N)  ~
block_number * group * treatment + (1|id). This model is quite simple: six single-valued
parameters common to all participants and then a subject-specific random effect. That is a
reduction from 8834 data points to 43 parameters (37 subjects + 6 fixed effects). We find
that the model represents the individuals well. Another option would be to fit a quadratic
time-trend instead of log-transforming N.
Figure 6: N as a function of block number during training for all 38 completers. Plusses
are individual data points, the irregular line is a 12-block running mean. The black line is
the fit by a full power function (with a random a, b, and k for each subject) and the red line
is the fit by the null model of no difference between group gains (only random k). The full
model has a better fit.
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Although the fit of a model with a fixed training effect yield good fits, an inspection of the
distribution of the first and last blocks reveals a nuance to the story. Figure  7 shows the
distribution of the first and last 12 blocks for each group x treatment cell. For the ABI
group where there is little improvement, the data are well represented by a shift in mean
and equal distributions. However, for the NI group, the distribution widens considerably,
reflecting a variability in the individual’s improvement. Here a fixed-effect-and-variance
view does not do justice to the data.
Figure  7: distribution  of  task  levels  for  the  first  (unfilled  histogram)  and  last  (filled
histogram) 12 blocks by completers. 
 2.2.6  Supplementary outcome data
Table 5 includes the subtests that make up the WAIS working memory index and processing
speed index. It also includes the absolute mean reaction time on the stroop task.
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Table 5
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 2.3  Epilogue: Is the N-back task a working
memory task throughout the 
experiment?
The claim that brain injured patients have an impaired ability to learn specific strategies
deserve more discussion and scrutiny than space allowed for in the paper. However, that
discussion will be postponed to after the next paper, since they inform each other. Here, I
want to expand on what this finding implies about the underlying cognitive change during
training. This was the line of thought that lead me to do a review and meta-analysis and
therefore also serves as an introduction to the review paper.
 2.3.1  Construct validity of the N-back training task
The N-back task is classically thought of as a working memory task but it  shares little
variance  with  complex  span  tasks,  such  as  Operation  Span,  even  though  both  are
considered to be working memory tests. Kane et al. (2007) found that OSPAN explained
around 11% of the variance in N-back while Redick et al. (2013) found it to be 4%. This
surprisingly weak relationship is  also observed in  intervention studies  with non-injured
participants  where  N-back  performance  increases  with  training  while  complex  span
performance remained stable in the same subjects (Jaeggi et al., 2010; Redick, 2012). This
is a reminder to be cautious when assigning abstract “cognitive labels” to particular tasks.
As I have argued, it is more accurate to say that N-back performance pertains to working
memory functioning than to equate the two, as is all too common (e.g. in the titles of Jaeggi
et al., 2008; 2010; Redick et al., 2012; Chooi et al., 2012).
In our study, we also find an increase in N-back performance and a relatively unchanged
performance on  the  operation  span  task  and  Raven’s matrices  from pretest  to  posttest.
Interestingly, Kane et al. (2007) found that the N-back task covaried with fluid intelligence
as assessed by Raven’s matrices  (though with a medium sized r=0.33),  but  we did not
observe  an  improvement  in  RAPM  even  though  N-back  performance  improved.  This
dissociation is most striking in healthy subjects since they improve the most on the N-back
task. If performance on N-back and RAPM reflected a bottleneck in the same underlying
construct,  improvement  in  N-back  would  not  be  possible  without  a  widening  of  this
bottleneck which in turn should cause better performance on RAPM. This is at odds with
our  findings.  This  conflict  between  findings  of  cross-sectional  studies  and  longitudinal
studies shows itself in many experiments. To mention a few, Chooi et al. (2012) and Redick
et al (2012) observed improvement on the N-back training, but not on RAPM outcome.
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Harrison et al. (2013) observed improvements on complex span training but not on RAPM
outcome. 
I can think of two possible theoretical explanations of this.
 2.3.2  Theoretical accounts of near-transfer
#1:  Low-level  strategy offloads high-level  cognition. It  may be that  subjects  develop
specific strategies to solve the task and use these to leverage the load on higher cognitive
processes.  Such  an  explanation  fits  well  with  many  learning  theories,  e.g.  the  ACT-R
framework  (Singley  &  Anderson,  1989)  and  the  free  energy  account  of  information
processing in the brain (Friston, 2010; Clark, 2013). High-level processing is expensive and
low-level  processing is  cheap.  So subjects  may draw on high-level  cognitive functions
initially  but  eventually  develop  specific  strategies  at  which  point  the  lower  layers  can
efficiently handle the task without loading the higher layers. If this shift happens at an early
stage, say during the first two or three training sessions, the high-level function is never
really “trained” extensively22 - or at least it has laid relatively dormant for a long time at
post-test. In other words, the training task changes construct validity during the training. An
N-back task may initially share a great deal of variance with other “working memory tasks”
but almost exclusively share variance with itself in the end of the training. If this is true,
this effective strategy of using as few mental resources as possible is the very principle that
underlies the dominance of near-transfer over far-transfer, as suggested by these theories.
#2: High-level cognition is illusory. An alternative explanation is that there is no unitary or
causally  intertwined  high-level  cognitive processes  in  the first  place.  According to  this
view, it  appears that different behaviors expresses the same underlying capacity limits (a
view  most  forcefully  promoted  by  Miller,  1956  and  Cowan,  2000,  2005)  while  the
underlying cognitive architecture is  not  causally related at  any given time.  Andy Clark
formalized  this  line  of  thought  under  the  heading  “Microcognition”  or
“microfunctionalism” (Clark,  1991),  according to which cognition is atomic at  its  core,
composed of very simple independent functional units. These units can, however, interact in
ways that establishes higher-order (or “emergent”) functionality.
So the correlations found in cross-sectional  studies  does  not  necessarily  imply that  the
underlying cognition is causally related. According to this view, the reason that  N-back
performance can increase while RAPM does not, is that they were never causally related.
The observed correlations between e.g. working memory behaviors may be caused by a
third factor. One prime candidate as a third factor is experience. All mental faculties are
formed by the same evidence base - the lifetime experiences of the subject - and this causes
some convergence in aptitudes. When subjected to computer-based training, a small set of
22  This is the muscle metaphor of cognitive improvement, which I will return to in the discussion
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these “microfunctions” are selectively exposed to experiences and thereby they are being
de-correlated from the other “microfunctions” which are not brought to bear on the training
task. As a result we observe a near-transfer effect.
Evaluation of the explanations:  I see no easy way that these two explanations could be
distinguished  empirically  from  behavioral  observations  since  they  make  the  same
predictions23.  However,  the  prospect  of  any of  them being a  more  accurate  account  of
learning and transfer  in  training experiments is  interesting in and of  itself.  A first  step
towards informing that distinction would be for authors to report the actual training data.
 2.3.3  Examples and implications
An important implication, if these speculations hold, is that the psychometric properties of
the training task changes during training. Specifically, trained behaviors become optimized
for the training task.  If  one extrapolated from this  narrow set  of  abilities  to  the whole
domain,  one  would overestimate  the  effect.  As an  extreme case,  Maguire  et  al.  (2002)
investigated  ten  world  memory  experts  compared  to  matched  controls  and  found  no
important differences in performance on classical intelligence and memory tests. Maguire
et al. attributed differences in memory performance to the use of specific strategies that can
be applied in a very narrow set of situations (see also Ericcson, 2003). It would be a gross
error  to  extrapolate  from  the  memory  experts’ specific  memory  skills  to  their  general
memory abilities. Anecdotally, I have experienced this myself. I reach a 15-back level on
the N-back task, a 7-back level on a dual N-back task, and a 3-back level on a quadro N-
back task. To my great regret, I did not notice any improvements in my cognitive abilities
on other materials, e.g.  the ability to concentrate on academic papers or to comprehend
complex arguments. I later learned to recite pi with 130 digits and the natural number with
around 60 digits. This did not enhance my ability to learn phone numbers and I did not
spontaneously see fragments of pi decimals in the world around me. For both N-back and
digits, the ability to do well was tightly locked to the exact material I had been training on.
The same may be true for  the participants in our N-back study and in the many other
studies cited in this section.
The above considerations about the potentially changing role of the training task and its
implications for transfer became apparent to me only after having conducted the N-back
studies and seeing the results. If the above is true, many studies (the N-back study included)
have confounded stimulus-specific effects with proper transfer effects. That was the point
of departure for the review which takes methodological confounds into account.
23  I have thought about this for three years now to no avail.
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 2.4  Computer-based cognitive 
rehabilitation following acquired 
brain injury: does the evidence 
support the claims?
Four necessary criteria for the claim that a behavioral interventions improves a cognitive
function are presented. A claim is supported if  (1) the outcome measures represents the
targeted cognitive domain. This entails that (2) outcome measures are dissimilar to the
training  task.  (3)  Changes  in  outcome  measures  must  be  relatively  consistent.  These
changes can only be attributed to the intervention if (4) the intervention is isolated using an
active control group.
A review on computer-based cognitive rehabilitation included 30 studies with a total of 42
parallel-groups treatment-control contrasts. At least 27 contrasts studies were categorized
as false positives according to these criteria. In other words, the publications claimed to
find cognitive transfer effects but did not provide the necessary evidence. At most three
contrasts were categorized as a true positives. There were 12 true negatives (null findings).
A meta-analysis found no effect on non-trained outcome measures (SMD=0.05, 95% CI=-
0.10 to 0.20), i.e. no transfer. The observed positive effects could be attributed to low-level
similarities between training and outcome tasks (add 0.24 SMD) and nonspecific effects
which go untested in passive control groups (add 0.23 SMD). 
Thus the very literature which is cited in support of cognitive transfer turns out to provide
strong evidence for the opposite view: computer-based cognitive rehabilitation does not
improve high-level cognitive functioning.
Systematic  reviews  and  meta-analyses  frequently  classify  the  quality  of  Randomized
Controlled Trials using the Jadad scale (Jadad, Moore,  Carroll,  et  al.,  1996).  This scale
assigns  a  0-5  score  to  individual  studies  based  on  their  procedures  for  randomization,
blinding  and  handling  of  dropouts.  Outcome  measures  for  “high-quality”  studies  are
classified into mental categories (e.g. “attention”, “executive functions”, “memory” etc.)
and  compared  across  studies.  By  doing  so,  however,  a  number  of  implicit  theoretical
assumptions are silently accepted and issues neglected. For example, several studies have
concluded that attention improved following computer-based cognitive training although
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improvement was only observed on half or fewer measures of attention relative to control
groups (e.g.  Sturm, Willmes, Bernt & Wolfgang, 1997; Sturm, Fimm, Cantagallo, et al.
2003; Gray, Robertson, Pentland & Anderson, 1992). This is hardly compatible with the
view that attention improved overall. Other studies have used the training task itself as an
outcome measure (e.g. Prokopenko, Mozheyko, Petrova, et al., 2013; Man, Soong, Tam,
Hui-Chan, 2006; Stablum, Umiltà, Mogentale, Carlan, & Guerrini, 2000) and interpreted
improvement  as  if  it  reflected  a  general  cognitive  capacity,  although  these  results  are
expected under the hypothesis of near transfer and even zero transfer.
Still, these studies are cited as were they evidence in support of a generalized cognitive
improvement  (e.g.  in Cha & Kim, 2013) even though the results are supportive of  the
opposite hypothesis: that any cognitive improvement is fairly specific to the trained task.
The interpretations laid out in the papers are silently accepted even when they are at odds
with the very method and data they are based on.
While the Jadad scale may be a good general-purpose tool to evaluate bias in empirical
studies,  I  will  argue  that  additional  criteria  are  necessary  for  behavioral  interventions
targeted  at  cognitive  improvement.  The  next  section  motivates  this  necessity  and  the
following section presents four such additional criteria.
 2.4.1  Training effects and transfer effects
Under what circumstances may claims like the following be supported?
Training on [task] improved [cognitive function]
… where the cognitive function could be a high-level construct such as attention, working
memory, prospective memory, executive functions, selective attention and the like.
To answer this question, it is important to distinguish between training effects and transfer
effects (Barnett & Ceci, 2002). Loosely, a training effect is a change in aptitude which is
closely bound to the material and context in which it was acquired. It is sometimes called
narrow learning, near-transfer, skill learning or low-level strategies. A transfer effect is any
change in aptitude which extends beyond the training effect, i.e. generalizes to new material
and  new  situations.  It  is  sometimes  called  wide  learning,  far-transfer,  remediation  or
generalized learning. Since cognitive functions usually take a wide variety of stimuli and
contexts as input, an improvement of a cognitive function by means of a limited set  of
stimuli  and  context(s)  would  require  a  transfer  effect  rather  than  a  training  effect.
Therefore, one has to present convincing evidence for a transfer effect to make the above
claim.
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Naturally,  transfer  effects  are  desirable  in  a  rehabilitation  setting  where  the  goal  is  to
improve  patients’  functioning  in  the  community  rather  than  their  performance  on
neuropsychological  tests  in  a  rehabilitation  setting.  Unfortunately, numerous  studies  on
learning have supported the view that learning and recall tends to be highly specific to the
conjunction  of  stimuli  in  the  learning  situation,  starting  with  Edwin  Thorndike  and
colleagues more than 100 years ago (Thorndike & Woodworth,  1901 later  extended by
Singley & Anderson, 1989).  It  has  later  been described in  cognitive psychology as  the
principle of encoding-decoding specificity (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) and in educational
psychology as the context-specificity of learning (Perkins & Salomon, 1989). Within brain
injury  rehabilitation  it  is  closely  related  to  the  distinction  between  remediation  and
compensation  (Dirette  et  al.,  1999).  Here  too,  many  have  advocated  the  view  that
interventions  should  be  very  specific  to  the  behavior  one  wish  to  improve  (Wilson,
Baddeley, Evans & Shiel, 1994; Park & Ingles, 2001)
In addition to this, the method of computer-based training is the “drill and practice” strategy
which is particularly known to form specific associations that are effective for rote learning
of explicit  facts but not for  thinking skills  (Perkins & Salomon, 1989; Tournaki,  2003;
McGurk, Twamley, Sitzer, McHugo, & Mueser, 2007). It may even hinder the development
of such abilities by over-training more specific solutions, leading to negative transfer when
subjects apply overlearned behaviors in situations where they are sub-optimal (Singley &
Anderson, 1989).
Thus I argue that the broader theoretical and empirical literature on human learning and
rehabilitation leaves the burden of proof on demonstrating transfer effects. But what would
it  take  to  establish  such  a  support  for  transfer  effects  in  a  study  on  computer-based
cognitive training? I propose four necessary criteria to this end in the next section. In the
following sections,  a  review applies  these criteria  to single studies  and a meta-analysis
synthesize evidence across studies.
 2.4.2  Necessary methodological criteria
In this section I will argue that it is necessary to (1) have a test battery that represents the
full transfer domain, which entails (2) having outcome measures that are dissimilar to the
training  task  so  that  potential  low-level  improvements  are  not  interpreted  as  proper
cognitive transfer. (3) Outcomes satisfying the first two criteria should show a consistent
effect, which (4) can only be attributed to the computer-based aspect of the intervention if
contrasted  with  a  parallel  active  control  group.  One  may  regard  this  section  as  an
explicitation of how the experimental method would flesh out when establishing the effect
of training (independent variable) on a cognitive function (dependent variable). Satisfying
Representativeness, Dissimilarity, and Consistency increases the experimental validity of
the  dependent  variable(s)  and  satisfying  the  active  control  criterion  increases  the
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unambiguity of the independent variable.
The criteria  will  be presented in  a  fairly  abstract  way here  but  they  are applied to  30
publications in the two following sections where they can be seen in action.
Representativeness: outcome measures should exhaust the transfer
domain
The aptitude of a cognitive function does per definition apply to all stimuli and processes
that depend on it. For example, if attention is improved, you would predict that all behavior
which is mediated or moderated by attention should be affected to the degree that attention
is involved. Therefore, a perfect support for the claim that attention improved would be to
address all of these behaviors and all should be affected in a way that is consistent with an
underlying  improvement  of  the  attention-specific  involvement  in  each  measure.  This
includes  a  wide  array  of  stimuli  for  each  sensory  modality  (visual,  auditory,  tactile,
olfactory etc) as well as interoceptive signals.
Such an exhaustive mapping of behavior is of course too comprehensive or even impossible
to do in practice. However, we can turn a logical argument into a probabilistic argument by
doing inference on representative samples. Just like we sample individuals because it is
unfeasible to test a full population, we can sample behaviors from the transfer domain. But
just like a single subject is insufficient to study the nature of human behavior in general, a
single outcome measure is insufficient to make claims about changes in domain-general
cognitive functions. Even two or three different subjects/tests seem like a very inadequate
sample although it is certainly much better than just one. Staying with the analogy, you
should be careful about generalizing to all of humanity if you only study subjects from one
culture, e.g. a western university (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Similarly, if the
aptitude of attention is measured using only visual tasks, you may make valid claims about
visual attention but should be careful about making inferences on the aptitude of attention
in untested modalities.
However, we can administer fewer tests than the analogy to sampling of subjects might
imply, because we usually do not know the properties of recruited individuals in advance
but  we  do  have  knowledge  about  many  tests.  Using  varieties  of  structural  equation
modeling (SEM, e.g. factor analysis, latent variable analysis and simple correlation) we
have approximated to what degree performance on particular tasks are representative of
each other. For example, Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices explains around 50 - 80 %
of  the  variance  shared  by  measures  of  fluid  intelligence  and  Operation  Span  explains
around 60 % of the variance shared by complex span measures of working memory (Engle,
Tuholski,  Laughlin,  &  Conway,  1999;  Kane,  Hambrick,  Tuholski,  et  al.,  2004;  Kane,
Hambrick, & Conway, 2005). SEM could be an important tool to select an experimentally
feasible number of outcomes that best represents the full transfer domain.
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In summary:
Representativeness recommendation: Administer multiple outcome measures
with high construct validity for the cognitive domain of interest.
Dissimilarity:  outcome  measures  should  be  dissimilar  to  the
training task(s)
The training task is often a part of the transfer domain. I.e. to improve attention, you train a
task which strains attention with the aim of improving it like a muscle. To improve working
memory  you  train  a  task  that  strains  working  memory. The  same  is  true  for  problem
solving, reasoning, prospective memory etc. 
I have argued that learning tends to be stimulus-specific. As a consequence, as subjects
improve on the training task, it is very likely to become a local aptitude maximum in the
transfer  domain.  Consequently,  the  performance  on  the  training  task  becomes  non-
representative of the transfer-domain and cannot be used as evidence on equal footing with
non-trained tests since it is a priori very likely to overestimate the underlying effect.
This is also true of outcome measures which are similar but not identical to the training
task. For example, if digit span is trained to improve memory and letter span is used as
outcome measure, and both are delivered in the same modality, at the same pace, and at
similar span lengths,  there could be some carry-over of specific optimizations for these
similarities which are peripheral to a general memory capacity. Again, the consequence is
that the letter span becomes unrepresentative of the memory transfer domain.
More generally, a measure within the transfer domain becomes positively biased to the
extent that it overlaps with the training domain. Its representativeness is “contaminated” by
the specific strategies developed during training. Therefore, the training domain becomes a
“blind spot” in the transfer domain, since stimulus-specific effects cannot be disentangled
from effects of the targeted cognitive function. So:
Dissimilarity recommendation: minimize stimulus-specific overlap between
the training task(s) and the transfer task(s) of interest. Evaluate the extent to
which any remaining overlap accounts for observed transfer.
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Consistency:  changes  in  outcome  measures  must  be  (largely)
consistent
Obviously, merely designing an appropriate test battery (satisfying Representativeness and
Dissimilarity) is insufficient to establish that a high-level cognitive change occurred. You
need data. Ideally outcomes should all improve, all deteriorate or all maintain status quo. In
the case that just one outcome measure with 100 % sensitivity to the underlying construct
does not change in the same direction as the other outcome measures, the claim that the
underlying construct changed as a whole is falsified, no matter how many other tests were
administered. 
This criterion can be relaxed since there is  no cognitive test  with 100 % sensitivity or
selectivity and therefore any deviation from an overall pattern could be due to influences
(noise) from other sources than the targeted cognitive process.  However, since the tests
ought to have high validity with respect to the construct (cf. the Representativeness and
Dissimilarity criteria), any such non-consistent outcomes poses problems for the claim that
the construct improved per se and should be interpreted explicitly.
Consistency recommendation: Only generalize findings to properties that the
improved outcome measures have in common and which does not overlap
with the properties of non-improved outcome measures.
Active control:  isolate the cause using a parallel  active control
group
Satisfying Representativeness, Dissimilarity and consistency is necessary to establish that a
high-level  cognitive  change occurred.  However,  to  establish what  caused  this  cognitive
change, various influences must be factored out using a control condition. Such influences
usually  include  retest  effects,  expectancy  effects  (placebo)  and  nonspecific  effects  of
training anything at all (e.g. repeatedly engaging in a cognitively demanding activity). The
rationale for using different kinds of control groups is well known but a short explicitation
for some common control groups is warranted for the present context. 
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Given proper stratification and that  Representativeness, Dissimilarity and Consistency is
satisfied, here is what may be concluded using each control group:
■ Passive: A mixture of training on [task], expectancy effects and nonspecific effects
improved [cognitive function]. The contribution of each is unknown.
■ Treatment  as  usual;  A  mixture  of  training  on  [task]  and  nonspecific  effects
improved [cognitive function]. The contribution of each was untested but we think
that some nonspecific effects are likely controlled for relative to a passive control.
■ Active: Training on [task] improved [cognitive function].
… where the active control condition would ideally be matched on all nuisance parameters
(e.g. motivation, duration and intensity), so that only the hypothesized “active ingredient”
differs between groups. That “active ingredient” is usually a particular task or suite of tasks.
Design-wise,  I  will  argue  that  the  only  proper  controlled  design  for  drill-and-practice
rehabilitation is  a  parallel  control  group drawn from the same sample as  the  treatment
group. I do this by excluding the two alternatives24. First, multiple-baseline designs do not
control for retest effects during the treatment-phase and they do not control for expectancy
effects  and  nonspecific  effects.  The  second  design  is  cross-over,  which  consists  of  a
treatment-control arm and a control-treatment arm. The first phase of a cross-over design is
a parallel groups design. But issues arise in the second phase: since the very purpose of
rehabilitative interventions is to achieve long-term cognitive changes in the patients, there
is  no  wash-out  period  so  the  “control”  condition  in  the  treatment-control  arm  is  not
comparable to the control condition in the control-treatment arm. Consequently, phase 1,
which is a parallel-groups design, is the only properly controlled part of a cross-over design
for studies on rehabilitation and training.
To sum up in the last recommendation:
Active Control recommendation: use an active control group to establish the
training task(s) as the independent variable.
24  Another type of control is the intermingling of test and control trials on a second-by-second 
basis, often in basic cognitive science. This kind of control is never used in treatment studies for 
the same reasons as cross-over studies are inappropriate: it is unsuitable for independent 
variables which cause a learning effect on the observed variables.
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 2.4.3  Criteria-based review: does the evidence 
support the claims?
In  this  section,  the  four  criteria  are  applied  to  studies  on  computerized  cognitive
rehabilitation of patients with acquired brain injury. The purpose of this qualitative analysis
is to characterize how many of the claims in the literature are substantiated by method and
design factors which remain unappraised under the Jadad criteria.
Search strategy
Publications were included in the review if they (1) were predominantly computer-based,
(2) targeted higher cognitive functions, which was defined as cross-modal functions. E.g.
studies targeting attention are included but those targeting visual attention are not. (3) Used
a  parallel  control  group,  (4)  included  patients  with  acquired  brain  injury  but  without
selecting  for  a  particular  deficit,  i.e.  neglect,  hemianopia,  aphasia  etc.  The  underlying
purpose of these the inclusion criteria was to homogenize the selection of studies. Details
on these criteria as well as search terms are provided in the supplementary A.
PubMed,  PsycINFO  and  Google  Scholar  was  searched  for  relevant  publications.  The
identification of the included studies are illustrated in Figure  8. References of all papers
assessed for eligibility were scanned for further sources as were earlier reviews (Cha &
Kim, 2013; Chung, Pollock, Campbell, Durward, & Hagen, 2013; Leclercq & Sturm, 2002;
Loetscher  &  Lincoln,  2013;  Poulin,  Korner-Bitensky, Dawson,  &  Bherer,  2012;  Rees,
Marshall, Hartridge, Mackie, & Weiser, 2007; Rohling, Faust, Beverly, & Demakis, 2009;
Xu,  Ren,  Prakash,  Kumar,  &  Vijayadas,  2013;  Xi,  2012).  Lastly,  publication  lists  for
commercial  rehabilitation  software  was  scanned.  Two  studies  had  insufficient  data  for
computation of effect sizes (Wood & Fussey, 1987; Sturm et al.,  2003) and information
about the intervention was too sparse for two studies (De Luca, Calabrò, Gervasi, et al.,
201425;  Röhring, Kulke, Reulbach, Peetz,  & Schupp, 2004, see Table  6).  Therefore,  the
review includes 30 studies and the meta-analysis is based on 26 studies.
Authors were contacted for clarification and nonpublished information/data where needed.
Unpublished data and details were obtained for 16 publications, 11 of which were included.
Requests to the authors of 15 included publications were not answered. It was not possible
to find functional contact information for 8 publications.
25  Per personal communication with authors. Clinical staff did the intervention and the authors do 
not know what they did.
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Figure  8. Flowchart of study inclusion and the studies that went into the review, the full
dataset and the norm dataset respectively.
Outcome extraction and scoring
Only  performance-based  outcomes  were  included  -  typically  administered  by  a
neuropsychologist  or  a  computer.  Observational  scores  (e.g.  Functional  Independence
Measure)  and self-evaluation questionnaires  (e.g.  SF-36) were not  included in order  to
homogenize the compared effect sizes and since they are seldom thought to be as direct
measures of the aptitude of specific cognitive functions.
Only outcomes which were targeted in the training were included. For example, Yip and
Man (2013) trained prospective memory so only the four “prospective memory” outcomes
out  of  11  outcome  measures  in  total  were  included.  Many  training  programs  simply
targeted  cognition  in  general  and  for  these,  all  cognitive  performance-based  cognitive
outcome measures were scored as targeted.
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A total of 298 targeted outcome measures were included and sufficient information about
the tests and intervention to judge the training-outcome similarity was obtained for 277 of
these (c.f. the Dissimilarity criterion). Each outcome was scored in one of three categories
which I hypothesized would show a ranked effect size (large-to-small):
■ SAME:  the  training  task  and  the  outcome  are  essentially  identical.  Response
modalities were allowed to differ. Typically a computer would use keyboard / mouse
whereas a testing session uses verbal answers, pointing or manual manipulations of
objects.
■ SIMILAR: There is an overlap in stimuli and/or structure which could be explained
by specific strategies that only applies to the training domain.
■ DISSIMILAR:  neither  SAME  or  SIMILAR,  i.e.  there  is  no  obvious  low-level
explanation for the observed effect on the outcome measure.
When the training task(s) was underspecified further information was sought from authors,
from publicly available information material and from other publications that used the same
training task(s). Scoring outcomes on these categories is elaborated in the supplementary A
and the supplementary dataset provides justifications for every single outcome.
Results
The 30 studies are listed in Table 6 and Table 7. Table 6 contains information about samples
and interventions while Table 7 contains information relevant for the four criteria.
The studies cover 1086 patients who were a weighted average of 47.3 years old and a
weighted median of 7.5 months post-injury following a mixture of traumatic and vascular
etiologies.  Total  training time was between 3.3 hours and 341.3 hours  with a  weighted
median of  14 hours  and the majority of  studies  carried out  training in for  hospitalized
patients (14 studies) or in a clinic for outpatients (7 studies). Studies targeted attention or
subcomponents  of  attention  (15  studies),  memory  (11  studies  targeted  either  Memory,
Working Memory or Prospective memory) or simply cognition in general (7 studies). PSS
CogRehab was used as training task in 4 studies while CogMed and AIXTENT were used
in three studies each. Information about therapist involvement and/or blinding was only
obtainable for little over half of the studies.
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 Table 6[descriptives]
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Table 7 presents some information which allows us to evaluate each study with respect to
the four criteria.  While the quantitative analysis of effect  sizes is  the topic of the next
section, this section is a logical analysis of whether the evidence (method and inferences)
supports the claims made in the papers.
                    paper  contrast   similar claim      p<5%  control          inference
      Sturm et al. (1983)             2/5/9/0   yes  14/16=88%     TaU               main
      Malec et al. (1984)             0/1/5/0    no     0/6=0%     TaU        interaction
     Kerner et al. (1985)    active   2/0/0/0   yes   2/2=100%  active        interaction
     Kerner et al. (1985)   passive   2/0/0/0   yes    1/2=50% passive        interaction
       Wood et al. (1987)             0/1/5/0    no     0/6=0%     TaU        interaction
  Middleton et al. (1991)       M-A   2/1/0/0    no     0/3=0%  active        interaction
  Middleton et al. (1991) reasoning   1/1/1/0    no     0/3=0%  active        interaction
      Sturm et al. (1991)             6/3/5/0    no   5/14=36%     TaU        interaction
   Piskopos et al. (1991)           10/1/23/0    no    0/30=0%  active        interaction
       Gray et al. (1992)            0/8/14/0   yes    2/22=9%  active        interaction
       Ruff et al. (1994) attention   2/2/3/0   yes    1/7=14%  active        main / post
       Ruff et al. (1994)    memory   2/9/6/0   yes   3/17=18%  active        main / post
       Chen et al. (1997)            8/3/10/0    no     0/4=0%     TaU        interaction
      Sturm et al. (1997) alertness   0/2/0/0   yes    1/2=50%  active        interaction
      Sturm et al. (1997) vigilance   0/2/0/0   yes    1/2=50%  active        interaction
      Sturm et al. (1997) selective   0/2/0/0   yes     0/2=0%  active        interaction
      Sturm et al. (1997)   divided   0/2/0/0   yes     0/2=0%  active        interaction
       Shin et al. (2002)             5/5/2/0   yes   4/12=33%     TaU               post
        Kim et al. (2003)            4/0/12/0   yes   5/16=31%     TaU               post
      Sturm et al. (2003) alertness   0/2/0/0   yes   2/2=100%  active               main
      Sturm et al. (2003) vigilance   0/2/0/0   yes    1/2=50%  active               main
      Sturm et al. (2003) selective   0/2/0/0    no     0/2=0%  active               main
      Sturm et al. (2003)   divided   0/1/0/0   yes   1/1=100%  active               main
      Sturm et al. (2004)             0/1/0/0   yes   1/1=100%  active            nothing
    Röhring et al. (2004)             0/0/0/6   yes    1/6=17% passive        interaction
        Dou et al. (2006)             9/2/6/8   yes   9/25=36% passive        interaction
        Man et al. (2006)             0/1/0/0   yes   1/1=100% passive               main
     Weiand et al. (2006)             7/0/8/0    no    1/15=7%  active        interaction
 Westerberg et al. (2007)             1/2/6/0   yes    4/9=44% passive        interaction
  Lundqvist et al. (2010)             2/3/1/0   yes   6/6=100% passive               main
 Prokopenko et al. (2012)   2-5days   0/0/2/0   yes     0/2=0%     TaU               main
 Prokopenko et al. (2012)  8-10days   0/0/2/0   yes   2/2=100%     TaU post + interaction
        Yip et al. (2013)     nonAI   0/3/1/0   yes    1/4=25% passive               post
        Yip et al. (2013)        AI   0/3/1/0   yes    3/4=75% passive               post
 Prokopenko et al. (2013)             1/1/3/0   yes    2/5=40%     TaU        main + post
   Åkerlund et al. (2013)             1/3/1/0   yes    1/5=20%     TaU        interaction
        Lin et al. (2014)             1/1/7/0   yes    6/7=86%     TaU               main
       Luca et al. (2014)             0/0/0/7   yes   7/7=100%     TaU        interaction
   Zuchella et al. (2014)             2/6/7/0   yes   7/16=44%  active        main + post
     Lindeløv et al. (NA)     nback   0/2/3/0    no     0/5=0%  active        interaction
     Lindeløv et al. (NA)    search   0/1/3/0    no     0/4=0%  active        interaction
  Beugeling et al. (2015)             0/0/4/0    no     0/4=0%  active        interaction
Table 7: assessment of the criteria with respect to the included contrasts. “similar” is the
counts of SAME/SIMILAR/DISSIMILAR outcome measures.
58
Representativeness and Dissimilarity:  Of the 277 targeted outcome measures, 140 were
scored  as  DISSIMILAR,  68  as  SIMILAR  and  69  as  SAME.  There  was  insufficient
information to score 21 targeted outcomes. With respect  to Representativeness,  it  is too
comprehensive for the current purpose to evaluate the psychometric properties of each of
the  277  targeted  outcome  measures.  A crude  test  is  counting  the  number  of  outcome
measures  used  and  see  whether  they  pass  a  certain  threshold,  say  three  or  four.  To
simultaneously  satisfy  the  Dissimilarity  criterion,  we  could  further  require  that  these
outcome measures are dissimilar to the training. Table 7 column “similar” list the number
of outcomes which are SAME/SIMILAR/DISSIMILAR and by requiring DISSIMILAR to
be  greater  than  two (as  a  bare  minimum),  we  see  that  21  out  of  42  treatment-control
contrasts fail these criteria while another 21 pass. That is, half of the contrasts fail a priori
by design to sample the transfer domain sufficiently, and thereby to provide evidence that a
transfer effect took place, no matter the outcome of the tests that was administered.
For example, Dou, Man, Ou, Zheng, and Tam (2006) administered 28 tests before and after
treatment. These included word lists (7 outcomes), stories (2 outcomes) and digit span (1
outcome).  Training  also  included  word  lists,  stories  and  digit  span.  In  other  words,  at
pretest, all subjects saw these tasks for the first time. At post-test, subjects in the treatment
group had done these tasks for 20 days whereas the control group had not. A statistically
noticeable difference was observed for 7 of these outcome measures,  but  this is  highly
compatible with a specific-learning hypothesis. As a side note, the 10 tests sample a smaller
memory domain which might be labeled “recall sequential verbal information”.
Consistency: Since most authors defined “effective” as statistically noticeable (p < 5%),
Table 7 lists the number and proportion of outcome measures in the targeted domain which
were  statistically  noticeable,  independent  of  Representativeness  and  Dissimilarity.  This
percentage should be compared with the “claim” column which is  whether  the authors
claim to have found a transfer effect (“yes”) or ambiguous/null result (“no”). As a heuristic
criterion, one could say that at least 75% of the outcomes in the targeted domain should be
positive in order to claim that there was a consistent positive outcome. All 12 “no” contrasts
have 36% positive outcomes or less which they all rightly interpret as evidence that the
targeted high-level cognitive function did not improve. However, 20 out of the 30 “yes”
contrasts had less than 75% positive outcomes. Strikingly, 18 of these had less than 50%
positive outcome measures, yet still concluded that the cognitive function which underlies
all of these had improved.
For example, the Ruff, Mahaffey, Engel, et al. (1994) memory-training group had positive
effects on just three out of 17 outcome measures and it was concluded that “the training
demonstrated efficacy on multiple levels” with respect to memory even though 14 memory
measures did not improve.
Failing the consistency criterion does not mean that transfer to untrained stimuli did not
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take place. It means that the observed pattern of positive results are too incompatible with
an improvement of the targeted cognitive function to count as positive evidence.
Active control: 12 studies used active control groups, 12 used Treatment as Usual (TaU)
and seven26 used passive control groups. I have argued that closely matched active controls
is required in order to claim that the  content of the treatment made a difference in the
outcomes and that it was not caused by nonspecific effects of just doing something. From
this criterion, 18 studies failed a priori by design to provide convincing evidence that the
computer-based task caused the improvement.
A pervasive issue in the use of control groups is how they are modelled statistically - or
rather that they are not. The critical variable of interest is of course the difference between
the  improvement  in  the  two  groups.  However,  12  publications  compared  significance
testing on either main effects (“control group did not improve (p > 5%) and treatment group
improved (p < 5%), therefore the treatment group improved significantly more than the
control group”) or post-test comparisons (“there were no difference between the groups at
pretest (p > 5%) and there was a difference at posttest (p < 5%), therefore the treatment
group improved significantly more than the control group”). Such tests are inappropriate
for  several  reasons,  which  have  been  treated  elsewhere  (Nieuwenhuis,  Forstmann  &
Wagenmakers, 2011; Redick, 2015). Briefly, you cannot support the null using frequentist
p-values. Thus p > 5% is not evidence that the groups are similar. Bayesian inference is
needed for such a claim (Dienes, 2011; Rouder & Morey, 2012). Second, there is no big
difference between p=4.9% and p=5.1% but that would count as “significant“ for these
studies. For example, Prokopenko et al. (2013) found statistically noticeable p-values for
both  main  effects  and  post-test  comparison  and  concluded  that  the  treatment  group
improved more than the control group. But the control groups numerical improvement was
almost the same as that of the treatment group - it just scored lower at pretest. This is a
likely cause of post-test difference which would have been accounted for in an analysis of
interaction27.
26  Kerner (1985) had both an active and a passive control group and is counted as both active and 
passive here.
27  In personal communication authors were asked to do this analysis but that request was not 
answered.
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Summary of evidence and claims: To answer whether the evidence supports the claims,
we  may  analyze  sensitivity  and  specificity  of  the  correspondence  between  claims  and
criteria  satisfaction.  These  are  compared  in  Figure  9 in  the  columns  labelled  “Criteria
verdict” and “Paper’s claim”. Since any thresholds on quality are ultimately arbitrary, I
present the analysis under several sets of thresholds.
As a Reference level, we may think of an intermediate level of evidence for a transfer effect
as (1) three or more DISSIMILAR outcome measures, (2) an active control group where
inference is based on the time�group interaction, and (3) that 75% of outcomes should
show an effect. Under these criteria, not a single study has the design-result combination
required  to  demonstrate  a  transfer  effect  (Figure  9,  left  panel).  Six  contrasts  had  the
appropriate design to show such an effect (Piskopos, 1991; Gray, Robertson, Pentland, &
Anderson, 1992; Weiand, 2006) but the results were lacking or inconsistent.
Lowering  the  thresholds  to  what  may be  thought  of  as  a  Minimum level  of  evidence,
requiring just two or more DISSIMILAR outcome measures and not requiring a proper
interaction analysis, does not make any contrasts pass the test (see Figure 9, middle panel).
When further lowering the thresholds below the Minimum level, by accepting treatment-as-
usual control groups and accepting as little as 50% of the targeted outcomes to show an
effect,  three contrasts (Sturm, Dahmen, Hartje,  & Willmes, 1983; Lin, Tao, Gao, et al.,
2014; Prokopenko, Mozheĭko, Levin, et al., 2012 8-10 days group) provided convincing
evidence for a transfer effect relative to these criteria (see Figure 9, right panel). Sturm et
al. (1983) was later replicated by Sturm and Willmes (1991) with a null result.
In comparison, there were 12 true negatives, i.e. null findings. Of these 4, 5, and 9 had an
appropriate design to detect  a transfer effect  given consistent  data under the Reference,
Minimum and Below Minimum criteria sets respectively.
Worryingly, between 27 and 30 out of 42 contrasts were categorized as false positives. That
is, they claim that there was an effect on the targeted cognitive function, but these claims
were  either  methodologically  unsubstantiated  (fails  Representativeness,  Dissimilarity,
and/or  Active  control)  or  contrary  to  evidence  (fails  Consistency).  No  studies  were
categorized as false negatives.
In summary, at the very best the literature has 100% sensitivity and 31% specificity for the
detection of improvement in cross-modal cognitive functions as defined by the four criteria
(see Table 8). This is a very strong bias. Furthermore, false positives made up at least 858
or 69 % of the citations according to Google Scholar estimates. The vast majority - if not all
- of these citations are in acceptance of the claims in the cited paper so this bias seems to
extend to the scientific literature on this topic in general.
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Figure  9:  Criteria ratings for each experimental treatment-control contrast. The leftmost
three columns in each panel is the three operationalizations presented in the main text:
Dissimilarity+Representativeness,  Control  group,  and  Consistency.  The  rightmost  two
columns compare the criteria verdict  (whether  all  criteria are satisfied) with the claim
made in the publication. A black square means “yes” or “passed” while a light square
means “no” or “failed”. Each panel applies different sets of thresholds for these criteria.
These sets are labelled in the panel title.
.
“Reference” and “Minimum” criteria:
Criteria
satisfied
Criteria not
satisfied
Effect
claimed
0 true
positives
30 false
positives
Effect not
claimed
0 false
negatives
12 true
negatives
“Below Minimum” criteria:
Criteria
satisfied
Criteria not
satisfied
Effect
claimed
3 true
positives
27 false
positives
Effect not
claimed
0 false
negatives
12 true
negatives
Table  8: Contingency tables with the number of contrasts categorized in each criteria x
claim cell. Sensitivity is undefined for the Suggested and Minimum criteria which have a
specificity of 28.6% For Below Minimum criteria, sensitivity=100% and specificity=31%.
63
In this section I have argued that the claims and interpretations laid out in the papers is a
poor test of a true underlying effect. This raises strong doubts about the current state of the
evidence. It does not, however, inform us directly about whether transfer effects occurred in
these studies or not, although the lack of consistent positive results in the transfer domain of
methodologically good experiments suggest that the transfer effect is small or zero. The
more direct quantification is the topic of the next section where evidence is synthesized
across  studies  in  order  to  quantify  the  actual  transfer  effect  when  discounting
methodological confounds.
 2.4.4  Meta-analysis: estimating the transfer effect.
Even if individual studies do not present self-contained convincing evidence for a transfer
effect, an effect could still emerge when synthesizing evidence across studies. The purpose
of the meta-analysis is to estimate the magnitude of the transfer effect and of the control
group and similarity nuisance effects.
Statistical models
Controlled  standardized  mean  difference: all  analyses  use  the  controlled  SMD  as
dependent measure (SMD = SMDtreat - SMDcontrol), i.e.  SMD is how much the treatment
group improves when factoring out non-specific effects captured by the control group.
The  unbiased  population  standard  deviation  was  used  as  the  standardizer  to  allow
comparisons across scales and outcome measures. The population standard deviation was
calculated  from  the  unbiased  pre-test  standard  deviations  as  recommended  by  Morris
(2008) under the assumption that both treatment and control subjects were sampled from
the same population (see  supplementary B).  This  SMD is  also known as  the  corrected
Hedge’s g or g*.
Norm set, full set and assumptions of normality: Authors presented data either as “norm”
(20  studies;  means  and  SD  for  pre-  and  posttest),  “med-iqr”  (3  studies;  median  and
interquartile range for pre- and posttest), change scores (3 studies; mean change and SD of
change) or “event” (2 studies; number of patients improved, status quo and deteriorated)
(see Table 6). All analyses are carried out on a “norm” and a “full” dataset separately. The
norm  set  comprised  the  18  “norm”  publications  where  standardized  mean  differences
(SMD) could readily be calculated. The full set is all  26 publications,  where additional
assumptions had to be used to transform the 8 non-norm studies into SMDc. Supplementary
B  details  these  transformations  but  briefly,  these  analyses  assume  (1)  that  median-
interquartile represents a normal distribution, (2) that change scores follow the relatively
consistent SDpre/SDchange=1.74 ratio derived from known data, and (3) that event data was
generated from a normal distribution. This is bad statistical practice but the “norm” studies
64
obviously break these assumptions as well. For example, at least half of the “norm” studies
(Sturm et  al.,  1983; Piskopos, 1991; Sturm & Wilmes, 1991; Sturm et al.,  1997; Chen,
Glueckauf, & Bracy, 1997; Shin, Ko, & Kim, 2002; Kim, Ko, Seo, et al., 2003; Weiand,
2006;  Yip  & Man,  2013;  Lin  et  al.,  2014)  report  reaction  time data  using  means  and
standard deviations even though a histogram or a look at the literature would reveal these to
be  highly  right-skewed  (see  e.g.  Ratcliff,  1979  or  Whelan,  2008).  The  same  problem
usually applies to time-since-injury descriptives. Since the majority of studies potentially
violate the assumptions of normality to some degree, violations of assumptions cannot be
used as a strong argument against at least considering the evidence from the 8 “non-norm”
studies.
The norm set should be regarded as primary evidence while the full should be regarded as
confirmatory when taking all evidence into account.
Inference  models: Parameter  estimation  was  done  using  the  MCMCglmm  package
(Hadfield, 2010) and inference was done using the metafor package (Viechtbauer, 2010) in
the statistical  software package R (version 3.0.2). Parameters were estimated using two
models. (1) an intercept-only model with random effects for outcomes and studies (Riley,
2009; Ishak, Platt, Joseph, Hanley, & Caro, 2007). I call this the “naive” model because it
lumps together  all  outcomes  and designs as  true  reflections of  an  underlying cognitive
construct. It is the conventional model for meta-analysis. (2) A “full” mixed effects meta-
regression model with random outcomes, random studies, and covariates for control group
(to quantify the Active control criterion) and difference score (to quantify Dissimilarity).
Consistency is somewhat operationalized by the parameter estimates when considering all
the  evidence.  Representativeness  could  not  be  included  in  the  model  since  there  is
insufficient data on loading of each of the outcome measures on the cognitive constructs
they target28. 
Likelihood Ratio Tests (LRT, see Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013) were used to make
inferences on the hypothesis that each fixed effect is zero and the strength of this evidence
is quantified using bayes factors based on the the unit information prior (Wagenmakers,
2007). Briefly, a bayes factor of 5 means that the model with the parameter is 5 times more
likely given the data than the model without that parameter, which has a posterior odds of
=0.2. LRT tests of control group, difference scores and therapist involvement were pre-⅕
planned. Other post-hoc tests of design parameters such as blinding, treatment duration, etc.
were not.
The data and analysis script is available at https  ://  osf  . io  / zxgjn. I encourage you to conduct
additional analyses on this dataset and to elaborate or criticise the findings reported here.
28  This analysis would entail weighting each outcome measure by a loading found through e.g. 
latent-variable analyses and also considering the convergence of multiple such outcomes within 
each study.
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Results
Figure 10 and Figure 11 show forest plots of the norm set and the additional contrasts in the
full set respectively. The naive estimate is plotted together with estimates broken down by
level of similarity. The ranking of difference scores  (same > similar > dissimilar) is evident
within  many  of  these  contrasts.  To  be  specific,  the  effect  estimate  for  DISSIMILAR
outcome measures was less than the the naive estimate in 15 out of 18 “norm” studies
which  had  at  least  one  test  in  another  DIFF  category  (binomial  test,  pbinom=0.008,
BFbinom=12.3) and 19 out of 23 in the “full” set (pbinom=0.003, BFbinom=28.6).
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Figure  10: Standardized mean differences and 95% confidence intervals for the “norm”
studies. Each horizontal field is a treatment-control contrast. For each contrast the naive
SMDc is  plotted (black and bold)  followed by SMDc  broken down by similarity  which
reveals a same > similar > dissimilar ordering of effect  sizes.  Most studies have SMDc
between 0 and 1. Horizontal dashed lines indicate that there are no observations in this
category. Ss = number of subjects. Outcomes is the number of outcome measures included
in the analysis. 
Figure  11:  Hedge’s g and 95% confidence intervals for the non-norm studies. See figure
text for Figure 10.
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Naive estimate:  When pooling all  targeted outcome measures  in a  single effect  (naive
model) there is an estimated effect of SMD=0.31 (95% CI=0.22-0.41). This effect in and of
itself is conventionally interpreted as half-way between ‘small’ and ‘medium’ in magnitude
(Cohen, 1992). It translates into a Number Needed to Treat of 9.5729 (Furukawa & Leucht,
2011). In other words: for each patient who experiences a favourable outcome compared to
the control group, 8.57 other patients will experience no differential effect. Still, the fact
that SMDnaive is non-zero could be used to label computerized cognitive rehabilitation as
“evidence based”.
Full estimate: However, when analyzing the full model where similarity-scores and control
groups are accounted for, the transfer effect is estimated to be SMD=0.06 (95% CI=-0.08 to
0.20). Adding the nonspecific effect of being in a passive control group and the specific
learning of being tested on a SAME outcome measure, the gain was an order of magnitude
larger (SMD=0.58, 95% CI=0.41 to 0.75). Effect estimates were almost unchanged when
calculated  from the  full  dataset.  For  all  combinations  of  difference  scores  and  control
groups, see Figure 12.
Effects on SIMILAR outcome measures were larger than DISSIMILAR outcome measures
(SMD=0.17, pLRT=0.0001, BF=18351) but SAME  was not much larger than SIMILAR in
the  norm  dataset  (SMD=0.07,  pLRT=0.10,  BF=1.8).  Effects  were  larger  in  TaU  control
groups than active control groups (SMD=0.19, pLRT=0.03, BF=9.8) but effects in passive
control groups were almost the same as TaU in the norm dataset (SMD=0.03, pLRT=0.68,
BF=6.2 in favor of no difference) and in the full dataset (BF=7.4 in favor of no difference).
Funnel  plots  for  the  naive  and  full  models  are  available  as  supplementary  figure  15.
Heterogeneity should be expected and quantified in meta-analysis of non-identical studies
(Higgins,  2008;  Higgins,  Thompson,  &  Spiegelhalter,  2009).  For  the  full  model,  the
variance  of  contrasts  was  σcontrast=0.02  (95%  CI=0.000  to  0.049)  and  the  variance  of
outcome measures was σtest=0.05 (95% CI=0.027 to 0.068). These variances are relatively
small  compared to the estimated effects  (see Figure  12),  so the covariate  estimates  are
reasonably representative of the dataset as a whole (see also Figure 15).
29  Assuming a controlled event rate of 20 %
69
Figure  12:  predictions from a classical naive intercept-only random effects model (top)
versus predictions from a mixed model with main effects of control group and outcome-
training similarity. Black diamonds are means and 95% credible intervals from “norm”
studies and white crosses are means based on all studies. Variance of the latter estimates
are marginally smaller than the black diamonds and the estimates are similar. The crucial
contrast is between the naive estimate and the transfer effect - the top two diamonds.
Moderating factors: A large array of contrasts and models are possible using this dataset.
For the sake of brevity, I will only report evidence to strengthen or weaken the finding that
the transfer effect is virtually zero. Table 9 present estimates and inferences on the extent to
which design- and subject-factors influence the transfer effect. Inferences are drawn from
the likelihood ratio test between the full model (which is a null model in this context) and
the full model plus a fixed effect for the moderating factor. All inferences were tested on the
norm and full dataset, but reported for the full dataset when the two deviate qualitatively.
None of the factors account for enough variability in the transfer effect to counterbalance
the complexity they add to the model (all BF support the absence of moderating factors
more than the presence of them), except for a negative effect of blinding as expected (Jadad
et al., 1996).
Note that some p-values are less than 5% while the bayes factor weakly supports the null.
This is  not  contradictory since p overstates the evidence against  the null  (Rouder, Sun,
Morey, & Iverson, 2009). For example, p=5% may correspond to a probability of the null
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being true between 29% and 82% (Berger & Sellke, 1987; Sellke, Bayarri, & Berger, 2001).
For  these  reasons,  bayes  factors  are  recommended  as  the  primary  measure  of  relative
evidence between the models.
Subject factors stud(contr) SMD pLRT BFBIC
Age in years (norm)
Age in years (all)
17(20)
25(33)
0.003
0.007
0.45
0.008
11.0*
2.0
Incidence in months 
(norm) 16(18) -0.000 0.99 14.2*
Treatment factors stud(contr) SMD pLRT BFBIC
Total training hours 18(22) -0.0006 0.17 5.6*
Number of sessions 18(22) -0.0006 0.17 5.7*
Minutes per session 18(22) -0.0004 0.78 14.2*
Number of tasks (norm)
Number of tasks (all)
13(16)
21(29)
-0.001
-0.003
0.06
0.58
2.1*
10.8*
Therapist, yes-no 13(16) -0.052 0.58 10.7*
Commercial, yes-no 18(22) -0.048 0.52 11.9*
Design factors stud(contr) SMD pLRT BFBIC
Blinding, yes-no 10(12) -0.27 0.003 6.8
Table  9: Standardized  mean  differences  and  inferences  on  subject  characteristics  and
design  characteristics.  In  general,  there  is  little  evidence  that  the  transfer  effect  was
influenced by these factors - most bayes factors favouring the null. Only studies which
provided information about these were included in the model for each row. Stud(contr) list
the number of studies and contrasts which were used for inference in each row. There are
18(22) in the norm set and 26(35) in the full set. Only inferences from the norm dataset are
presented except where there is a discrepancy between the norm dataset and full dataset.
BF* is the bayes factor in favor of the null. ‘yes-no’ indicates that the effect size is yes-no,
i.e. a positive SMD is a larger effect for ‘yes’ than ‘no’.
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 2.4.5  Discussion
There  is  no  convincing  evidence  that  computer-based  cognitive  rehabilitation improves
cross-modal cognitive constructs such as attention, memory and or executive function. Two
independent arguments lead to this conclusion.
First, I presented four criteria (Representativeness, Dissimilarity, Consistency and Active
control) as necessary premises for a convincing argument that transfer took place. They
were compared to the claims made in the reviewed articles. The literature had at best a
sensitivity of 100% and a specificity of 30% which is a heavy bias towards selectively
interpreting positive outcomes and disregarding weaknesses and/or contrary evidence. In
fact, only two out of 42 treatment-control contrasts provided convincing evidence that the
computer-based training caused an improvement of the targeted cognitive function. This
hardly overcomes the 12 null  findings and the 28 contrasts  which violated at  least  one
criterion.
Second, controlling for non-specific effects of control groups and task-specific learning, the
proper transfer effect  was estimated to be between -0.09 SMD to 0.21 SMD with 95%
probability. In other words, there is 2.5% probability that the effect size is larger than 0.20
SMD which corresponds to  a 97.5% probability  that  you need to treat  more than 15.7
patients for just one patient to distinguish himself/herself from the active control group.
Even though the treatment durations covered a very wide range from 2.7 to 341.3 hours the
duration of treatment did not influence transfer, consistent with the idea that the training
task  does  not  cause  transfer.  This  has  been  found  in  computer-based  training  on
schizophrenics as well (McGurk, Twamley, Sitzer, et al., 2007).
The current evidence rules out several potential “active ingredients” that one could add to
the mix to stimulate transfer. There were no substantial effects of task-specific factors such
as therapist involvement or commercialisation nor subject-specific factors such as age or
time since incidence.
These results imply that we could invoke a law of parsimony and draw the preliminary
conclusion that in general, computer-based training on patients with acquired brain injury
follows the same learning principles as in healthy participants and other patient groups. I.e.
that drill-and-practice interventions stimulate little transfer to high-level cognition (Perkins
& Salomon,  1989;  Singley  & Anderson,  1989;  Tournaki,  2009;  McGurk  et  al.,  2007).
However,  this  does  not  preclude  that  such  an  effect  could  be  obtained  from a  refined
computer-based intervention and such research attempts are encouraged given the many
desirable  properties  of  a  relatively  flexible  and  automated  rehabilitation  method.  The
present findings merely implies that a priori such high-level transfer effects should not be
expected given the current evidence.
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Interestingly, Rohling, Faust, Beverly and Demakis (2009) found an overall effect size of
SMD=0.30 in a meta-analysis of 114 studies on cognitive rehabilitation following acquired
brain  injury.  This  is  exactly  the  same  as  the  naive  estimate  in  the  present  analysis,
suggesting their estimate may be confounded by inappropriate controls and test-outcome
similarities since these criteria hold for non-computerized interventions as well.
Transfer scope and strength: Specific transfer did occur as evidenced by the positive
effect on SIMILAR outcomes. SIMILAR includes e.g. transfer from simple span lengths on
visual  digits  material  to  simple  span  lengths  on  verbal  digits,  arithmetic  on  visually
presented numbers to arithmetic  on verbally presented numbers,  discrimination reaction
time to simple reaction time etc. That is, there does not need to be a perfect correspondence
between contexts  and materials  for  at  least  some transfer  to  take  place,  indicating that
particular aspects of the training can indeed be extracted and brought to use in slightly
deviating situations.
It is not possible to quantify the strength of transfer from the training task to SIMILAR and
DISSIMILAR outcome measures since training data was rarely reported. One could use the
SAME outcome measures as an index of improvements on the training task  (SMD=0.29).
We may heuristically quantify transfer as the ratio between gains on the training task (the
transfer source) and the targeted outcome measures (the transfer domain). So 0.05 divided
by 0.29 yields an estimated transfer of 17.2%. However, the SAME outcome measures are
likely to underestimate the training effect since they were often administered in a different
setting than the training and  using a  different  response modality. One study (Lindeløv,
submitted)  explicitly  analyzed  and  interpreted  actual  training  data  and  found  an
improvement on the training tasks of around 0.5 to 1 SMD. This would indicate a transfer
between 5% and 10% in the present case.
Revisiting the  four criteria: The meta-analysis  support  the criteria  that  the  SIMILAR
category and the treatment-as-usual control group are impure measures of transfer effects
since they deviate from the estimate of proper transfer by a magnitude of 2 or 3.  This
confirms the importance of satisfying the Dissimilarity and Active Control criteria.  The
selective reporting of positive findings on one out of several outcome measures pertaining
to  the  same  underlying  cognitive  constructs  highlights  the  necessity  of  imposing  the
Consistency criterion. It is beyond the scope of this paper to quantify the effect of violating
the Representativeness criterion.
I invite the reader to be skeptic about these findings and interpretations, just as I have taken
a skeptical look at the literature. The strongest rebuttal would be the falsification of any of
the criteria which serve as premises for most of the arguments. An easier target for criticism
is the similarity ratings. I invite researchers to look at the justifications for the similarity
rating of each outcome measure in the dataset  (see link earlier in text).  Some of these
ratings  were  based  on  quite  sparse  information  in  the  published  literature  since  the
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interventions are generally underspecified in the publications and had to be obtained from
other sources.
In order to apply the criteria in practice, I introduced some simple operationalizations and
minimum thresholds in the review section. These thresholds are ultimately arbitrary and
should not be applied mindlessly, just as many other thresholds should not (alpha = 5%, BF
>  3  etc.).  It  may  be  helpful  for  researchers  to  consider  the  four  criteria  but  the
operationalizations and thresholds are not carved in stone and should be subject to informed
judgement on a case-by-case basis.
One may interpret the lack of studies passing these criteria in two ways. One interpretation
is that it is very difficult to convincingly demonstrate transfer effects because they are too
small or even zero. Another interpretation is that the criteria are too high. The former is
supported by the meta-analysis while I have argued against the latter when I presented the
criteria. For example, the Below Minimum criteria accepts treatment-as-usual which the
meta-analysis showed to be confounded by other effects than the training task per se.
Limitations:  The review and meta-analysis may be based on a slightly positively biased
selection of the literature. Two papers (Hajek, Kates, Donnelly, & McGree, 1993; Mazer,
Sofer, Korner-Bitensky, et al., 2004) were excluded solely on the basis that they assigned a
modality-specific label to the training even though many of the included studies had similar
unimodal training programs. Both studies were null  findings.  In addition, only targeted
outcome  measures  were  considered  in  this  review  so  non-targeted  outcome  measures
should per theory be subject to smaller effects. The 21 outcome measures which could not
be  scored  on  similarity  had  a  negative  effect  estimate  of  -0.39  SMD  relative  to  the
predictions from the full model. Lastly, a simple p < 5% threshold was used to categorize
an outcome as significant as did most studies. Correction for multiple comparisons should
be applied to control the false positive rate in hundreds of analyzed outcome measures.
Conclusion for researchers
The findings of this review and meta-analysis lend support to the view that computer-based
cognitive rehabilitation yields task-specific improvements but little  transfer  to untrained
tasks. That is, the specificity of learning in drill-and-practice interventions is no different
among computer-based interventions and brain injured individuals than in the rest of the
learning literature. It is also in line with findings from recent reviews and meta-analyses on
computer-based training on healthy subjects (Shipstead, Hicks, & Engle, 2012; Shipstead,
Redick, & Engle, 2012; Melby-Lervåg & Hulme, 2012).
The state of the literature strongly suggests that effects of inappropriate control groups and
training-outcome similarities should be expected and not confounded with proper transfer
effects.  To  this  end,  I  encourage  considerations  of  Representativeness,  Dissimilarity,
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Consistency, and Active Control group as a supplement to the Jadad criteria.
Conclusion for clinicians
Current  evidence  strongly  suggests  that  computer-based  rehabilitation  of  brain  injured
patients  does  not  improve  high-level  cognitive  functions  such  as  attention,  memory,
processing speed etc. Computer-based rehabilitation should therefore not be used for this
purpose. However, this does not rule out using computer-based training of specific skills
such as driving (Akinwuntan, De Weerdt,  Feys, et  al.,  2005) or shopping (Yip & Man,
2013) using simulators which are closely matched to the environment where the patient will
put  such skills  to use.  Indeed,  this  meta-analysis  demonstrated that  even skills  such as
recalling  digits,  short  messages  and  wordlists  may be  specifically  trained  although the
amount of carry-over to everyday settings is unclear.
There was no evidence that commercial software outperformed noncommercial software.
Since licenses are expensive and inflexible to handle with outpatients, I recommend using
noncommercial software.
Lastly, computer-training may be used for other purposes than cognitive improvement. For
example  for  recreation,  for  insight  or  to  enhance  motivation  and  engagement.  But  the
evidence  laid  out  in  this  paper  suggest  that  computer-based  rehabilitation  is  generally
ineffective for rehabilitation of high-level cognition, computer-based rehabilitation.
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 2.4.7  Supplementary A: search and scoring
Search terms
The following search string was used on PubMed (525 results) and PsycINFO (72 results):
(brain-injury OR head-injury OR stroke OR concussion OR
ischemic OR ischemia) AND (computerized OR computer OR
computer-based OR microcomputer OR personal-computer OR
pc  OR  tablet  OR  smartphone  OR  commodore)  AND
(rehabilitation OR training OR retraining OR remediation)
AND (control OR controls OR passive) AND (cognitive OR
cognition) 
Google Scholar were scanned for the first 500 out of 6.480 results:
(brain-injury OR head-injury OR stroke OR concussion OR
ischemic OR ischemia) AND (computerized OR computer OR
computer-based)  AND  (intitle:rehabilitation  OR
intitle:training  OR  intitle:retraining  OR
intitle:remediation) AND (cognition OR cognitive)
Publication lists were scanned on the websites of PSS CogRehab, CogMed, and RehaCom.
No studies were included from this search which were not already appraised
Study inclusion criteria
■ Intervention should predominantly be computer-based using a monitor  while
physically  at  rest.  This  excludes  studies  with  concurrent  physical  training,
neurostimulation (tDCS, TMS), pharmacological interventions. This also excludes
studies  where  therapist  contact  constituted  a  major  part  of  the  computer-based
intervention.
■ Intervention  should  target  higher,  cross-modal  cognitive  functions. This
excludes skill-training programs targeting e.g.  driving,  computer  operation skills,
handling ticket automata etc. It also excludes studies targeting just visual perception
or aphasia (verbal).
■ Separate  control  group. Cross-over  studies  were  included but  multiple-baseline
studies were not since they do not control for retest effects.
■ Sample from a fairly broad, adult, brain injured population, such as TBI, CVD,
stroke or a mixture. Studies on children or using healthy controls were excluded.
Samples  with  specific  symptoms  like  hemiplegia,  neglect,  aphasia  etc.  were
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excluded since  they are  not  representative  of  the  patient  group as  a  whole.  For
example, neglect patient “attention training” targeted at the neglected hemifield was
not included because it might not be “attention training” for a non-neglected patient.
■ Enough data to calculate a statistic: Single-case studies were excluded. Van Vleet
et al. (2014) was not included because it was a case report with five TBIs in total: 3
in intervention group and 2 in a  passive control  group.  Sturm et  al.  (2004) was
included with 4 patients in each group.
Outcome inclusion criteria
■ Has to be a neuropsychological test. Questionnaires, self-ratings, and observation
measures were not included. A neuropsychological test is a test which are none of
the above and which is administered by a person or a computer.
■ Has to be targeted: An outcome measure was targeted if the authors attributed the
same cognitive label to it as they did to the training task. If “cognition” was targeted,
all  cognitive  outcome  measures  were  scored  as  targeted.  The  vast  majority  of
outcomes could be scored as targeted/non-targeted using these two criteria. In some
publications  which  did  not  assign  cognitive  labels  to  the  outcome  measures,  a
qualitative judgement was made.
■ Has a similarity-score.
Scoring outcomes
■ SAME: the training task and the outcome are essentially identical. They should be
identical in stimulus material, modality and in the structure of the task. For example,
Lin et al. (2014) trained PSS CogRehab which includes a story recall task and used
WMS Logical Memory as an outcome, which is also recall of stories of similar types
and lengths. Westerberg (2007) tested subjects on a span board task but they trained
on spatial span tasks as well. 
■ SIMILAR: When there is a partial overlap in stimuli and/or structure which could
be  explained by specific  strategies  that  only applies  to  the training domain.  For
example,  Westerberg  (2007)  and  Åkerlund  (2014)  trained  patients  on  CogMed
which contains visual digit and letter span tasks while the verbal digit span tasks
from the WAIS battery was used as outcome measure. Another example is Gray et
al. (1992) who used PASAT as an outcome measure and trained playing an arcade
game  while  simultaneously  doing  arithmetic.  Here  is  some  stimulus-overlap
(numbers) and some structure overlap (arithmetic - while doing a concurrent task).
But it is not the same task.
■ DISSIMILAR: neither  SAME or  SIMILAR,  I.e.  there  is  no  obvious  low-level
explanation for the observed effect on the outcome measure. For example, Sturm et
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al.  (1983)  administered  a  german  version  of  the  digit-symbol  coding  task  from
WAIS. Subjects trained on various reaction time tasks where they had to detect the
presence of digits and symbols, but at no time were they asked to pair them or to
generate other responses than “present” vs. “not present”. Lin et al. (2014) tested
subjects on a digit span tasks. Subjects trained on a forward word span task but not
on digits and not in reverse or ranked order.
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 2.4.8  Supplementary B: Calculating effect sizes
Calculating standardized effect sizes
Effect  sizes  were  calculated  using  hedge’s  g  with  the  pretest  SD  as  standardizer  as
recommended by Morris (2008).  It  is  common to use a pooled SD as standardizer (the
square root of the weighted mean of the unbiased variances) but this is an underestimation
of the population’s SD because it is assumed that there are two means and therefore the
variability around each mean is lesser than if there were only one mean. Since all subjects
were drawn from the same population, I think that the one-mean model better reflect the
sampling intentions in  these experiments.  Given   and   as  the  pretest  SDs of  the
treatment  and  control  group respectively,   as  the corresponding means and   as  the
number of patients in each group, the population SD was calculated as:
… which is just the unbiased weighted mean of the sum of the squared standard deviation
and the squared means minus the square of the weighted means. 
The standardized effect size is the difference between pretest and posttest divided by the
population SD. However, pretest and posttest are correlated because they are calculated on
the same individuals. This in turns means that the variance of the estimated effect sizes are
smaller  than  if  these  measures  are  not  correlated.  The  correlation  must  be  taken  into
account. However, the pretest-posttest correlation is not given in any of the publications.
Based on our own data from 7 different interventions, 104 brain injured patients and 126
outcome measures in this kind of studies, I calculated the pre-post correlation on each of
these 126 outcomes. Correlations are essentially F-distributed so they were log-transformed
to make them well represented by a mean and intervals. The correlations turned out to be
remarkably consistent with a mean of 0.84 and CI from 0.82 to 0.86. They are plotted on
Figure 13 along with the estimate, CI and SD.
This estimate was used in the analysis.
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Figure  13:  Correlations between pre-test and post-test on 126 outcome measures (dots).
The curved line is the empirical density of these correlation coefficients. The mean (thick
black line), 95 % confidence interval (broken lines) and SDs (outer dotted lines) of the
average correlation coefficient are plotted.
Median-Interquartile data: med-IQR is often reported when the data cannot be assumed
to be normal. I justify converting it to normal data for several reasons. (1) one study did not
mention  (non-)normality  or  any  justification  for  using  med-IQR  instead  of  mean-SD
(Zucchella et al., 2014). (2) two studies simply reported that data were “non-parametric”
(Prokopenko, 2013) or that it failed the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality (De Luca et al.,
2014). It is not clear that all outcomes were non-normal in the latter two studies. (3) data
which is known to be  non-normal was reported in many of the “norm” studies, e.g. non-
log-transformed  reaction  time  data.  Indeed,  most  of  these  do  not  mention  or  assess
normality. In summary, this conversion can be justified on the ground that the data reported
using med-IQR data may not be very different from the data reported using mean-SD.
If the med-iqr is assumed to be normal, it can be transformed by setting median=mean and
SD=IQR/(cdf(0.75) - cdf(0.25)) where cdf is the cumulative density function of the normal
distribution.
Change-SD  data: the  pretest  SD  is  needed  as  a  standardizer  in  order  to  calculate  a
standardized effect size. This is, however, not given in change-SD studies, where the SD is
calculated  from  the  change score.  I  used  the  dataset  described  above  to  calculate  the
SDpre/SDchange ratio for each of these outcomes. Since ratios typically are F-distributed, the
126 ratios were log-transformed so that it could be represented by a mean and an interval. 
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The ratio turned out to be relatively consistent across interventions and outcome measures
with a mean of SDpre=1.68*SDchange and CI between 1.58 and 1.79. I therefore used this
estimate to convert SDchange to SDpre and thereby calculate a standardized effect size from
change-SD data.
Figure 14 shows the 126 outcomes on a log-log plot with the estimated ratio, the +/- CI and
the mean +/- 1 SD. Notice how well this ratio applies across different magnitudes.
Figure 14: log-log plot with observed data (points) and SDchange on x-axis, SDpre on y-axis.
A prediction line for the mean ratio (thick line) +/- 1 CI (broken lines) and +/- 1 SD (hard
outer lines).
Event data: Event counts were probit transformed to an estimate of SMD. This assumes 
that the events were discretized from a normal distribution.
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Funnel plots
The outcomes are clearly heterogeneous but not biased as tested by the slope of means as a
function of variances.
Figure  15:  Funnel plots for the naive model (left, random effects intercept) and the full
model (right, random effects with intercepts for control group and similarity score). Filled
circles are contrasts from the norm dataset and open circles are contrasts not in the norm
dataset.
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 2.5  Epilogue on computer-based cognitive
training
 2.5.1  The generality of the four criteria
The criteria are not limited to brain injured patients. Neither are they limited to computer-
based interventions. Applying them on computer-based cognitive training of brain injured
patients was simply a manageable task and a subject on which I had first-hand experience.
Computer-based  interventions  have  the  advantage  that  they  are  easier  to  describe  than
therapist-administered  interventions,  where  the  human factor  adds  more  unknowns  and
variability  in  the  actual  intervention.  With  a  better  description  of  the  intervention,  the
scoring of similarity is more accurate and verifiable.
Being  nothing  more  than  an  explicitation  of  the  experimental  method  for  behavioral
research, the four criteria apply a to all interventions with behavioral outcomes. Sometimes
the intervention obviously does not overlap with outcome measures (e.g. pharmaceuticals
or exercise) and sometimes the transfer domain will be much more narrow than the ones I
reviewed here (e.g. driving skills, simple math, using a Word Processor, etc.), but the same
principles apply. 
When  there  is  no  intervention,  the  Dissimilarity  criterion  may  be  dropped  from  the
equation.  This  is  the  case  in  many experiments  in  cognitive  science.  Examining  some
classical studies in cognitive science, we see that while the Consistency and Active Control
criteria are often well satisfied, the Representativeness criterion is not. The opposite is often
the case in intervention research: the Consistency and Active Control criteria are often not
satisfied while the Representativeness is an ideal in the sense that many different outcome
measures are expected for a solid argument. In that way, basic research and intervention
research  may  be  mutually  inspiring  in  the  search  for  a  good  experimental  design.  To
mention a few famous findings from basic cognitive science:
■ Sperling (1960) is  known for  the discovery of  iconic (or  sensory) memory -  an
unlimited memory trace which decays largely within a second. The experiment is
entirely composed of single letters and digits presented in a visual grid of various
dimensions for various durations. The contrasts (Active Control) are very precise
and the almost limited capacity is demonstrated under all experimental conditions
(Consistency). However, the claim is that there is a short unlimited sensory trace
regardless of stimuli while it was only demonstrated for visual digits and letters. It
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might be that the conclusion holds only for digits and letters and does not generalize
to audition, tactility, etc. The findings has since been replicated numerous times on
different stimulus materials, but failing the Representativeness criterion means that
the  study  does  not  hold  self-contained  convincing  evidence  that  these  findings
generalize.
■ Tulving  & Thomson (1973)  demonstrated  encoding  specificity  using  lists  of  24
words and various cues. Again, the contrasts were well defined and the results were
consistent under various cue conditions. But it was only demonstrated on lists of 24
words between 3 and 6 characters long, yet the claim generalizes to all information.
■ The book chapter by Baddeley & Hitch (1974) popularized the Working Memory
construct  using  only  auditory  and  visual  words  and  letters.  The  initial  study,
important as it is, did not provide self-contained evidence that the findings on the
sampled material would hold for the full hypothesized domain of working memory.
All of these studies may be said to fail the Representativeness criterion at the outset, but
numerous  replications and  extensions have  indeed proven the phenomena to generalize
across stimuli and contexts. This is an important point: failing anything but the Consistency
criterion does not mean that  the the conclusions are false.  It  means that  the paper does
present  sufficient  evidence  to  support  the  conclusion.  Reviews  and  meta-analysis  can
transcend these limits of the individual studies.
Some classical  studies  do well  with respect  to  Representativeness.  For example,  Miller
(1956) reported a memory capacity limit of around 7 items for auditory pitch, auditory
loudness, saltiness (taste), and spatial positions. Cowan (2000) sought to revise the capacity
limit to a capacity limit of 4 chunks using evidence from more than 30 experiments in a
wide variety of setups.
 2.5.2  Is strategy learning impaired in brain injured 
patients?
Returning to the topic of this thesis, we observed that brain injured patients improved much
less on the training tasks compared to non-injured subjects in the N-back study. Combined
with the interpretation that improvements on the training tasks were highly specific (see N-
back epilogue), I argued that this impairment indicates an impairment of the ability to form
simple and effective strategies. Space limited the presentation of the full argument for this
claim. Here I will expand on the argument. I will begin by applying Morgan’s canon: is
there a simpler explanation for the observed results? Such simple explanations could be
experimental confounds:
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Age: The most obvious confounding difference between the patient group and the healthy
group is the age differences of 27 years. However, the review found no effect of age on
SAME  outcome  measures,  which  is  our  closest  estimate  of  the  training  effect  in  the
reviewed studies in the face of no published training data. In fact, the full dataset showed a
weak  trend  in  the  opposite  direction:  that  improvement  on  SAME  outcome  measures
increases with age (pLRT=0.008, BF=2). The effect was only 0.007 SMD per year which
amounts to a predicted SMD=0.19 difference in favor of the brain injured group in the N-
back study30.  This is clearly a long way from the observed difference of SMD=5.6 and
SMD=2.5 in favor of the non-impaired group. This weak age advantage was also found in
healthy subjects by Schmiedek et al. (2010) who subjected 101 young (25.4 years) and 103
old (71 years) subjects to a 100-hour intervention. They found an average increase on the
training tasks of 0.81 SMD for the younger subjects and 0.98 SMD for the older subjects.
Dahlin et al. (2008) observed no difference between 15 younger and 13 older adults on four
training tasks and a small advantage for the younger group on one training task. Based on
these data, I find it unlikely that age is a major confounder of the difference in improvement
on the training task.
Training location: In  the N-back study, patients trained at  the hospital  while  the non-
impaired subjects trained at home. Had they shifted training location, would the results
have shifted likewise? Although it is not clear how that should influence learning during
training, it might nonetheless be a factor which should not be attributed to the condition of
having brain injury per se. 
We can use the review data to get an estimate of the influence of training location. It was
possible to obtain information about training location for 24 studies and 33 contrasts. There
were  four  different  locations:  home (as  the  non-impaired  group  in  our  N-back  study),
hospital  (as  the  brain  injury  group),  lab  (patients  living  at  home  but  training  at  the
experimental facilities) and home+lab (a combination of the latter two). Testing a model
with an interaction term for  SAME � location, the model without location was clearly
preferred (BF=265 in favor of the null with a unit information prior on covariates). The
estimated  effect  sizes  of  different  locations  was  at  most  0.30  SMD.  The  bayes  factor
enforces parsimony so the sheer number of location-variables could cause a preference for
the null even if they individually explain a bit of the residual variance. Reducing the five
location to a single numeric predictor with the hypothesis that SAME � location follow a
ranked order (effect size for home > home + hospital > lab > hospital) was not preferred
either (SMD=0.06 per category, BF=6.3 in favor of the null). The training location hardly
explains the observed differences in training gains.
30  (56 years - 29 years)  0.007 SMD/year = 0.19 SMD⨉
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Treatment as usual: Our N-back patients participated in rehabilitation efforts and were
assisted  with  activities  of  daily  living  besides  the  computer  training.  Presumably,  the
healthy participants did not. Would we have observed the opposite training improvement
pattern if the two groups had exchanged daily activities?
The review dataset allows for a test to see if this holds in general. The treatment-as-usual
hypothesis can be operationalized as the interaction between TaU and SAME outcomes, i.e.
whether the presence/absence of treatment-as-usual makes a difference for the change in
SAME outcomes. Treatment � SAME does not explain any variance over and beyond main
effects of control group and similarity (BF=7.1 and 9.1 in favor of the null for the norm and
full dataset respectively). So this is not a confound in other studies. 
Likewise, there are indications that it does not in our study. (1) All the healthy participants
were students or working, thus certainly active and learning most of the day. If they can do
this and improve on the training task, it is not clear that replacing their daily activities with
physiotherapy, exercise, group discussions, etc. would prevent them from improving. (2)
The patients had a wide range of activity levels, from 1-3 hours daily to a full schedule with
visits in the evening. Still, no patient reached more than N=6 in the N-back task (compare
to N=14 in the non-impaired group, after removing the outliers that reached level 27 and
46) and N=50 in the Visual Search task (compare to N=121 in the non-impaired group). (3)
Several of the patients requested more training, indicating that they did not perceive the
treatment-as-usual as a barrier.
What is the cause of the difference? Being unable to attribute the impaired task-specific
learning to confounders, I conclude, as I did in the paper, that the cause most likely has to
do with the brain injury, i.e. a property of the subject. The present evidence does not permit
taking  this  conclusion  further.  However,  concluding  that  learning  on  computer-based
training  tasks  is  impaired  in  brain  injured  subjects  relative  to  healthy  participants  is  a
relatively big step if it replicates. It did hold across two different training tasks in the N-
back study, so this may count as a semi-replication. But given the small sample size, this
single  study merely  puts  the  idea  on  the  table  and  further  studies  will  substantiate  or
discredit this idea.
The  review  was  carried  out  after  the  N-back  study  was  finished.  Looking  back,  it  is
interesting to see how the N-back study fared with respect to the four criteria. The overall
scorings are shown in Table  6, Table  7, and Figure  12 in the review paper. The N-back
study was classified as a True Negative in Table 8. A more qualitative analysis is the topic
of the next few sections:
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 2.5.3  Representativeness for working memory
First a warning: the length of this and the next section on the representativeness of just the
tests used in the N-back study is a testament to the amount of work needed to be done to get
just an approximate grasp on the representativeness of the test batteries for all 30 studies in
the review. This is the reason that such an analysis was omitted.
The domain of working memory was sampled using five different tests:
■ WAIS-IV Digit span forward, backward, and ordered - age corrected.
■ WAIS-IV Mental arithmetic - age corrected.
■ WAIS-IV (optional) Letter-number sequencing, age corrected.
■ Operation Span with partial credit unit scoring (Conway, 2005). 
■ Raven’s advanced progressive matrices (RAPM), 
C.f. Morgan’s canon, we should use the lowest possible model to account for the constructs
in play in this test battery. The lowest-level heading that represents these five tests could be
“temporary processing and storage of  visual  and verbal  information”.  This  is  relatively
close to classical definitions of working memory. Were it not for RAPM, the heading could
have  been  more  specific:  “temporary  sequencing/arithmetic  and  storage  of  visual  and
verbal digits/letters”. These tests do not sample the full domain of working memory since
there is no assessment of tactility, olfactory working memory (Dade et al., 2001), tactility
etc.  A few  comments  on  the  properties  of  each  test  with  respect  to  a  hypothesized
underlying working memory construct are in order:
WAIS working memory subtests: A first quality of the WAIS tests is that there is a danish
normative reference material to make scores comparable and to correct for age influences.
Second, the working memory and processing speed indices has been shown to have good
internal consistency (> 0.85) and test-retest reliability (> 0.75; Iverson, 2001). Numerous
studies  have  tested the factor  structure of  WAIS and generally  found that  the Working
Memory  Index  indeed  explains  variance  not  captured  by  other  tasks  or  indices  (e.g.
Canivez & Watkins, 2010; Benson et al., 2010; Holdnack et al., 2011). There are nuances to
this story. The high loadings of the Working Memory factor on a general intelligence factor
(r > 0.90 in all studies) means that when g is accounted for, working memory accounts for
little of the remaining variance (r < 0.25). This lead Canivez & Watkins (2010) to suggest
that g should be the primary level of inference. 
The mental arithmetic subtest generally has a smaller load on the working memory factor
than the other subtests. It could be that the shared variance between these other subtests,
which are all composed of sequences of letters/digits, can be attributed to shared low-level
properties rather than a high-level working memory construct. If this is the case, the lower
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loading  of  Mental  Arithmetic  (down  to  r=0.57)  could  be  most  representative  of  the
proportion that is shared through a common high-level factor.
Operation Span is  one of three common complex span tasks:  reading span, symmetry
span, and operation span. Of these, Operation Span has shown to share most variance with
a common underlying construct, although only marginally so (r=0.76 vs, 0.72 and 0.73;
Conway et  al.,  2002;  Engle et  al.,  1999).  This  complex  span-derived working memory
construct could again be said to be confounded by shared low-level commonalities because
the three complex span tasks are structurally identical, just using different stimuli. Here
also,  the  working  memory  factor  is  almost  identical  to  a  fluid  intelligence  construct
(r=0.98). 
Operation Span was initially  presented by Daneman & Carpenter  (1980) and was later
shown also to have good psychometric properties in a computerized version (2005). It has
become the “Gold standard” operationalization of working memory in healthy populations
but it is rarely applied in patient populations.
RAPM is often called the “gold standard” operationalization of fluid intelligence given it’s
very high loading on such a latent construct with r>0.90. The reason for including it in a
test battery for working memory is that  Engle et al. (1999)’s and Conway et  al. (2002)
entertained the idea that Gf might be the central executive in the working memory models
by Cowan (1988) and Baddeley (1974, 2007). To be clear, they speculate about the specific
claim that  Gf=Central  executive  and  not  the  more  general  claim Gf=working  memory.
Correlations for the latter relationship is far lower than suggested by unity (r=0.5 to 0.6;
Ackerman,  Bier  & Boyle,  2005).  Thus while  RAPM can be said to  be in  the working
memory domain, it shares most of its variance with the executive part of working memory
in particular.
Representativeness  verdict: In  hindsight,  I  would say that  this  “working  memory  test
battery” is representative enough to at least stimulate curiosity about an effect on the level
of working memory if a consistent effect was found. Given the low-level similarities of the
WAIS span-subtests and the tasks used to infer the loading of Operation Span on a working
memory construct, I would not say that this test battery is suitable for definitive claims
about high-level effects. However, it should be noted that the test batteries of many studies
would fail at this level of scrutiny.
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 2.5.4  Representativeness for processing speed
While the Visual Search task was initially thought of as an active control, it does have some
of the characteristics of a processing speed task. N � N stimuli has to be scanned within
less than two seconds while the N-back task only requires consideration of N stimuli. To
test for the hypothesis that  visual search training improves processing speed, three tests
were added to the battery:
■ WAIS-IV Symbol-digit coding - age corrected.
■ WAIS-IV Symbol search - age corrected.
■ Computerized stroop color-word interference: stroop effect.
■ Computerized stroop color-word interference: reaction time.
The  lowest  level  heading  that  subsumes  these  outcome  measures  could  be  “speed  of
judgements  on  simple  symbols  and  colored  words”.  All  tests  are  visual.  Lacking  e.g.
auditory tests and visual images, this battery is not as representative as one may require to
establish claims about improved processing speed, even though it passes the criterion of “at
least 3 dissimilar tests”. Still, it is sufficient to falsify a claim about transfer. If these tests
fail, one would need 12 other positive outcomes to make the compound result passe the
Consistency >= 75% level.
WAIS  processing  speed  subtests: As  with  the  WAIS  working  memory  index,  the
processing speed index has also been shown to explain unique variance. The two subtests
share many low-level features which may account for at least some of this shared variance.
For  example,  both  involve  simple  visual  symbols  and  both  involve  a  great  deal  of
horizontal left-to-right scanning and motor response. Interestingly, processing speed shares
almost no variance with fluid intelligence (r < 0.11) and little with working memory (r <
0.29;  Conway  et  al.,  2002),  making  this  index  relatively  independent  of  the  working
memory index (Canivez & Watkins, 2010).  This is a good thing with respect  to testing
differential effects in the domain of processing speed and working memory respectively.
Stroop: This is seldomly used as a processing speed measure but it is readily interpretable
as such given the central role of inhibition in race-based cognitive theories (e.g. Norman &
Shallice,  1986;  Cowan,  1988)  at  which  schemas  or  chunks  are  selected  by  effectively
inhibiting competitors. 
Absolute  stroop  reaction  time  can  be  thought  of  as  a  continuous-performance  task.  In
earlier  experiments  I  have  found  the  stroop  effect  and  absolute  reaction  times  to  be
independent and therefore interpretable as different outcome measures. This did not hold
for the N-back studies where I found a linear relationship, meaning that to some extent the
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two indices represent the same ability, just measured at different scales (see Figure  16).
Since they arise from the same test, they share maximal low-level task similarity and are
thus not readily interpretable as separate measures of a high-level construct.
Figure  16: Scatter  plot  of  the stroop effect  as  a function of  absolute reaction time as
measured  in  the  N-back  studies.  Open  circles  are  healthy  subjects.  Filled  circles  are
patients. A common linear regression line is superposed. It is clear that the the stroop effect
and the reaction time covaries and that patients were slower than healthy subjects.
Representativeness  verdict: In  hindsight,  I  would  say  that  the  processing  speed  test
battery  fails  to  represent  a  broader  domain  of  processing  speed.  Given  the  low-level
similarities between the WAIS subtests and the correlation of stroop measures, it does not
constitute four low-level-independent  tasks.  Still,  a  consistent  positive finding on these
tasks could stimulate further research to assess the generality of such a finding.
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 2.5.5  Dissimilarity
In  the  review process,  I  explicitly  wrote  a  motivation  for  the  similarity-score  for  each
outcome. They can be seen in the dataset to the review in the column “diff.text”. I copy-
paste them in here for completeness. For the N-back training there were three dissimilar
and two similar outcomes:
■ Digit  span  was  scored  as  SIMILAR.  N-back  on  digits  was  trained.  Though  as
passive recognition and seldomly higher N than 4.
■ Arithmetic was scored as DISSIMILAR. No arithmetic in training. Some numbers,
but no counts of objects as in the mental arithmetic test.
■ Letter-number sequencing was scored as DISSIMILAR. No sequencing in training.
In N-back, things just have to be recalled in the presented order.
■ Operation Span was scored as SIMILAR. Some resemblance to the letter-condition
during training.
■ RAPM was scored as DISSIMILAR. There was a spatial N-back condition, but no
hidden rules or pattern recognition in simultaneously presented stimuli.
and for the Visual Search training there were three dissimilar and one similar outcome:
■ Symbol-digit  coding  was  scored  as  SIMILAR.  Resembles  the  training  task  but
differs  in  that  there  are  two targets  and  the  layout  is  different  and  you have  to
indicate location rather than mere presence.
■ Symbol search was scored as DISSIMILAR. Training did not involve numbers, nor
the drawing of shapes.
■ Stroop effect was scored as DISSIMILAR. No color and no words in training.
■ Stroop  reaction  time  was  scored  as  DISSIMILAR.  No  color  and  no  words  in
training.
Taken together, there are three dissimilar outcome measures for each intervention. This just
barely meets the “Reference” threshold level for the Dissimilarity criterion in the review
paper. Note that I included both Stroop outcome measures in spite of the considerations of
representativeness. I did this because it was in the supplementary to the N-back paper (I
should not treat my own paper in a special way in the review) and since many studies had
such multiple indices from the same task.
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 2.5.6  Active control
The  active  control  group  should  ideally  isolate  the  independent  variable  which  is
hypothesized to cause cognitive improvement, which we observe as improvement on the
outcome measures. In the N-back study, this independent variable can be described as “the
retention  and  updating  of  sequential  visual  and  auditory-verbal  information”  since  the
visual search task had neither retention, updating or sequential information. For a perfect
contrast, the visual search tasks should have had an equal number of different auditory and
visual implementations with the same characteristics as the N-back stimuli. Still,  the N-
back study had the most closely matched control group of all studies included in the review.
The second place is shared by all studies using computer training as active controls (Sturm
et  al.,  1997,  2003,  2004;  Beugeling,  2015;  Ruff,  1994;  Gray, 1992;  Middleton,  1991;
Kerner, 1985). In all of these studies, the training tasks diverged on many other parameters.
 2.5.7  Consistency
There  was  not  a  positive  effect  on  any  outcome measure.  Since  Consistency  is  about
consistent positive outcomes, the N-back study fails this criterion.
The total verdict of applying the “Reference” thresholds to the N-back study is that it is
methodologically  capable  of  detecting  a  transfer  effect  if  there  was  one,  but  the  data
indicated that there was not. Therefore, we interpreted the results as a null finding with
respect to transfer.
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 3.1  Prologue: Hypnosis and brain injury
We conducted a study where we used hypnotic suggestion to improve working memory in
brain injured patients. The study itself was conceived and carried out before the studies on
computer-training. It is in review in Current Biology as of writing this text. The Current
Biology report format does not allow for much background information, so I will use the
following sections to present the background on which this experiment was conceived.
 3.1.1  Meditation and the improvement of attention
The  initial  idea  for  this  study  was  the  result  of  the  observation  that  attention-related
problems were frequent in (but not limited to) brain injured patients (Cumming, Marshall,
& Lazar 2013; Carroll et al., 2003, Engberg & Teasdale, 2004; Fox, Lees-Haley, Earnest, &
Dolezal-Wood, 1995) and that meditation was supposedly a method to improve attention
directly in healthy subjects (Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Chiesa et al., 2011). Connecting
the  dots,  I  anticipated  that  meditation  may  be  a  good  intervention  for  these  patients.
However, I  soon discovered that  such attempts had been carried out with consistently31
negative  results  with  respect  to  high-level  cognition,  such  as  attention  and  memory
(McMillan  et  al.,  2002;  Bédard,  2003;  Bédard,  2005;  See  also two recent  papers  with
similar findings: Johansson et al., 2012. Azulay et al., 2013) although positive effects on
other aspects were observed in some of these studies. Sedlmeier et al., (2012) carried out a
meta-analysis on 163 meditation studies (the hitherto largest meta-analysis on the topic)
and  found  small-to-medium  sized  effect  on  attention  (r=0.28),  memory  (r=0.21)  and
intelligence (r=0.20) in healthy subjects. To put these effect sizes in a clinical perspective,
these effect sizes correspond to Number Needed to Treat32 of 5.1, 7.1 and 7.6 respectively,
so less than 20% of subjects would show a differential effect compared to a control group.
 3.1.2  Hypnotic suggestion and the manipulation of 
cognition
Exposed to the meditation literature, it was not long before I encountered the literature from
the recent upsurge in basic science research on hypnosis (Oakley & Halligan, 2009, 2013).
fMRI studies on hypnosis showed that highly hypnotizable subjects were able to inhibit
31  Bédard (2002) was a pilot study with positive results but a larger replication by Bédard (2005) 
failed to reproduce the results.
32  Assuming the default controlled event rate of 20%. If CER=50%, NNT=10 and if CER=50%, 
NNT=7.1. 
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color vision (Kosslyn et al., 2000), to induce pain in the absence of stimulation (Derbyshire
et  al.,  2004), and to inhibit  pain in the presence of stimulation (Vanhaudenhuyse et  al.,
2009).  These  studies  had  not  only  convincing  behavioral  results  but  also  perfect
physiological  results  where  real  perception  and  suggested  perception  were
indistinguishable.  Similar  results  were  obtained  in  behavioral  studies  where  the  stroop
effect was virtually eliminated (Raz et al., 2002, see review in Lifshitz et al., 2013 for a list
of more than 10 successful replications), and the McGurk effect was reduced (Lifshitz et
al., 2013). Taken together, this literature implies that hypnotic suggestion can de-automatize
what  was  previously  thought  to  be  automatic  cognitive  processes  to  a  hitherto
unprecedented extent (Kihlstrom, 2011).
This literature gives the clear impression that hypnotic suggestion is a powerful means of
altering human information processing. However, the literature almost exclusively targets
low-level  cognition  and  perception,  and  I  searched  in  vain  for  studies  targeting  the
phenomena  of  interest  for  the  present  purpose,  namely  high-level  cognition  such  as
attention,  working  memory, executive  function  etc.  An  exception  is  perhaps  the  failed
attempts  at  enhancing  recollection  (see  below).  We set  out  to  fill  this  gap  with  an
experiment. Before proceeding to our experiment, a few comments on the scope and limits
of hypnotic suggestion are in order:
Naturally, there are limits to what can be achieved using hypnotic suggestion compared to
waking suggestion. With respect to the findings above, the induction of color blindness
findings of Kosslyn et al. (2000) was not reproduced when changing the suggestion slightly
(Kirsch et al., 2008; Mazzoni et al., 2009). Although the stroop effect finding is replicable,
negative priming between consecutive trials was unaffected by the suggestion, indicating
that subjects were not wholly unable to perceive the words presented in colored ink (Raz &
Campbell, 2011). There is at least uncertainty in whether recall can be genuinely enhanced
or whether apparently improved memory can be attributed to changed criteria (Dywan &
Bowers, 1983; Klatzky, 1985). More generally, Ted Barber famously demonstrated that a
number of hypnotic behaviors could be a result of experimental methods differing in subtle
ways between hypnotic conditions and non-hypnotic conditions and he discounted the idea
that  hypnosis  was  a  distinctive  mental  state  (Barber  &  Gordon,  1965).  Similarly,
mentioning the word “hypnosis” increases suggestibility much more than if substituted with
“relaxation” (Gandhi & Oakley, 2005), indicating that prior expectations about hypnotic
experience and behavior is a major factor in hypnotic responsiveness.
Several theories have been put forth to systematise positive and negative findings. They
will not be discussed here since our experiment was not designed with any of these theories
in mind. I will briefly speculate about how our findings might inform theory in the epilogue
to the paper. 
For the present purpose, I will try to throw off as much theoretical weight as possible and
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adopt a rather simple procedural account of what hypnosis is33: Suggestion is guidance of
thought, usually delivered through language (White, 1941). The utterances “everything will
be all right”, “look, there’s a bird over there” and “hand me the salt” are all suggestions,
just  as  is  “you  are  now in  a  deep  hypnotic  state”  and  “your  hand is  numb now”  are
suggestions (Hilgard, 1973). Suggestion, whether hypnotic or not, can bring about profound
changes  in  behavior  that  are  relatively  consistent  with the  suggestion given  (Kirsch  &
Braffman,  2001).  The induction and  termination of  hypnosis  is  nothing but  a  series  of
suggestions, usually about relaxation and heightened suggestibility (Kihlstrom, 2008). The
word  “hypnosis”  as  in  “hypnotic  suggestion”  and  “hypnotic  state”  denotes  a  particular
family of suggestion, just as “meditation” and “psychotherapy” denotes other families of
suggestion.
Much is left  unsaid about the hypnotic  state  and the mechanisms by which suggestion
operate, but this short introduction will suffice for the claims I make in the paper.
 3.1.3  Suggestibility of brain injured patients
Can brain injured patients  be  hypnotized  at  all?  The answer seems to be yes.  Laidlaw
(1993)  tested  21  concussed  outpatients  on  a  Harvard  Group  Scale  of  Hypnotic
Susceptibility form A and found that they were no different than 31 healthy controls with
respect  to  suggestibility. Likewise,  Kihlstrom (2013)  tested  15  patients  on  the  Arizona
Motor  Scale  of  Hypnotizability  (AMSH)  and  found  them  to  be  like  healthy  controls,
regardless  of  site  of  lesion34.  There  are  no  danish  norms  for  Stanford  Hypnotic
Suggestibility Scale, form C, but our 49 patients in the treatment groups scored higher than
normative means from 8 out of 10 other nationalities (see Table 10. Our sample mean is 7.3
(median 8, see 17). With an average age of 46.0 years, our sample was much older than the
oldest normative sample (Taiwanese, 33.6 years) but age differences are unlikely to affect
the  results  considerably  given  that  Piccione  et  al.  (1989)  found  no  time-trend  in
suggestibility over a 25-year period. Taken together, the evidence support that patients with
mild  to  moderate  brain  injury  can  be  hypnotized  and  that  they  may  even  be  more
suggestible than the healthy population on average.
33  Barnier & Nash (2008) distinguished between hypnosis-as-procedure and hypnosis-as-product 
as two different ways of accounting for what hypnosis is. The former describes the procedures 
and the observed behavior whereas the latter describes this in mental terms on the part of the 
hypnotized subject. The former often assumes the latter without testing it.
34  Kihlstrom used this sample to falsify the hypothesis that hypnosis represents a shift to right-
hemisphere dominant processing.
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Reference Nationality Age N Mean (SD)
Naäring et al. (2001) Dutch 21.5 135 4.31 (2.6)
Hilgard et al. (1965) American 307 5.19 (3.1)
Bongartz et al. (2000) German 22.4 174 5.53 (2.8)
Lichtenberg et al. (2009) Israeli-HebrewIsraeli-English
around
30
169
38
5.62 (2.4)
5.68 (3.3)
González et al. (1996) Spanish 19.5 115 5.78 (3.2)
Pascalis et al. (2000) Italian 19-29 356 6.81 (around 3)
Roark et al. (2012) Taiwanese 33.6 322 6.87 (2.4)
Lindeløv et al. Danish 46.0 48 7.3 (2.7)
Sánchez-Armáss et al. 
(2005) Mexican 25.5 513 7.56 (2.3)
Allen (2008) American-Indian 31.6 40 7.75 (2.9)
Table 10: SHSS:C normative results for healthy subjects of different nationalities, ordered
by mean score. Note that SHSS:C scores are not normally distributed (see Figure 17) so the
means and standard deviations are not truly representative of the population.
Figure 17: The distribution of SHSS sum scores at baseline in our sample of 49 patients.
The  mean  is  7.3  and  the  median  is  8.  This  non-normal  distribution  is  similar  to  the
published histograms from the normative studies in Table 10.
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 3.1.4  Pilot study
We ran a pilot study in the fall of 2009 and spring of 2010 including four patients with
acquired brain injury. The methods and results  of  this  pilot  is  described in  the paper’s
methods and supplementary. Briefly, two patients were given suggestion which targeted
working memory related experiences explicitly. Among other techniques, we used used age
regression  to  the  pre-injury  state,  visualizations  of  recovery  in  the  present  and  post-
hypnotic  suggestion about  successful  experiences.  A working memory  index  score  was
enhanced by 1.4 SMD (using the healthy population standard deviation as standardizer)
following 8 weekly 1-hour sessions of this intervention (see figure  24, subject 1 and 2).
This effect was sustained after 2 months break (timepoint 2 and 3).  Two other patients
(subject 3 and 4) were assigned to a control condition consisting of hypnotic induction →
listening to music → termination. They remained at status quo improvement (0.07 SMD).
When crossed over to the targeted-suggestion condition, they improved 1.3 SMD, similarly
to the first two patients.
To put these effect sizes in perspective, they correspond to a Number Needed to Treat of
2.0. A power calculation for an interaction effect in a repeated measures ANOVA estimated
the appropriate sample size to be 6 subjects in total for 95.8% power to detect an interaction
effect at an alpha level of 1%. This convinced us that this project was worth pursuing. We
hypothesized that the improvement was caused by the content of suggestion rather than the
hypnotic state or suggestion per se. We made the appropriate corrections in the script and
design to isolate that variable. 
The  experiment,  which  is  reported  in  the  paper,  simply  establishes  the  strength  of  the
relationship between the targetedness of suggestion and the effects on outcome measures
without theorizing about the cause of such an effect. Given the lack of prior knowledge on
this topic, that step is big enough in and of itself so more detailed research questions about
the psychologically mediating mechanisms were saved for later studies.
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 3.2  Hypnotic suggestion can normalize 
working memory performance in 
chronic brain injured patients.
Working memory is the mental capacity to perform short-term storage and manipulation of
information  in  the  face  of  concurrent  processing  (Baddeley,  2007,  Cowan,  1988).  The
importance of working memory in everyday functioning (Alloway & Alloway, 2010) has
given rise to a broad interest in persistent enhancement of WM in healthy subjects and in
patients. Here we show that hypnotic suggestion can effectively restore otherwise impaired
working  memory  performance  in  patients  with  acquired  brain  injury.  Following  four
sessions, patients had a standardized mean improvement of 0.68 and 0.57 more than an
active control group and around 1.1 more than retest. This effect was maintained after a 6.7
week break. The active control group was crossed over to the working memory suggestion
and showed superior improvement. Both groups reached a performance level at- or above-
the healthy population mean with effect sizes between 1.55 and 2.03 standard deviations
more than a passive control group. We conclude that there may be a residual capacity for
information processing in patients with mild brain injury and that hypnotic suggestion may
be an effective method to improve working memory performance.
 3.2.1  Introduction
Working  memory  is  a  central  cognitive  function  that  enables  short-term  storage  and
manipulation of information in the face of concurrent processing (Baddeley, 2007, Cowan,
1988). The importance of working memory in everyday functioning (Alloway & Alloway,
2010) has  given  rise  to  a  broad  interest  in  persistent  enhancement  of  WM in  healthy
subjects and in patients. 
Biological approaches include pharmaceuticals Repantis, Schlattman, Laisney, & Heuser
(2007),  physical  exercise Smith et  al.  (2010),  neurostimulation (Thut  & Pascual-Leone,
2010)  and  nutrition  Balk  et  al.  (2007).  However,  these  interventions  do  not  target  any
particular cognitive domain and effect sizes on higher cognitive functions are in the zero-to-
moderate range for repeated administrations.
Behavioral  approaches  targets  specific  mental  functions  by  loading  them  bottom-up.
Bottom-up refers to processing elicited by incoming sensory stimuli. This approach usually
uses computerized training or other repetitive tasks to do “work out” of working memory
by repeatedly straining it bottom-up through difficult tasks. However, effects tend to be
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specific  to  the  trained  task,  i.e.  not  generalizing  to  dissimilar  tasks  (Melby-Lervåg  &
Hulme, 2012; Shipstead, Hicks, & Engle, 2012; Shipstead, Redick, & Engle, 2012).
In  this  study, we  pursue  an  alternative  and  novel  approach:  top-down enhancement  of
working memory capacity. Top-down processing refers to processing elicited by previous
experience, expectation, context and motivation. Suggestions are probably the most direct
behavioral  instrument  to  experimentally  control  top-down  predictions  and  hypnotic
suggestions seem to be particularly powerful in this respect (Kirsch & Braffman, 2001).
Examples include unprecedented control over color perception Kosslyn et al., (2000), the
McGurk effect (Lifshitz, Aubert Bonn, Fischer, Kashem, & Raz, 2013), the Stroop effect
(Raz, Shapiro, Fan, & Posner, 2002) and pain perception (Derbyshire, Whalley, Stenger, &
Oakley, 2004; Vanhaudenhuyse et  al.,  2009).  However, these were all  obtained through
suggestions about altered perception. The current study uses suggestions about working
memory in order  to  investigate to  what  extent higher cognition can be enhanced using
hypnotic suggestions.
We recruited  52 subjects  with  acquired  brain  injury  in  the  chronic  phase  of  which 49
completed (see descriptives in Table  11). They were randomly assigned either to receive
targeted or non-targeted suggestions. The targeted procedure consisted of suggestions about
enhancing WM functions. The theme of the targeted suggestions was the instantiation of
pre-injury WM ability in the present. Techniques included age regression to before and after
the injury and visualizations of cognitive change and brain plasticity. The active control
procedure  consisted  of  non-targeted  suggestions from mindfulness  meditation practices,
involving  body  and  thought  awareness  with  no  explicit  mentioning  of  brain  injury  or
working memory-related abilities. Mindfulness meditation has previously demonstrated no
or small effects on cognitive abilities in brain injured subjects (Azulay, Smart, Mott, &
Cicerone,  2013;  Johansson,  Bjuhr, & Rönnbäck,  2012; McMillan,  Robertson, Brock,  &
Chorlton,  2002).  A number  of  steps  were  taken  to  factor  out  confounding  differences
between these two interventions (see Experimental Methods).
An additional 21 subjects were recruited using identical criteria to control for retest effects.
They  received  no  intervention  and  were  compensated  1.500  DKK  on  completion.  19
subjects completed.
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N TBI / Stroke /other / NA Age (SD)
Years since
injury (SD)
Sex
F/M
SHSS:
C (SD)
Group A 27 18 / 5 / 4 / 0 45.2 (13.0) 11.6 (11.4) 15/12
7.7
(2.1)
Group B 22 12 / 5 / 5 / 0 47.0 (14.1) 8.0 (6.7) 14/8 6.8(3.3)
Control 19 4 / 10 / 3 / 2 54.1 (11.7) 7.9 (6.6) 11/8 NA
Table  11. Descriptives  of  sample  and  groups.  SHSS:C  is  the  Stanford  Hypnotic
Susceptibility Scale form C (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962). NA = Not available.
The experiment had three phases (see Figure 18): phase 1 followed by a break (6.7 weeks,
SD 1.4) followed by phase 2. Group A received two versions of the targeted procedure.
Group  B received  the  non-targeted  procedure  during  phase  1  and  the  first  of  the  two
targeted  procedures  during  phase  2.  Each  procedure  consisted  of  a  weekly  session  of
approximately 1 hour duration for four successive weeks. The control group was passive
throughout the experiment but was tested like all other participants.
Figure  18. The  experimental  design  with  three  groups  and  four  tests  (vertical  lines).
Arrows  between  tests  represents  no  treatment.  The  middle  column  is  a  break  with  an
average duration of 6.7 weeks. Test1 is baseline and Test3 is follow-up.
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Subjects  were  tested  on  the  Working  Memory  Index  (WMI)  from  the  Wechsler  Adult
Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III) and the Trail Making Test part A and B  before and after each
procedure. WMI is calculated from four tasks: forward digit span, backward digit span,
letter-number  sequencing  and  mental  arithmetic  and  has  good  psychometric  properties
(Iverson, 2001). All WMI scores were corrected for age and converted to index-100 scores.
The B-A Trail  Making index is the time cost  of  alternating between increments in two
sequences relative to just incrementing one sequence. It is frequently used as an index of
executive control (Sánchez-Cubillo et al., 2009) - the central part of the working memory
system. B-A is log-normal so log(B-A) was used as dependent variable.
 3.2.2  Results
The  results  supports  the  hypothesis  that  targeted  hypnotic  suggestion  have  a  distinct
positive effect on working memory performance (see Figure 19).
Figure 19. Per-test and change scores with 95% CI for the Working Memory Index (WMI)
and the Trail Making Test. Left: scores for each of the four test sessions. WMI scores in
group A and B improved from below (< 85) to above the population average (> 100)
following the full program while the control group remained at status quo. In both groups,
the major improvements in WMI and TMT occurred during the targeted procedure. The
higher the WM capacity and the smaller the TMT time the better. Right: Standardized mean
differences for each phase. The control group (squares) is persistently close to zero (dashed
line) indicating small retest effects.  See results from subtests in Figure  20 and  21 and
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compare to pilot study in Figure 24.
Phase 1: Most importantly, the targeted hypnotic procedure received by group A in phase 1
improved WMI by 0.68 SMD more than the non-targeted procedure received by group B
(pLRT=4.1×10-5) with a Bayes factor (BF) of 342 revealing that it is 342 times more likely
that group A had superior improvement relative to group B than that they experienced the
same effect. Group A improved 1.39 SMD more than the retest effect during phase 1 on the
WMI (pLRT=7×10-13, BF=1.7×1013). By convention these estimates correspond to large and
very large effects (Cohen, 1992). The selective effect of the targeted procedure was even
more apparent for TMT with a similar effect size of 0.63 SMD (pLRT=0.0007, BF=37.5) but
with no improvement following the non-targeted procedure (SMD=0.30, pLRT=0.50) with a
Bayes Factor of 6.2 in favor of the null meaning that it is 6.2 times more likely that group B
simply  experienced  the  same  retest  effect  as  the  control  group  than  that  group  B
experienced a separate effect. The retest effect is factored out in all the following unless
otherwise specified and a full table of estimates, intervals and inferences can be found in
Table 12.
Break: WMI remained unchanged after a 6.7 (SD 1.5) week break following the targeted
procedure (SMD=-0.10, pLRT= 0.46, BF=7.3 in favor of no difference) as well as the non-
targeted  procedure  (SMD=0.14,  pLRT=  0.76,  BF=9.1  in  favor  of  no  difference)  when
controlling for non-specific and retest effects respectively. This is also true of TMT (see
Table 12).
Phase 2: In phase 2, group B had crossed over to the targeted intervention which enhanced
WMI by 0.74 SMD (pLRT=2.0×10-5, BF=535) and 1.20 SMD for the TMT (pLRT=1.2×107,
BF=72813). Note that group B improved more on both measures following the targeted
intervention in phase 2 compared to the non-targeted intervention in phase 1, thus providing
evidence for a distinctive effect of the targeted hypnotic suggestion. Subjects in group A
improved another 0.60 SMD (pLRT=0.0008, BF=30.0) on the TMT while the evidence was
weaker for WMI (SMD=0.35, pLRT= 0.018, BF=1.5).
Total  improvement:  Interestingly, WMI improvement  from baseline  to  the  last  test  in
group A (SMD=1.73, 95% CI=1.30-2.17) and B (SMD=1.55, 95% CI=1.13-1.98) had the
same magnitude (BF=4.4 in favor of no difference). The same is true for TMT which again
demonstrated very large total improvements in group A (SMD=1.83, 95% CI=1.29-2.38)
and group B (SMD=2.03, 95% CI=1.47-2.60) with a similar magnitude (BF=2.0 in favor of
no difference).
The  fact  that  WMI  improved  to  the  population  mean  indicates  that  subjects  were
representative of  the normal population before their impairment and that  this level  was
restored  following  the  targeted  hypnotic  suggestion.  TMT improved  to  better  than  the
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population mean (Nielsen, Knudsen, & Daugbjerg, 1989) with a median improvement from
48 seconds to 24 seconds in the treatment groups.
Robustness: The above inferences were not qualitatively altered when including gender,
time since injury, baseline score, SHSS:C score, duration of break, years of education and
cause  of  injury  in  the  model  (see  supplemental).  The robustness  to  moderating  factors
indicate  that  this  finding  should  generalize.  For  example,  participants  with  an  initial
performance  above  the  population  average  improved  just  as  much  as  those  below the
normal range.
The reported pattern is evident in each of the WMI subtests (Figure 20). The TMT results
were mostly driven by TMT-B, consistent with the hypothesis that the targeted functions
were  improved whereas  the non-targeted visuo-motor  skills  were not  (Figure  21).  This
experiment numerically replicates a small pilot study on 4 patients (Figure  24). Plots of
subtests, additional effect sizes, intervals and inferential results can be seen in Table 12.
 3.2.3  Discussion
We conclude that hypnotic suggestion can restore working memory performance in brain
injured patients. These data suggest that acquired brain injury does not necessarily impose
an irreversible bottleneck on the amount of  items that  people can effectively store and
process,  nor  the  cost  of  switching  between  tasks.  On  the  contrary,  working  memory
performance proved to be malleable in a short timeframe.
While these data demonstrate the behavioral effects of targeted hypnotic suggestion, we
make no claims about the underlying mechanism. Patients were asked to improve their
current working memory functioning based on pre-injury experiences. We do not mean to
imply that they literally did this given that hypnosis may in some cases impair recollection
(Friedlander & Smith, 1985). We find it more plausible that suggestion facilitated mental
imagery or expectations about being unimpaired which may have recruited non-impaired
strategies. Other potential mechanisms include unlearning learned helplessness, stimulation
of  brain  plasticity,  anxiety-reduction  and  role-playing.  Anxiety  reduction  is,  however,
unlikely given that there was no differences in the hypothetized direction on the European
Brain  Injury  Questionnaire  as  rated  by  subjects  and  their  relatives  (see  Figure  22).
Narrowing  in  on  possible  mechanisms  is  a  topic  for  future  research.  Regardless  of
mechanism, the result is a long-lasting improved working memory performance.
We claim  that  the  improvements  were  predominantly  caused  by  the  targeting  of  the
suggestions which was captured by the difference between group A and B in phase 1 and
the break. This view was further supported by the superior improvements in group B during
phase 2. The influence of confounding factors was ruled out by design and data. The design
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controlled  for  retest  effects,  relaxation  responses  and  expectancy  effects.  Demographic
parameters did not explain the effects. Furthermore, the results are not readily explicable in
terms of specific low-level strategies since the intervention did not mention or resemble the
outcome measures and the results generalized to dissimilar visual and verbal material. The
two treatment groups had the same level of motivation and belief in the effectiveness of the
hypnotic procedures throughout the experiment (see Figure 23).
Suggestibility did not influence the effects notably, contrary to what is commonly found in
the hypnosis  literature  (Halligan & Oakley, 2013;  Oakley  & Halligan,  2013;  Kirsch &
Braffman,  2001; Raz,  Shapiro,  Fan, & Posner, 2002).  However, suggestibility has been
found not to be a precondition for effectiveness in surgical patients (Montgomery, David,
Winkel, Silverstein, & Bovbjerg, 2002). Suggestion for health improvements may be easier
than captured by suggestibility scales,  or  may work through different  mechanisms than
suggestibility  as  measured  by  classical  tests.  Again,  we  make  no  claims  about  the
underlying mechanism of change. Future studies using non-hypnotic suggestion on patients
and hypnotic suggestion on healthy subjects would be ideal to determine the preconditions
and scope of the effect.
The novel  contribution of  the present  work is the demonstration that  targeted hypnotic
suggestions causes a very large and long-lasting improvement in human working memory-
related performance. In particular, the results give evidence for the hypothesis that hypnotic
suggestion can be used to influence working memory, and furthermore, that this is more
efficient than known bottom-up behavioral and biological approaches.
 3.2.4  Experimental procedures
Controlling nuisance factors:  The following steps were taken to ensure that the contrast
between the targeted and non-targeted procedures was pure: (1) Procedures were written up
as a  manual as dictated by the hypnotist.  (2) Manuscripts for the two procedures  were
identical  with  respect  to  the  induction  and  termination  of  the  hypnotic  state,  and
accordingly, only differed in the targeting of the suggestions. (3) Duration of the sessions
and all information material were kept equal. (4) testers were blinded and participants were
blinded to the existence of any other groups in the study. (5) To homogenize expectations,
all participants were informed about a successful pilot study (see supplemental) but that the
outcome of  the current  experiment  was unknown.  (6)  To minimize test-specific  effects
neither  procedure  contained  any  training  or  mention  of  the  neuropsychological  testing
situation and materials.
Inference model: Results were modelled using a mixed effects model with a covariate for
retest, non-targeted, and targeted effects for each phase and a random intercept per subject.
This model explicitly controls for retest and non-targeted effects when assessing targeted
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effects. Covariates were tested against the null using the likelihood ratio tests (LRT) where
the null model was the full model less the covariate(s) in question. The strength of evidence
for the covariate being zero was quantified using the Bayes Factor (BF) with a Cauchy(0,
√(2)/2 )  prior on covariates (Rouder & Morey, 2012). The Bayes Factor is the shift in
the posterior odds ratio between the full model and the null model that was brought about
by the data.  Conventionally, a BF of 3-20 is labelled as “positive evidence”, 20-150 is
“strong evidence” and >150 is “very strong evidence” (Kass & Raftery, 1995) but we invite
readers to simply interpret each BF as an odds ratio rather than transforming them into
crude universal categories. As a general rule, these labels are more conservative than p-
values (Wetzels et al., 2011). An advantage of Bayes Factors relative to p-values is that they
quantify  evidence  for  both  the  full  and  the  null  model  while  accounting  for  model
complexity (Posada & Buckley, 2004).  Sensitivity analyses using different Bayes factors
are available in the supplementary material.
For parameter estimates a more informative Normal(0, 0.5) prior was used which expresses
a skeptical prior belief that there is around 98% probability of the effect size being less than
1 SMD. Therefore the effect sizes reported here are smaller than had they been obtained by
conventional maximum-likelihood estimation. With an uninformative prior, the means and
CIs coincide largely with those obtained from maximum-likelihood methods.
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 3.2.6  Supplemental data
Figure 20: Means and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for each WAIS-III working
memory subtest,  corrected  for  age.  Digit  Span is  a  compound score for  forwards  and
backwards digit  span.  The  overall  pattern  from figure  19 is  well  representative  of  the
individual subtests.
Figure 21: Means and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for each TMT subtest. The
B-A index is mostly driven by TMT-B as subjects improved approximately equally in TMT-
A.
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Figure  22: Average scores and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals on the European
Brain Injury Questionnaire (EBIQ) as rated by the patient self (left) and a significant other
(right). Most items on EBIQ could be expected to covary with anxiety so the average score
can be used as a crude assessment of the hypothesis that anxiety reduction explains the
improvements on the outcome measures. There is no indication that group A experience
fewer problems on the EBIQ than group B. To the contrary, patients in group B reported
superior  improvements  during  phase  1  on  the  EBIQ,  thus  discrediting  the  anxiety-
hypothesis.
Figure  23:  Medians and interquartile intervals for the Visual Analogue Scale rating of
motivation to participate and belief that hypnosis can help. There is a clear ceiling effect
and no apparent differences between groups. To minimize bias, these ratings were filled out
privately  by  the participants  before each  treatment  and put  in  an envelope  which was
opened when blinding was lifted, i.e. after all participants had completed.
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 3.2.7  Supplemental: Pilot study
This paper replicates findings from a pilot study using the same design. The pilot results are
shown in figure 24. Briefly, we recruited 4 patients and divided them into a group A and
group B so that base WMI score was equal in the two groups. The group B intervention in
phase was listening to relaxing music between induction and termination and no additional
suggestions were given. The experimental  design was identical  to the current study but
participants in group B were not given a test after the break.
Group A improved by 20  points  following the  targeted  suggestions  in  phase  1,  stayed
relatively stable during the break and increased further in phase 2. Group B stayed at status
quo during the control procedure in phase 1 and had improved 20 points following the
targeted  suggestions  in  phase  2.  The  present  study  not  only  replicate  these  finding
conceptually, but also quantitatively.
The “pure state” procedure was eventually altered into the much more closely matched
non-targeted mindfulness-like procedure that was administered to group B during phase 1
in the present study.
Figure 24: Data from the four participants in the pilot study. Group A (blue) and group B
(red) essentially followed the same pattern and the same magnitudes as observed in the
present study. The dashed line is the average of the normal population. Compare to figure
19.
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 3.2.8  Supplemental Experimental Procedures
Intervention procedures
Induction of hypnosis: The same induction was used in both procedures. Participants were
asked to increasingly relax and to pay attention only to the hypnotist’s voice. Participants
were  asked  to  prepare  to  work  towards  improvement  during  the  session.  Inductions
typically lasted 5-10 minutes and made use of visual imagery, e.g. walking down a staircase
or going down with an elevator.
Targeted procedure: The  hypnotist  told the  participants  that  they  could  improve their
memory  and  attentive  functions.  The  participants  were  asked  to  perform various  tasks
during the session:
■ Imagining  previous  strategies: Participants  were  asked  to  experience  how  they
solved problems and remembered things in their lives prior to the injury.
■ Imagining the process of recovery: Participants were asked to imagine the physical
growth of neurons and connections in their brains.
■ Imagining results of recovery: Participants were asked to feel what it would be like
to be able to use their previous abilities and strategies in their current life situation.
■ Trusting improvement: Participants were asked to believe that it is possible to make
improvements  regardless  of  what  they  had  been  told  after  hospitalization  or
rehabilitation.
■ Goals:  Participants were asked to  identify their  current  problems and what they
would like for the future in terms of their own cognitive abilities.
Translated excerpts from session 1: ”While you are fully relaxed, I will ask you to create a
picture of your life history as a line (…) once it was easy for you to concentrate… without
getting tired as you do now… So if you are not already there, then go...  back in time,
longer and longer into your own past… to the time before the incident… just relax, it does
not have to be experienced in one particular way… just accept the way you experience this
(…) Now find three situations… in your past, before the incident… where you concentrate
and remember all that is relevant to you with ease and without any trouble… something
that you today find hard to do (…) Now, take your re-found knowledge of how it used to
be… and move forward… towards now (…) if something is blocked or closed… you just
find another way… and a new way can be as good… sometimes even better… than an old
one (…) Now move to the future… and experience yourself in a situation… where you can
do something you thought was impossible… experience it very life-like… notice as many
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details as you can.”
Non-targeted  procedure:  The  hypnotist  used  suggestions  known  from  mindfulness
meditation. In particular, the suggestions including focused attention on bodily sensations,
e.g. breathing, and open monitoring of the stream of thought.
Translated excerpts from session 1: ”Feel that you sit in the chair… notice which part of
your body occupy your attention… (…) perhaps you will feel the sensations change (…)
also feel your tendency… to want to be with some impressions more than others (…) ask
yourself what you experience right now… do not judge what you feel… just feel it (…)
extend your attention to  include the fact  that  you are just  sitting here in  silence… the
silence  and  closeness…  right  now  and  here…  just  sensing  what  may  come…  without
judging (…) Feel what it is like to breathe… notice that you chest rises and lowers… feel in
the inhale and the exhale (…) Now direct your attention to your left foot… from the toes to
the heel… if you have tensions… let them go (…) maybe you feel sensations or emotions…
when you feel something… be attentive, curious and open to what you feel.
Termination  of  hypnosis: The  same  termination  was  used  in  both  procedures.
Terminations were brief as the hypnotist slowly counted backwards from 10 to 1 while
suggesting the participant to wake up in a pleasant way, and to prepare to continue their
day.
Recruitment of subjects
Patients  were  recruited  from  Danish  brain  injury  communities  based  on  self-reported
working memory problems, such as poor concentration and forgetfulness. The cognitive
nature of the self-reported problem was subsequently confirmed in patient records as well
as neuropsychological tests (including MMSE and clock drawing) and relevant aetiology.
Exclusion  criteria  were  psychiatric  or  neurodegenerative  disease  and/or  other  severe
cognitive  dysfunctions  (e.g.  severe  aphasia)  and  concurrent  rehabilitation  at  any  time
during  the  study.  Heterogeneity  in  the  sample  was  intentional  since  the  hypothesis  is
invariant with respect to aetiology and demographic variables. See table 11 for a description
of the sample.
Subjects  were  continuously  enrolled  and  randomly  allocated  to  two  groups  using  coin
tosses.
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Model and inferences
Regression model:  Observed data were modeled using a mixed effects model with retest
effects (observed in the control group), non-targeted effects (additional effect observed in
group B) and targeted effects (additional effect observed in group A) as fixed effects. These
effects accumulated over time so that  they reflect  change scores from the previous test
session to the current. Expressed mathematically:
… where g is the group index,   is the test session index and i is the subject index. X is
design  indicators  where   when   (baseline)  and   otherwise,
 for the control group,   for group B
and   for group A. However, when  , i.e. phase 2 or test
session 4,   for group A because no non-targeted effects were
assessed directly. This  is  due to  the non-crossover design,  which  was  intentional  since
strong order effects would be likely if group A should transition from the targeted to the
non-targeted intervention. 
Subject  was  added  as  stochastic  part  to  account  for  dependencies  between  repeated
measures. subjecti is the subject-specific offset relative to the population baseline captured
by the intercept. The full model had a good fit (r2=0.896, random effects included)
Inferences:  the specific parameter estimates are of primary interest. Thus we did not use
more  general  procedures  such  as  testing  the  group  x  session  interaction  in  a  repeated
measures ANOVA because they answer much more general questions (“do the two groups
of  individuals  develop  differently?”)  than  would  be  informative  here.  Likewise,  latent
change scores (McArdle, 2009) and other growth models might better represent the actual
time course of the sessions but at  the cost  of a much higher model complexity than is
needed to answer the main research questions of this paper.
Bayesian and frequentist  inferences: Likelihood Ratios  (LR) and Bayes  Factors  (BF)
both yield posterior odds of the two models in question. They do differ in that the LRT
considers only the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) against the null whereas the BF
considers the full set of credible parameter values. By so doing, BF inherently penalizes
model  complexity  whereas  LRT has  to  make  an  additional  decision  based  on  Akaike
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Information Criterion (AIC) or Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to avoid overfitting.
For  this  particular  model,  the  frequentist  and  Bayesian  analysis  yield  almost  identical
parameter  estimates  and  intervals.  This  is  also  true  for  the  BIC-based  Bayes  Factors
(Wagenmakers, 2007),  , g-priors-based Bayes Factors (prior is
Cauchy(0, sqrt(2)/2)) on SMD and on Product Space (PS) derived Bayes factors  where we
used a Normal(0, 0.5) prior on covariates. These three Bayes factors were used to assess the
sensitivity of the inferences to prior specifications.
The BIC may be interpreted as the unit information prior which is as informative as one
data point. The unit information prior is very wide (uninformative) and thus puts less mass
on the null than the g-priors and the related JZS prior which has 95% mass between -9 and
9 SMD. Thus Bayes factors based on BIC is more supportive of the null than those based
on the g-prior because the relative change from prior to posterior probability at the null is
larger. Likewise, for the PS Bayes factor we set a prior 95% probability between -1 and 1
SMD and is thereby the most informative prior with the least supportive of the null and
conversely similarly larger supportive of the alternative. Analysis using these three priors
are listed in table 12 and can be explored using the accompanying data analysis script.
As mentioned in the main text, we find inferences about model odds given the current
dataset  much more  informative  than  p-values  which  are  simply  a  decision  criterion  to
control the type-1 error rate in the limit of infinite perfect replications and does not quantify
the probability of type-1 error rate in a single experiment.
Effects: Effects were derived as means of the posterior and 95% highest posterior density
regions, also called credible intervals. A Normal(0, 0.5) prior was used on covariates which
puts 95% probability mass between -1 and 1 SD. This causes the effect sizes to be around
10% smaller  than  maximum-likelihood estimates  reflecting  a  somewhat  skeptical  prior
view on big effect sizes. See table 12 for effects (retest is relative to intercept, non-targeted
is  relative  to  retest,  targeted  is  relative  to  non-targeted+retest),  effect  sizes  (SMD  =
difference / SDpretest, credible intervals, pLRT and Bayes factors. Notice that all retest effects
and  break  effects  lend  support  to  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  effect  is  zero  while  the
treatment effects led support to the alternative.
Nuisance covariates: were tested using a likelihood ratio test between (1) the mixed effects
model described in Methods and Materials plus the interaction between the covariate and
the fixed effect in question and (2) this model without the fixed effect. Effectively, this
models the extent to which the covariate can explain the variance otherwise caught by the
fixed  effect,  i.e.  the  extent  to  which  the  covariate  is  an  alternative  interpretation  or  a
confounder to the effect of the behavioral intervention. No covariates qualitatively replaced
the fixed effect (see main text). All covariates were mean-centered. 
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Notes on specific covariates:
■ Cause was  tested  on  Traumatic  Brain  Injury  and  Stroke  patients  only  (N=54),
ignoring  other  patients.  There  were  too  few cases  of  other  causes  (e.g.  cerebral
hypoxia or encephalitis) to model them.
■ SHSS:C (suggestibility)  was  only tested  on group A and B (N=48)  and  not  the
control group, since the control group was completely hypnosis-free.
■ Break duration was only tested on the interactions with the three fixed effects for the
break, i.e. change from session 2 to 3.
■ Education was the nominated number of years between public school and the latest
completed education. A value of 0 corresponds to 9 years in public school.
117
 3.3  Epilogue: mechanisms and 
implications for theory
We have kept the paper almost entirely free from theoretical  considerations in order  to
present  the  findings  as  they  are.  Simply  establishing  that  the  targetedness  of  hypnotic
suggestion causes something that seems to be a genuine high-level cognitive improvement
is a major step in and of itself. It is therefore also one that should be subjected to scrutiny
before  making  too  much  of  it  theoretically.  Such  scrutiny  includes  replications  and
extensions.  I  therefore consider  the following discussion to  be a catalogue of  ideas  for
future studies rather than definite conclusions.
 3.3.1  What was improved?
We observed improved performance on outcome measures typically thought to represent
working memory functioning. It may seem obvious to conclude that working memory per
se was improved. However, there are several other explanations which offer the same end
result  but  through  different  underlying  changes.  I  will  consider  the  merits  of  each
alternative in the following.
First,  we can  derive  that  the  improvement  is  a  cognitive improvement.  Given  that  the
patient was the only common factor between the hypnosis sessions and the testing sessions
and that differences in the hypnosis sessions affected the results in the testing sessions, the
mediating factor must be a property of the patient. Given that the targetedness is a semantic
property  of  hypnotic  suggestion  (the  targetedness)  and  that  decoding  semantics  is  an
entirely  cognitive  phenomenon,  the  mediating  factor  must  be  cognitive.  From  here,
Morgan’s canon dictatet that low-level alternative explanations should be considered. I list
such alternatives here in the approximate order of explanatory level.
Chance:  It could be that the findings of the hypnosis study is simply due to chance - an
extreme 1 in 10,000 study which would fail to replicate the other 9,999 times. Such a claim
could be substantiated by noting that the findings are at odds with many previous findings.
First, it has never been published before. If the effect is as versatile as our study seems to
suggest, someone should have noticed and published it after decades of basic and clinical
hypnosis research. Second, persistent positive effects of this magnitude following such a
short intervention have not hitherto been reported in patients with acquired brain injury in
the chronic phase.  Third,  as  far as I know no established theory of hypnosis allow for
hypnotic suggestion to work on high-level cognition (see discussion of hypnosis theories in
a later section). 
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Independent  replication would  be  the  primary  test  of  the  chance-explanation.  We have
replicated the results under various conditions. (1) in the pilot study, Here,  patients had
EEG mounted simultaneously. (2) In group A during phase 1. The script had been rewritten
relative to the pilot  study. (3)  in group B during phase 2,  in which case subjects were
arguably  more  familiar  with  the  hypnotic  procedure  and  had  already  been  through  a
mindfulness-hypnosis.  (4) We have casually run two more subjects through a 4-session
treatment with a once-again rewritten script, and observe effects of the same magnitude.
Finally, the persistency of the effect following the break in both the pilot and for group A
count as replications with respect to the chance-claim that the results were merely lucky
momentary fluctuations in the state of the patients. Given that the results were replicated
under these differing conditions, the claim that there was a consistent methodological bias
is  at  least  somewhat  ameliorated.  The  latter  would  be  most  forcefully  tested  by  an
independent replication.
We set a prior bayes factor of 1 between the full and null models, meaning that we assumed
equal prior probability of the presence and absence of a unique effect of targeted hypnotic
suggestion.  One could formalize the “chance” skepticism by favoring the null  model a
priori say by setting a BFnull=10, corresponding to 9% prior probability of the presence of an
effect. The critical bayes factor (difference between group B and group A in phase 1) was
342 for the working memory index and 37.5 for the trail making index. With the skeptical
prior, the posterior bayes factors would be 34.2 and 3.75 - still in favor of the effectiveness
of targeted suggestion. One would need to set the prior bayes factor at around 100 in favor
of the null to stay unconvinced by all results, even after having observed the results from
the pilot study. Given that the pilot study constitute the only direct prior evidence, I find the
latter skeptical prior hard to defend.
Test-specific  learning:  It  could  be  that  the  targeted  suggestion  caused  improvements
specifically  on  the  test  material  but  nothing  else,  i.e.  a  non-generalizing  effect.  This
explanation  would  predict  smaller-  or  no  improvements  on  tests  which  we  did  not
administer. Therefore it cannot be supported or falsified from the present dataset.
None  of  the  suggestions  in  the  targeted  condition  mentioned  the  specific  tests,  test
performance, or the test context. For the test-specific explanation to work, subjects would
have to be very goal-directed in using the suggestions to improve on the tests only, e.g. by
staying focused in the test situation or a particular test throughout each hypnosis session
and interpreting all suggestions as pertaining directly to that. But since patients initially set
specific goals for the everyday problems they wanted to improve and since the testing was
for research purposes only, I find this unlikely.
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Context-specific effect: Hypnosis and testing took place in the same building. For around
half of the patients, hypnosis and tests took place in the same room. It could be that the
effects of the hypnosis sessions were tied specifically to that building/room. We can discard
the room-explanation since every single patient in group B improved, so if around half of
them were tested in a different room, it must have generalized across rooms. Unfortunately,
we did not register which room patients were tested in to quantify such an effect. With
respect to the building, we know that at least some of the effect “leaked” out of the building
since patients and relatives observed a positive effect in everyday life.
Even if the full effect could be attributed to the room- or building-hypothesis, the results
still demonstrates that the targetedness of hypnotic suggestion improved performance on
the working memory-related tests.
Short-term memory: One could also posit that the effect can be attributed to something
lower in the cognitive hierarchy than working memory, e.g. simply the slave systems of
Baddeley’s  working  memory  model.  Such  a  claim  would  be  at  odds  with  the  way
processing is isolated in the Trail Making B - A index and the letter-number sequencing
task. Extensive manipulations of the sensory input have to take place to produce a correct
answer for these tasks.
Changed criterion: Hypnotically enhanced recall has been shown to do little more than to
decrease the response criterion of the subject  while the underlying ability is unchanged
(Dywan & Bowers, 1983; Klatzky, 1985). I.e. the subject recalls more details correctly but
also makes more mistakes. This cannot be the case in this experiment since the subjects
would not benefit from a changed criterion alone in neither of these outcome measures.
Trail Making is stopped and rewinded on mistakes (a time consuming event, thus yielding
poorer scores) and the full trial is scored as failed upon a single mistake in in the Working
Memory Index.
Reduced anxiety: Performance could have been improved simply because subjects are less
anxious after having heard reassuring statements in the targeted hypnosis sessions. In the
test  situation,  less  anxiety  could  be  said  to  increase  the  focus  on  the  task  at  hand by
reducing  the  attention  allocated  to  monitoring  one’s  own  emotional  state  or  intruding
thoughts about being inferior. According to this explanation, changes in anxiety and test
performance should covary.
We have data that indirectly inform us about the merits of the anxiety-explanation. We
administered  the  danish  version  of  the  European  Brain  Injury  Questionnaire  (EBIQ,
Teasdale et al., 1997) to patients and significant others at all four tests. EBIQ contains 62
items about somatization, cognition, motivation, emotion etc. and asks how much each was
experienced during the last few weeks. Possible answers are (1) not at all, (2) a little, and
(3) a lot. Anxiety should affect most of these items, perhaps except the somatization items.
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The results runs somewhat counter to the predictions of the anxiety-theory (see Figure 25).
There is no sign of group A showing superior anxiety reduction during phase A or group B
showing superior anxiety reduction in phase B (where the change is comparable to the
control group), either as rated by the patient himself/herself or by a significant other. In
fact, there was the opposite trend in the self-score during phase 1, indicating a dissociation
between subjective experience and objective performance.
Figure 25: Score on the “core” index of the European Brain Injury Questionnaire as rated
by the patient (left) and a significant other (right). Although there are improvements in the
two intervention groups overall, they do not follow the pattern from the objective scores.
While our main experiment was ongoing, I became aware of two anxiety-focused papers on
hypnosis and brain injury which resembled our experiment. Sullivan (1974) stratified 24
young subjects with acquired brain injury into three groups. The intervention consisted of 4
weekly hypnosis sessions of which the first three was simply hypnosis tests on a modified
version  of  the  Stanford  Hypnotic  Susceptibility  Scale  to  familiarize  the  subjects  with
hypnosis. The fourth and critical session consisted of a short passage with suggestion on
feeling relaxed and safe. The aim was to reduce “catastrophic anxiety”. An active control
group received 4 weekly sessions with a (non-hypnotic) systematic relaxation intervention.
There was a passive control group as well.
Improvements of SMD=0.45, 0.27 and 0.05 were observed in the treatment, active control,
and control groups respectively on a picture completion task35. Another outcome measure
showed no general  improvement in  the treatment group but a  differential  improvement
between high- and low-susceptible patients. Sullivan concluded that hypnosis could reduce
anxiety sequelae of brain injury, which in term improved behavior on tests.
35  Sullivan only published variances for change scores. Variances from Gray et al. (1992) were 
used for standardization. The brain injured sample from Gray et al. had a similar age and was 
tested in the same time period.
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An older experiment by Fromm et al. (1964) made an almost inverse experiment. Fromm
hypnotized 9 healthy subjects to think that they had sustained a brain injury. Blinded testers
rated subjects as more brain injured under this condition than three other control conditions,
although the ratings was not as strong as would be expected for patients with actual brain
damage. Fromm also concluded that the hypnosis induced “catastrophic anxiety” and that
this constitutes a part of the behavioral deficits observed in brain injury patients.
Neither  Fromm (1964)  nor  Sullivan  (1974)  actually  assessed  the  anxiety level  of  their
subjects and therefore their conclusions about catastrophic anxiety as mediating factor does
not  follow directly  from the  data.  What  they  do  demonstrate  is  that  suggestion  about
catastrophic anxiety increased or decreased performance on neuropsychological outcome
measures. This, in turn, is of course indicative that anxiety might be a mediating factor in
this  experiment.  If  Sullivan  and  Fromm  are  right  in  this  assumption,  then  we  have
established that a reduction in anxiety can increase cognitive performance in situations like
our  experiment.  But  we  saw  an  indication  of  a  superior  anxiety  reduction  in  the
mindfulness-suggestion  condition  compared  to  the  targeted  suggestion  condition.  It  is
possible  that  different  mechanisms  are  at  play:  that  mindfulness-suggestion  primarily
increased  performance  via  anxiety  reduction  whereas  targeted  suggestion  primarily
increased performance through one of the other mechanisms mentioned in this section.
Although  our  results  seem  to  indicate  that  anxiety-reduction  cannot  account  for  the
observed effect of targeted suggestion, it is certainly not ruled out. If anxiety indeed was the
underlying cause, this explanation would still predict that the effect should generalize.
As a side note, Wagstaff et al. (2001) did an experiment similar to that by Fromm et al.
Wagstaff et al. tested 60 students in a study on amnesia test malingering. Here, hypnotically
induced “brain injury” yielded behaviors which resembled malingering more than organic
brain injury. Wagstaff concluded that hypnotically induced “brain injury” was not a realistic
model of real organic brain injury. Similarly, Fromm et al.’s “brain injury models” did not
show as  gross  deficits  as  would  be  expected  from organic  brain  injury. It  seems  that
hypnotically induced brain injury models are not realistic and therefore cannot be used to
study the psychological mechanisms of suffering a brain injury.
Role-playing or  expectancy:  So-called  “non-state”  theories  of  hypnosis  posit  that  the
mechanisms that bring about hypnotic behavior are mundane and that hypnotic behavior in
this sense is no different than responses to other kinds of suggestion. These theories include
that  the  patients  were  role-playing  to  be  healthy, role-played  to  be  good experimental
subjects,  and  that  they  did  well  on  the  tests  because  they  expected  to  do  well.  These
theories are meant as a challenge to the view that hypnosis involves special processes. That
discussion does not have much relevance for the interpretation of our results. In either case,
the patient  actually  succeeded in improving their  performance which had hitherto been
impaired.
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Improved working memory: It could be that working memory per se improved. Working
memory is often thought to be a multi-component system (c.f. Baddeley, 2007; and Cowan,
1988), so this explanation is mute with respect to the exact distribution of improvement
across components as long as no single component is hypothesized to be worse than what
would be compatible with the observed data. In the present case, there was improvement
both on auditory span + processing (WAIS) and visual task switching, so it must at least
involve the central executive since there is processing in both of these tasks which cannot
be carried out by the slave systems / short term memory.
That working memory improved per se is not contradicted by design or data. It is however
at odds with prior knowledge. I am not aware of any 4-to-8 hour intervention that resulted
in long-term working memory improvement. This is why I have made an effort to consider
all alternatives in this epilogue and why I embedded some prior skepticism in the prior on
the covariates of the statistical model. I used a Normal(mean=0, sd=0.5) prior which puts
around 95% probability on an SMD between -1 and 1. It caused the SMD to shrink around
SMD=0.2 towards zero for both group A and B relative to a maximum-likelihood estimate
(see table 12 for a comparison of ML-effect sizes and bayesian effect sizes).
Improvement of other high-level functions:  It could be that other high-level cognitive
functions improved but that working memory did not. There is a great overlap between the
so-called  “higher  cognitive  functions”  among  which  working  memory  belongs.  For
example, it has been speculated that fluid intelligence is entirely a property of the central
executive component in working memory (Engle et al., 1999. See discussion in Conway et
al., 2002). The central executive is also said to govern attention (Baddeley, 2007; Cowan,
2005)  and  to  play a central  role  in  resolution of  cognitive conflicts  (Botvinick,  2001).
Executive functions is a rather vague term referring to e.g. planning, problem solving, task
switching  and  other  factors  in  mental  flexibility.  Such  abilities  covary  with  working
memory functions so it is tempting to say, that working memory plays a role here as well
(see also Conway, 2002; Conway, 2003; Alloway, 2010; Kane, 2004, for similar arguments
that working memory is intertwined with most high-level cognition).
Careful experiments can isolate these constructs through multiple contrasts. But any given
test will share variance from many of these constructs, thus not allowing certainty about
which constructs contributed how much to the behavioral improvements. Here we have to
use reverse inference: (1) if we have prior knowledge that a given outcome measure shares
more  variance  with  working  memory  than  other  constructs  and  (2)  we  observed  an
improvement on the outcome measure, then it follows that (3) working memory has the
highest posterior probability of having improved although other underlying causes are still
probable.
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As a reminder, I use this “cognitive language” as a reference to relationships between how
subjects perform on a range of tasks which share more or less variance with other tasks. For
high-level  cognition,  there  is  a  great  overlap  between  the  categories,  i.e.  the  transfer
domains, making it different to make an empirical distinction between them.
 3.3.2  Suggestibility and clinical effects
It is a common finding in the hypnosis literature that the degree of response to suggestion
covaries with suggestibility as measured by various scales. We used the “golden standard”
Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale form C (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962), but did
not observe any relationship between suggestibility and improvement (see figure  26). As
mentioned in the hypnosis paper, this leaves us with two possibilities. Either the treatment
suggestions are so easy that SHSS:C does not discriminate between them. 
Alternatively, the effect was not driven by the same mechanism as that of the basic sciences
literature.  In  contrast  to  the  cognitive  neuroscience  literature,  suggestibility  is  rarely
assessed in the clinical literature. For example, without assessing suggestibility, successful
results  were  obtained  by  using hypnosis  to  reduce  discomfort  in  patients  with  irritable
bowel syndrome (Moser et al., 2013), reduce side effects following breast cancer surgery
(Montgomery et al., 2007), or reduce stress during conscious sedation (Faymonville et al.,
1997). The relatively large effect sizes in these studies imply that effects are not driven by a
subgroup  of  patients.  While  most  clinical  studies  who  assess  suggestibility  do  find  a
ranking of treatment effect  with low-to-high suggestible patients, some do not (see e.g.
Montgomery et  al.,  2002; Askay et  al.,  2007).  It  seems that  being highly suggestible a
positive predictor for the effectiveness of the intervention but not a necessity.
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Figure  26. Changes in outcome measures (ΔTMT and ΔWMI) as a function of baseline
SHSS  score  for  phases  with  targeted  suggestions.  There  is  no  relation,  i.e.  patients’
improvements are not limited or facilitated by suggestibility.
 3.3.3  Implications for hypnosis theory
Our experiment was not designed based on any theories of hypnosis, so it did not directly
assess necessary variables to directly distinguish between predictions of different theories.
Still, it remains vaguely informative about at least some theories.
Suggestibility  and  executive  ability: The  finding  that  suggestibility  was  the  same  or
higher in patients  than in healthy subjects does lend support  to the view, that  hypnotic
behavior  is  not  bottlenecked  by  higher  cognitive  abilities  such  as  mental  flexibility,
intelligence,  central  executive  etc.  These  findings  are  contrary  to  the  predictions  of
Neodissociation Theory (Hilgard,  1974,  1977),  which  says that  executive  resources  are
used to maintain the dissociations - at least to the extent that the executive is loaded enough
for its capacity limit to play a role in the hypnotic behavior resulting from this upheld
dissociation.  The  findings  are  more  in  line  with  Dissociated  Control  theory  (Miller  &
Bowers,  1993;  Woody  & Bowers,  1994)  and  Cold  Control  Theory,  which  posits  that
hypnotic behavior and experiences are caused by a reduction in executive control36 which
36  The supervisory attentional system in Norman & Shallice’s information processing model, to be 
exact. It is not entirely clear from Miller & Bower’s theory how conflicts between competing 
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allows  suggestion  to  trigger  behavior  more  directly  without  the  usual  corrections  by  a
reality testing executive.
Hypnotic  meditation? Our  group  B  did  meditative  practices  during  the  hypnotic
procedure. To my knowledge, this concurrent hypnosis and meditation has never been done
before, although several studies have looked at relationships between hypnotic performance
and meditative performance in the same individuals (see e.g. Nuys, 1973). Such a condition
is  interesting  as  seen  from the  cold  control  theory  and  socio-cognitive  account  of  the
difference between hypnosis and meditation, which under these theories can be said to be
opposite  phenomena (Semmens-Wheeler  et  al.,  2012;  Dienes  et  al.,  in  press).  In  these
theories, hypnosis is associated with an inaccurate meta-awareness of one’s mental state
while meditation is associated with an increasingly accurate meta-awareness. In the words
of Semmens-Wheeler et al., (2012) hypnosis is “self-deception” while meditation is “self-
insight”. If self-deception and self-insight are on a continuum, i.e. mutually exclusive, these
theories  would  predict  that  a  hypnotic  state  and  a  meditative  state  cannot  co-exist.  If
attempting to do so, they would either cancel each other out or only one would dominate,
presumably after a rather conflicting battle of the two. In particular, since the active control
condition consisted of a hypnotic induction followed by meditative suggestion, there should
be a break or a disturbance of the hypnotic state at the time when the meditative suggestion
began. This was not observed. One could say that patients shifted back and forth between
hypnosis and meditation without showing so in overt behavior. We do not have data to
assess this directly. It would require an assessment of the mental states of the patients while
hypnotized/meditating and would be strengthened by having a condition with the same
suggestions but without a formal hypnotic induction. Such an experiment would be well
suited to test the merits of Cold Control theory in this instance, or at least it’s account of the
difference between hypnosis and meditation. For what it is worth, the hypnotist reported
that  there  was  no  difference  in  the  hypnotic  depth  between conditions  as  judged from
observations and patients’ own reports.
These considerations could be of theoretical importance, were the functioning of high-level
cognition the only difference between patients with acquired brain injury and a healthy
reference population. Naturally, this is not the case. All patients had traumatic experiences,
many received disability pension, and some had physical disabilities. In these respects, and
many more, they differ from the typical samples in hypnosis research.
activations are resolved. Maybe hypnotic suggestion are usually conflict-free so that the absence 
of conflict resolution does not cause problems.
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 3.3.4  Relevant hypnosis literature
There are at least 7 published single-case reports on hypnosis with brain injured patients.
They sought to improve motivation for other therapy, improve compliance to other therapy,
and improve impaired motor functions, e.g. in hemiplegia. These single-case studies were
not pre-planned experiments but rather post-hoc reporting of interesting clinical cases. With
a lack of pre-planned research questions and control groups, there are too many potential
biases and unknowns to interpret their findings here. For the interested, here is the list:
■ Manganiello et al. (1986), single case study.
■ Holroyd et al. (1989), single case.
■ Appel (1990), three cases.
■ Vodovnik (1979), single case.
■ Crasilneck & Hall (1970), three cases.
■ Chappell (1961), two cases.
■ Kirkner, Dorcus, and Seacat (1953), single case.
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 4  Discussion
We observed a large transfer effect in the hypnosis study contrary to the findings in the N-
back study. I conclude that targeted hypnotic suggestion caused a generalized improvement
of   “untrained”  behavior  whereas  computer-based  training  lead  to  very  narrow
improvements. I have argued that there was an effect of the hypnotic suggestions which
could be uniquely attributed to the  meaning of the targeted suggestions. In comparison,
there was no inherently meaningful content in the computerized training tasks. I suggest
that  the  gist  of  these  results,  and  the  results  on  the  broader  literature  of  cognitive
enhancement  and  rehabilitation,  may  be  summarized  using  three  metaphors  for  the
relationship between the intervention and the mind:
 4.1.1  Metaphors for cognitive improvement
In the midst  of many complex theories about  human cognition, it  can be useful  to use
intuition to arrive at a rough solution to a particular problem. I propose the following three
metaphors as intuition pumps37 on what kind effects to expect on high-level cognition from
different intervention strategies.
Mind as a muscle, treatment as exercise: Computer training and paper-and-pencil tasks
belong in this category. The idea is that by straining a cognitive function to the maximum of
its capabilities “bottom-up”, it will improve over time. The physical analogue is the muscle
which  is  strengthened  by  repetitive  exercise.  Given  the  lack  of  transfer  effects  in  the
computer-training and the miniscule effects of Attention Process Training (SMD around
37  A term coined by the philosopher Daniel Dennett. An intuition pump is a thought experiment 
designed to arrive at a correct solution using intuition rather than bullet-proof reasoning. 
Effective as they are, they also have the potential to be misleading. Dennett originally used the 
term in a negative way to counter several thought experiments as misleading but later found them
to be a useful way of conveying ideas, if used thoughtfully. 
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0.2) which were reviewed in the introduction, muscle-exercise interventions do not seem to
be effective for higher-level cognition. However, the metaphor does not fail universally. It
holds quite well for Constraint Induced Movement and Language Therapy, for example.
Mind  as  a  plant,  treatment  as  nourishment: Pharmaceuticals  and  physical  exercise
belong in this category. The idea is  that by providing the right nutrition, the mind will
regrow to its natural state. This is an analogue to nourishing a plant and letting it grow by
itself. Given the small effect from 7 pharmaceutical and exercise studies reviewed in the
introductory section (average SMD=0.18), the results are not encouraging for the plant-
nourishment interventions targeting higher cognition.
Mind as a computer, treatment as programming: Suggestion-based interventions, such
as hypnosis, meditation, and psychotherapy belong in this category. The idea is that the
suggestion is a small piece of programming code which is interpreted by the subject and
compiled  into  a  more  automated  form.  The  programming  metaphor  fits  well  with  the
current  evidence  since  we  saw  the  semantics  of  suggestion  be  realized  in  behavioral
changes. The non-targeted suggestion did as well, but was less efficient with respect to
working memory behavior. Lastly, I reviewed three studies on Mindfulness Based Stress
Reduction in the introduction, which yielded small effects relative to passive control groups
(SMD=0.2). Merely providing “code” to the subject is not sufficient. The “code” has to be
efficient and executed in the desired mental/physical context. Posthypnotic suggestion is
often  conditioned  on  a  specific  context,  e.g.  in  the  treatment  of  phobia.  For  example,
Azulay et al. (2013) achieved large reductions in fatigue using MBSR and I have mentioned
others who targeted anxiety using hypnotic suggestion (Sullivan et al., 1974; Fromm et al.,
1964; Faymonville et al., 1997).
Other  physical  analogies  could  possibly capture the same intuitions.  E.g.  the computer
metaphor could be equivalent to the mind as a top-down controlled organization. It is not
the analogue that is important but the intuitions it carries.
 4.1.2  Limitations
The limitations of the isolated conclusions for the three articles have been presented in their
respective epilogues. With respect to the more general discussion, it is important to bear in
mind that the N-back study and the hypnosis-study diverge on many parameters that does
not pertain directly to the content of the treatments. I have compiled a list of factors that
diverge between experiments but to which I argue that the difference in effects cannot be
attributed (subject factors, location, duration, and therapist contact, see Appendix A). One
factor, motivation, could confound the contrast between the studies to an unknown extent.
Most  subjects  in  the  hypnosis  study  were  highly  motivated  (see  Figure  23)  while
motivation probably was lower for the subjects in the computer-training study. While we
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did not assess this directly, the high dropout rate and the irregularity of training for subjects
in the computer-training study is most likely an indicator of lower motivation. 
Motivation is a confound for psychological theorizing but not for the evaluation of clinical
utility. If subjects find hypnosis motivating and computer-training unmotivating, then that is
a genuine property of the interventions as they are administered in real  life and should
therefore not be factored out as a nuisance parameter.
 4.1.3  Clinical implications: revisiting cost-
effectiveness
I introduced this thesis with a small review showing that current treatment approaches have
low clinical value as judged from their cost-effectiveness. We are now in a position to add
the N-back study, typical computer-based studies, and the hypnosis study to the table (see
Table  13).  Maximum-likelihood  estimates  of  effect  sizes  are  displayed  to  make  it
comparable to table 1. Effect sizes relative to the passive control group is included for the
same reason. 
In the N-back study, it took estimated average of around 60 minutes per patient to set up
their user, instruct them, monitor their training, follow-up on missing training, and help
with technical problems. Using the Hours Needed to Treat statistic, 31 hours of therapist
time is needed for one patient to show a more favourable outcome than would be expected
was he/she in the control group. In that time, however, 30 patients spent a total of 150 hours
training in vain. For this reason, the N-back task is not recommended to improve behaviors
in the domain of working memory. When applying the same analysis to a typical computer-
based study in the review, one out of 70 patients would benefit from a genuine transfer
effect. While that lucky patient would have trained for a median of 14.5 hours, the other 69
patients would collectively have trained 1000.5 hours in vain.
For the targeted hypnotic suggestions, it took an estimated 6.4 therapist to treat a subject
relative to a passive control group. That is, for each patient  that improves more than a
passive control group, the therapist and other patients have spent only 2.4 hours in vain.
The untargeted suggestion also seem feasible in this analysis with 12.8 Hours Needed to
Treat and 8.8 therapist/patient hours spent in vain for each successful patient.
These estimates should be compared to the between 319 and 930 therapist hours required
for Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction, Attention Process Training, and physical exercise.
I  conclude  that  hypnotic  suggestion  may  be  a  viable  new  strategy  for  cognitive
rehabilitation of patients with acquired brain injury in the chronic phase. Given the many
ways  in  which  this  finding  is  novel  and  in  some  respects  at  odds  with  established
knowledge, independent replication is needed. Whether hypnotic suggestion are effective in
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the post-acute phase, for other patient groups, or even for healthy subjects, could also be
fruitful topics for future studies.
Intervention Target BF > 3 Hour SMDc NNT HNT
N-back Workingmemory 0 of 5 1.0 0.11 31.1 31.1
Visual search Processingspeed 0 of 4 5.0 -0.11 % %
Targeted suggestions 
with active control
Working
memory 2 of 2 4.0 0.84 3.3 13.2
Targeted suggestions 
with passive control
Working
memory 2 of 2 4.0 1.72 1.6 6.4
Untargeted suggestions
with passive control
Working
memory 1 of 2 4.0 0.88 3.2 12.8
Naive effect of a typical
computerized study 1.2 of 4 % 0.30 10.6 %
Transfer effect of a 
typical computerized 
study
1.2 of 4 % 0.05 70.0 %
Table 13: Effect sizes, consistency of outcomes and economic feasibility of the interventions
from the  present  thesis.  BF: Bayes Factor. SMDc:  controlled effect  size.  NNT: Number
Needed to Treat. HNT: Hours needed to treat. See Table 1 for further details.
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 6.1  Appendix A: What did not cause 
differential transfer in the N-back and
hypnosis studies
Subject  factors differed  between  studies. Age,  gender,  and  chronicity  did  not  affect
outcomes of the hypnosis study, nor did any of these explain more variance than they added
to  the  model  in  the  review  dataset.  They  are  therefore  unlikely  to  explain  the  major
difference in outcome measures between the studies. For chronicity, however, the hypnosis
study required subjects to be at least 1 year post injury and therefore data is lacking for
effects of hypnosis in the post-acute phase.
Treatment location also differed between studies: Patients were hospitalized in the N-back
paper whereas they were community-dwelling in the hypnosis study. It could be that the
context  somehow  determined  the  outcome.  This  would  be  the  claim  that  had  the
155
participants in the hypnosis study instead been given computer-based training, they would
have improved equally and the reverse: that had the hypnosis been given in a hospital, it
would have been ineffective. This seems unlikely at face value. Furthermore, the review
found no differential effect of training location on cognitive improvement.
Treatment duration: Patients trained on average 5 hours on the computer task whereas
each phase of hypnosis treatment was approximately 4 hours of face-time, summing to 8
hours in total. Another aspect is intensity. Thus the duration of treatment cannot account for
the  difference.  The  computerized  training  was  more  regular  with  subjects  training  on
average 3.5 days per week whereas there was one hypnosis sessions per week. It might be
that one weekly 1-hour computer training session would be more optimal.
Therapist contact: the hypnosis was therapist-administered whereas experimenter contact
was kept to a minimum in the N-back study. Therapist contact does not explain differences
between hypnosis group A and B who had equal amount of therapist contact. It could be
that therapist contact explains some of the effect in hypnosis group B relative to the passive
controls  and  for  both  group  A and  B  in  phase  2,  where  there  was  no  active  control.
However,  the  review  found  no  effect  of  therapist  contact  so  this  is  unlikely  to  have
increased improvement on the transfer tasks in the N-back study. With respect to hypnosis,
the only direct comparison of hypnotist-administered suggestions versus other media was
conducted by Hammond et  al.  (1988)  who administered  suggestions using a hypnotist,
audiotape, and through self-hypnosis with 48 subjects. The results showed a clear ranking
so that subjective experience of the quality of hypnosis as well as objective performance
was greatest with a hypnotist, lower with the audiotape and lowest for self-hypnosis. Means
on scale 0-100 scale of subjective experience indicated that it  was comparable between
conditions (87, 79 and 70). No other actual effect sizes were reported. A meta-analysis on
hypnosis for surgical patients found no statistically noticeable (p < 5%) difference in the
effect of 14 studies with hypnotist-administered suggestions (SMD=1.5) and 8 studies with
audiotaped suggestions (SMD=0.55), although the absolute effect sizes seem to suggest a
trend in favor of the former. Johnson and Weise (1979) found that subjects performed worse
on an audiotaped hypnosis test compared to the same test administered by a hypnotist. The
latter finding is less relevant for the present purposes since the effect did not covary with
suggestibility. 
Taken together, a minor part of the effect in the hypnosis study may be conditioned on a
hypnotist being present, but the absence of a therapist is not thought to reduce effectiveness
of the computer-based training. I conclude that this is not a major explanatory factor and
that current evidence indicate that only minor decreases in effectiveness should be expected
if the targeted suggestions were delivered using audio or video.
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 6.2  Appendix B: Statistical models
All statistics were done in R. I write the models here in lme4::lmer syntax although the
random terms are specified differently across different packages. The following just serves
to give the most crucial information but is, of course, not the full analysis script. The full
analysis script is available upon request.
N-back paper
The N-back paper used a simple ANOVA-like mixed model, analyzed using lme4::lmer and
BayesFactor::lmBF: 
■ Time x group x treatment interaction, full and null: 
dependent ~ time * group * treatment + (1|subject)
dependent ~ time * group * treatment - time : group : treatment + (1|subject)
■ Within group interaction, full and null:
dependent ~ time * treatment + (1|subject)
dependent ~ time + treatment + (1|subject)
■ The training data was modeled using the following power function: 
power.f = deriv(~ k + a * x ^ b, namevec=c('k', 'a', 'b'), function.arg=c('x','k','a','b')).
■ Testing whether groups develop differently during training:
N ~ power.f(block_number, k, a, b) ~ (k|subject) + (a|treat) + (b|treat) + (a|group) + 
(b|group)
N ~ power.f(block_number, k, a, b) ~ (k|subject) + (a|treat) + (b|treat)
JAGS was initially used for the power model but mixing was very poor.
Meta-analysis
The  meta-analysis  used  the  following,  analyzed  using  metafor::rma.mv  and
MCMCglmm::MCMCglmm with known variances:
■ Naive model: 
SMDc ~ 1 + (1|contrast)
■ Testing e.g. whether SAME is different than SIMILAR:
SMDc ~ 1 + b.TaU + b.passive + b.similar + b.same + (1|contrast)
SMDc ~ 1 + b.TaU + b.passive + b.similar + (1|contrast)
■ Testing whether the transfer effect (intercept in the model above) was explained
by another covariate (full and null):
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SMDc ~ 1 + b.TaU + b.passive + b.similar + b.same + age + (1|contrast)
SMDc ~ 1 + b.TaU + b.passive + b.similar + b.same + (1|contrast)
Here the intercept correspond to “active + SAME” and the covariates are coded as:
■ similarity: b.dissimilar < b.similar < b.same
■ control: b.active < b.TaU < b.passive
… so e.g. all rows with b.same = 1 had b.similar = 1 and b.dissimilar = 1. That makes
SAME the difference between SIMILAR and SAME.
For MCMCglmm, I used 100.000 samples and no thinning. MCMCglmm was used because
mixing was very poor when implementing this model  in  JAGS with the product  space
method. The model was:
    # Indicator variable for product space method
    null.post ~ dbern(null.prior)
    keep[1] <- 1
    keep[2] <- null.post
    
    # Hierarchical offsets per paper
    sd.contrast ~ dunif(0, 2)  # variability between contrasts in SD
    for(i in 1:n.id) {mean.contrast[i] ~ dnorm(0, sd.contrast^-2)}  # centered at zero
    
    # Regression parameters
    for(i in 1:5) {
      b[i] ~ dnorm(0, sd.prior^-2)
      b.keep[i] <- b[i] * keep[H[i]]  # product space indicator
    }
    
    # Fix to data
    for(i in 1:length(y.obs)) {
      # underlying effect = covariates + random
      y[i] <- inprod(b.keep, X[i, ])  + mean.contrast[id[i]]        
     # observed effect was generated by the observed SD and y
     y.obs[i] ~ dnorm(y[i], sd.obs[i]^-2)
    }
Hypnosis paper
There  was  only  one  model  and  reduced  versions  of  it.  Modeled  using  lme4::lmer,
BayesFactor::lmBF, and jags::jags:
■ Testing the targeted effect in phase 1 for TMT, full and null:
TMT ~ 1 + C1 + Cb + C2 + BC1 + BCb + BC2 + ABC1 + ABCb + AC2 + (1|
subject)
TMT ~ 1 + C1 + Cb + C2 + BC1 + BCb + BC2 + ABCb + AC2 + (1|subject)
■ Testing suggestibility on group B phase 2, full and null:
TMT ~ 1 + C1 + Cb + C2 + BC1 + BCb + BC2*SHSS + ABC1 + ABCb + AC2 + 
(1|subject)
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TMT ~ 1 + C1 + Cb + C2 + BC1 + BCb + BC2 + ABC1 + ABCb + AC2 + (1|
subject)
The effect was simultaneosly
■ Cumulative over groups (control, group B, group A): C < B < A
■ Cumulative over time (1st, break, 2nd): 1 < b < 2
Testing BC1 is testing that  for phase 1,  group B and the control  experienced the same
effect. Testing ABCb is testing that for the break, group A and B experienced the same
effect.
JAGS model:
  # Priors on baseline population and subject
  # population mean for each group
  for(i in 1:n.group) {mean.pop[i] ~ dnorm(mean.pop.prior, sd.pop.prior^-2)}
  sd.pop ~ dunif(0, 100)  # flat prior on population SD.
  # subject-specific intercepts from group means and common SD
  for(i in 1:n.id) {subject[i] ~ dnorm(mean.pop[id.group[i]], sd.pop^-2)}  
  # Model index for product space bayes factor estimation
  null.post ~ dbern(null.prior)
  keep[1] <- null.post  # test covariate
  keep[2] <- 1  # keep covariate
  # Priors on covariates and error
  sd.resid ~ dunif(0, 100)  # flat prior on residuals
  for(i in 1:n.b) {
    b.d[i] ~ dnorm(0, prior.scale.cov^-2)  # prior on regression parameters in stand. 
units
    b.abs[i] <- b.d[i] * sd.pop  # in absolute units
    b[i] <- b.abs[i] * keep[effect.index[i]]  # add model selection. b is used in 
regression
    b.abs.pred[i] ~ dnorm(b.abs[i], sd.resid^-2)  # posterior predictive for effects
    b.d.pred[i] <- b.abs.pred[i] / sd.pop
  }
  
  # Model and fix to observations
  for(i in 1:length(y.obs)) {
    y[i] <- subject[id[i]] + inprod(b, x[i,])  #model-based y.
    y.obs[i] ~ dnorm(y[i], sd.resid^-2)  # observe with uncertainty (error)
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This thesis is an empirical investigation into two cost-effective treatment 
options for patients with acquired brain injury. Based on an experiment and 
a review, I argue that in general computer-based cognitive rehabilitation, as 
it is currently practiced, has virtually no effect on untrained tasks. That is, 
training does not cause cognitive transfer and thus does not constitute “brain 
training” or “brain exercise” of any clinical relevance. 
A larger study found more promising results for a suggestion-based treatment 
in a hypnotic procedure. Patients improved to above population average in a 
matter of 4-8 hours, making this by far the most effective treatment compared 
to computer-based training, physical exercise, phamaceuticals, meditation, 
and attention process training.
The contrast between computer-based methods and the hypnotic suggestion 
treatment may be reflect a more general discrepancy between bottom-up and 
top-down processes although such a claim woukd require more empirical 
substantiation.
